

# THE JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES

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J. G. WEISS

THE KAVVANOTH OF PRAYER IN EARLY HASIDISM

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## The Extent of Jewish Polygamy in Talmudic Times

MODERN research in this field has a history of over a century. The rich and varied researches carried out on marriage and family life amongst the Jews in post-biblical times<sup>1</sup> could not circumambulate the problem. Hence arises a diversity of opinions, reaching from an extreme apologetic attitude which denies polygamy altogether,<sup>2</sup> to the radical acceptance of the Church Fathers' accusation, attributing even to some Rabbis "polygamous perversity".<sup>3</sup> The majority of scholars, however, were and are of the opinion that the extent of polygamy among Jews in talmudic times was very limited.<sup>4</sup> The present paper is not intended to refute this opinion. We are nevertheless justified in re-opening this discussion, since the sources present us with a problem which has not been sufficiently explained by former research.

The crucial point around which the problem of polygamy revolves is the contradictory evidence given in the talmudic sources. As we shall see later, when we examine these sources, while it seems that polygamy was seldom mentioned as being practised, and when so mentioned, cited as an exceptional case only, nevertheless *de jure*, i.e. in legislation, it appears to be the dominant situation as postulated. It is obvious that this contradiction was a conscious one, and by revealing the underlying idea we may shed some light on the whole problem of the extent of polygamy.

The possibility that "talmudic Judaism clung to this unrealistic legal theory in conscious opposition to Græco-Roman monogamy to maintain the ancestral heritage against the influx of foreign ideas and institutions",<sup>5</sup> is not a satisfactory explanation. The sources indicate that there was hardly any difference in this respect between the Jewish communities in different countries. It would be difficult to explain the

<sup>1</sup> For the literature of the 19th century cf. LEOPOLD LÖW: "Eherichtliche Studien", *Gesammelte Schriften* (Szegedin, 1893) Vol. III p. 14 no. 1. For recent literature cf. S. W. BARON: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, 1952), II p. 409 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Z. FRANKEL: "Grundlinien des mosaisch—talmudischen Eherechts" *Jahresbericht des jüdisch—theologischen Seminars* (Breslau 1860), pp. X, XI.

<sup>3</sup> Löw: *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. BARON: *op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

testimonies of Josephus<sup>6</sup> and Justin Martyr<sup>7</sup> in such a way as to support any rabbinic polemical attitude towards monogamy. Although Greeks and Romans speak of Jews of "all lands" practising polygamy, their testimony is valid for the Græco-Roman world only, and refers to a time when the main centre of Judaism in Babylonia was beyond their ken.<sup>8</sup> Since Babylonian Jewry was not challenged to cling to "unrealistic legal theory" we should expect it to be changed; and if they really had practised polygamy more than Jews in the Roman Empire did, considerable clues would have remained in our sources. The whole theory that Roman legislation was a deterrent to polygamy has no foundation.<sup>9</sup> Uncle-niece marriages, considered incest according to Roman Law, were nevertheless encouraged by the Rabbis.<sup>10</sup> A short re-examination of the talmudic sources is essential to reaching the solution of this problem.

Tannaitic sources dealing academically with marital legislation presuppose a polygamic state of affairs.<sup>11</sup> This does not, however, prove that this picture reflects a historical reality. In many instances we find whole chapters of the *Mishnah* covering purely academic legislation,<sup>12</sup> on subjects which have been labelled by tannaitic sources as legal fictions.<sup>13</sup> In the case of polygamous legislation, however, there is no such hint, and both the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds deal with these sources<sup>14</sup> in the same way but without indicating their practical value. On the other hand, to accept these sources at their face value as historical facts would not be any better than to attribute the practice of concubinage to the same period, since this problem is also dealt with in both Talmuds.<sup>15</sup> With regard to the latter problem, we are on safer ground in assuming that it is of academic interest only, since the whole manner of the discussion and the divergence of opinions as well as the different traditions in

<sup>6</sup> *Ant.*, XVII 1, 2, 14; *Bellum*, I 24, 2. 477. Josephus' private life may, however, be the reason for his clinging to the "ancient custom of having many wives at the same time".

<sup>7</sup> *Dialogue*, 134, 1; 141, 4 (Migne, *PG* VI 785, 800). Here the polemical background is instrumental.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Z. FRANKEL: *op. cit.*, p. XI note 2.

<sup>9</sup> This is admitted also by BARON, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. n. 152.

<sup>11</sup> *Yeb.* ch. I, and also in the following chapters on the subject of "*Šaroth*"; *Keth.*, ch. X; *Qid.* II 6, *ibid.* III 9 etc.

<sup>12</sup> *San.* ch. VIII; *ibid.*, XI (T.B. 111b ff.); *Neg.* ch. XII-XIII.

<sup>13</sup> *Tos. San.* XIV 1 (ed. ZUCKERMANDEL, p. 436); *Tos. Neg.* VI 1 (*ibid.* p. 625); T. B. *San.* 71a.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. n. 11.

<sup>15</sup> *J. Keth.* V. 2, 29d; B. *San.* 21a.



both Talmuds indicate its unreality.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the *Midrash*<sup>17</sup> describes a King, who was supposed to uphold the practice of concubinage<sup>18</sup>, visiting his concubine furtively, as if it were a shameful and illegal act.

Concerning polygamy there are similar objections voiced in the *Midrash*. This moral preaching goes back to the Bible, where many verses strongly advocate monogamy.<sup>19</sup> The 'Aggada praises Job for his monogamous life, which is considered to follow Adam's example in accordance with the will of God.<sup>20</sup> Elkanah's praise is challenged in the *Midrash*,<sup>21</sup> because the clause "And he had two wives"<sup>22</sup> is interpreted in a derogatory way; and the barrenness of Hannah is proffered as an explanation of his second marriage. In Lamech's case, where both wives had children, his double marriage was explained as the prototype of the carnal degeneration of the generation of the flood.<sup>23</sup> The Targum to Ruth (which is based on the *Midrash*) says explicitly: "I cannot redeem it for myself, for I have a wife: *I am not permitted to marry another*. Redeem thou to thyself, for thou hast no wife".<sup>24</sup> Many positive allusions, such as "he who loves his wife as himself and honours her more than himself",<sup>25</sup> "he who divorces his first wife,"<sup>26</sup> and all the expressions involving the word "*Ziwwugh*" (pairing, i.e. marriage)<sup>27</sup> make sense only if monogamous marriage is taken for granted. Attached to the ancient legend about the vineyard-dances where match-making took place<sup>28</sup> there is an additional

<sup>16</sup> This is also the reason for the differences in opinion among the *Poseqim*. cf. Maimonides (and Rabad), 'Ishshuth I 5; *Melakhim* IV 4. *Shulhan 'Arukh*, 'Ebhen Ha-'ezer XXVI 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Gen. Rab.* LII 5; *Lev. Rab.* I 13; *Yalqut Shim. (Job)* 497; etc.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Maimonides *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> *Mal.* ii: 15-16; *Isa.* viii: 3; *Liv.* 6; *Ezek.* xxiv: 18; *Hos.* ii: 18; *Ezr.* xiv: 16-18, etc. cf. L. M. EPSTEIN, *Marriage Laws in the Bible and in the Talmud*, (1942) pp. 3, 34.

<sup>20</sup> 'Abhoth de-Rab. Nathan 2nd version, ch. 2 (ed. Schechter p. 9).

<sup>21</sup> *Pesiq. Rab.* 43 (ed. FRIEDMANN p. 181b). A slightly different version, but with the same sense, *II Yalq. Shim. (Sam.)* 77.

<sup>22</sup> 1 *Sam.* i: 2.

<sup>23</sup> It is presumed that if the chosen one—Lamech—behaved so, so much the more will the common people have done so. One wife was meant for procreation while the other for pleasure only. Since both wives are recorded in the Bible as having children there are opposite views as to which wife was for which purpose: *Gen. Rab.* XXIII 2; *T. Jer. Yeb.* VI 5, 7c.

<sup>24</sup> Targum *Ruth* iv: 6, based on *Ruth Rab.* VI 7; *II Yalq. Shim. (Ruth)* 606; *Num. Mal.* XV 12. Cf. A. N. Z. ROTH, *History of Monogamy etc.* (Hebrew) *Jewish Studies in Memory of Michael Gutmann* (Budapest, 1946) Hebrew part, p. 116.

<sup>25</sup> *Yeb.* 63a.

<sup>26</sup> *Git.* 90b and the verse in *Mal.* ii: 14.

<sup>27</sup> *Sot.* 2a; *Git.* 90b; *San.* 22a; *Gen. Rab.* LXVIII 4 and parallels.

<sup>28</sup> *Ta'an*, IV 10.



*Baraitha*, which runs: "he who has no wife goes there".<sup>29</sup> In cases of marriage to another woman the *Midrash* assumes the previous divorce of the former wife as, e.g., in the parable of the Ethiopian slave-girl and her mistress.<sup>30</sup>

These aggadic sources, while reflecting a moral *desideratum*, nevertheless fall short of constituting an historical proof testifying to a situation in which an obligation to refrain from polygamy actually implies monogamous reality. These sources are a mere continuation of the ancient moralists' dicta such as "talk not much with a woman".<sup>31</sup> Such implicit exhortations to chastity could hardly be considered incompatible with a legal system in which polygamy remains unrestricted. It may nevertheless be safely assumed that the Rabbis strongly advocated monogamy on moral grounds, and that monogamy was in fact the ruling practice in every-day life. Hence the existing discrepancy between moral teaching and legal freedom from restriction cannot be accidental. We must attempt a solution of the problem as to whether we are confronted with an innovation, due to outside influence, or with an independent development of the *Halakhah*, by a careful examination of the sources dealing with facts and legal decisions.

Polygamous marriages are mentioned in the Talmud from early tannaitic times down to the amoraic period. The paucity of these stories, the contexts in which they are mentioned, and the details of most of them make them invalid as the basis of generalisations. It is rather the other way round, they reflect the exceptions to the prevailing rule. Towards the end of the first century we come across the story of one of Agrippa II's governors who was simultaneously married to two wives, one in Tiberias and the other in Sepphoris.<sup>32</sup> Ritual questions put to R. Eliezer by this man prove his religious adherence, which may suggest that his polygamous status was not objectionable to the Rabbis. Such a conclusion is nevertheless unacceptable if we take into consideration that royal families and the circles of the ruling class did practise polygamy during the Herodian

<sup>29</sup> B. *Ta'an.* 31a.

<sup>30</sup> *Cant.* R. I 6 § 3 and parallels.

<sup>31</sup> *'Abhoth*, I 5. Both the interpretation of this adage and its dating are irrelevant for our purpose. (cf. ed. R. T. HERFORD, New York, 1925, p. 25). We may safely accept the Talmud's interpretation (*'Erub.* 53b; *Ned.* 20a), which understands it to mean *avoid adultery*.

<sup>32</sup> *Suk.* 27a. If this man is to be identified with Joseph b. Simai (B. *Shab.* 121a; J. *ibid.*, XVI 7, 15d, *Tos. ibid.* XIII 9) he is also said to act more strictly in the laws of Sabbath than rabbinic prescription demanded.

period; this example may be one of those cases tolerated by the Rabbis due to this tradition, but far from meeting with their approval.<sup>33</sup> One should not ignore the possibility that this governor set up separate homes in these two cities for political reasons.<sup>34</sup> From a testimony of R. Joshua<sup>35</sup> we learn that among the High Priests in Jerusalem there were some who had "rival wives" (*Šaroth*) simultaneously. But a closer examination of these cases reveals that they are problems of levirate marriage (or *Hališah*). This proves that these priests were childless all their lives and therefore their polygamous life may be attributed to their desire for children. The same applies to the story of 'Abba the brother of Rabban Gamaliel who took a second wife because the first one (the daughter of R. Gamaliel) was barren.<sup>36</sup> R. Tarfon is said to have been betrothed to three hundred women<sup>37</sup> for the purpose of enabling them to eat tithes in years of famine as wives of a priest. In a parallel source<sup>38</sup> it is explicitly stated that these betrothals were purely nominal.

No one would take seriously as an example from everyday life the story of a man who became betrothed to five women by presenting them with a basket of figs.<sup>39</sup> Here we have an impulsive and irresponsible act which must nevertheless be discussed in legal fashion. There is a legend about Rabbi commanding a levir to marry the widows of his twelve deceased brothers.<sup>40</sup> Even if we assume that this legend has a historical basis there is no evidence that, were it not for the need of fulfilment of the levir's duties, such a demand would ever be made. On the contrary, Rabbi Judah the Prince advised his son not to marry a second wife on moral grounds, even in a case where the first wife was barren.<sup>41</sup>

From all these examples of polygamous marriages in the tannaitic period there is no evidence for any widespread practice; most of the

<sup>33</sup> It is not impossible that in this generation there existed already a controversy among the *Tanna'im* on this subject. While R. Eliezer (most probably b. Horqenos) did not comment on his double family life in two distinct localities, others could object to it (cf. B. *Yom.* 18b; *Yeb.* 37b). This *Baraita* may originate from R. Eliezer b. Jacob I.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. GRAETZ: *Agrippa II etc.*, *MGWJ* XXX (1881), pp. 482-4.

<sup>35</sup> *Tos. Yeb.* I 10; B. *ibid.*, 15b; J. *ibid.*, I 6, 3a. The discussion about similar cases is purely academic.

<sup>36</sup> B. *Yeb.* 15a.

<sup>37</sup> *Tos. Ket.* V 1.

<sup>38</sup> J. *Yeb.* IV 12, 6b.

<sup>39</sup> *Qid.* II 7.

<sup>40</sup> J. *Yeb.* IV 12, 6b.

<sup>41</sup> *Ket.* 62b. cf. A. N. Z. ROTH, *op. cit.* p. 118. This problem will merit a more elaborate treatment later on.



facts are exceptional cases, where additional wives were taken for the fulfilment of the law of levirate marriage, or to fulfil the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply".

As in all matters of *Halakhah*, the amoraic development does not show any significant deviation from the monogamous trend laid down by the *Tanna'im*. The only tannaitic legislation which takes monogamy for granted<sup>42</sup> is treated in both Talmuds in a similar manner.<sup>43</sup> There is no ground for the theory that there was a strikingly different attitude towards polygamy in Palestine and Babylonia.<sup>44</sup> The mere fact that the Talmud<sup>45</sup> makes a distinction between R. 'Ammi, who holds that "whoever marries a second wife must divorce his first one and pay her *Kethubbah*", and Rabha, who says "a man is free to marry as many wives (simultaneously) as he is able to maintain", does not prove that they represent the opinions of Palestine and Babylonia respectively. R. 'Ammi, while he was head of the Academy in Tiberias, exercised a great influence in Babylonia as well<sup>46</sup> and his numerous utterances are found in identical form in both the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds. Were it the case that we are confronted here with a saying of R. 'Ammi which denotes an exclusive Palestinian tradition, we would expect some parallels in the Palestinian Talmud as well. However, not only does this saying have no Palestinian counterpart but the whole subject of monogamy is not mentioned therein.

Nevertheless we cannot so easily write off this source. R. 'Ammi's dictum cannot be understood divorced from its context. On the subject of sterility the Talmud quotes three decisions of R. 'Ammi, of which the above-mentioned is the middle one. For the moment we should disregard the *Sugya* in its present literary form, in which the editors interpolated later elements and *Sebhara*. Taking R. 'Ammi's words at their face value only, there cannot be any doubt that their relationship does not depend solely on the common subject but they are obviously a unified form of the same thought. In the first instance<sup>47</sup> R. 'Ammi rules that in cases of sterility after ten years of marriage,

<sup>42</sup> *Yeb.* II 10. This evidence was first mentioned by Ž. FRANKEL. (*op. cit.*, xi note 1), and has been quoted since without acknowledgement. Cf. e.g. D. W. AMRAM, *The Jewish Law of Divorce* (London 1897), p. 76, n. 3; p. 108, etc.

<sup>43</sup> *J. ibid.*, 4b; *B. ibid.*, 26b. The Babylonian Talmud adds the case of divorce because of the *Baraita* which has to be reconciled with the Mishnah, but this does not in any way prove that there is a difference between the Talmuds.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. S. W. BARON, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

<sup>45</sup> *B. Yeb.* 65a.

<sup>46</sup> *Git.* 44a. R. Nahman sent him his questions, *ibid.*, 63b.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. n. 45.



when the husband claims that the wife is barren and she counters with an accusation against him of impotence, the woman is to be trusted. The husband, however, may claim that he can prove his virility by marrying another woman while keeping his first wife (because he refuses to pay her *Kethubbah*). In this second case R. 'Ammi rules<sup>48</sup>: "I decide that in this case also he should divorce his wife and pay the *Kethubbah*, for it is my opinion that whoever marries a second wife etc." The third regulation of R. 'Ammi deals with the case in which the husband claims that his wife had a miscarriage (so as to avoid divorce on grounds of childlessness), but she denies it; "in this case also she is to be trusted".<sup>49</sup> The expression "in this case also" denotes that there is a common subject of all three rulings, which cannot be anything else than the right of the wife to remarry. This would suggest that R. 'Ammi's preference for monogamy is not the motive for his command to divorce the wife in case of a second marriage.

For a better understanding of R. 'Ammi's motives a more elaborate treatment is needed. There is a story about a couple who came before R. 'Ammi in a case of divorce on grounds of childlessness. When the wife demanded her *Kethubbah* she was refused it, on the grounds that as a woman she is not commanded to "be fruitful and multiply"<sup>50</sup> (and therefore the husband cannot be forced to divorce her). Only after she pleads that she is worried lest, if her old age be childless, she will not have anyone to support her does R. 'Ammi concede: "In this case we certainly shall force a divorce". It must be noted, however, that R. 'Ammi does not speak about the *Kethubbah*.<sup>51</sup> The reason must be that R. 'Ammi follows the Palestinian version of the Talmud,<sup>52</sup> namely, that the *Halakhah* is according to anonymous opinion

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*: according to variant reading of R. Asher; "ro'eh 'ani" in sense of rendering a decision as e.g. *Rosh Hash.* II 8; *B Bath.* IX 1; *Shebh.* VI 3; *Pes.* 78a-b etc.

<sup>49</sup> *B. Yeb.* 65b.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Even the *Poseqim* (cf. 'Alfasi and *Tosafoth in loc.*), who take the final version of the Talmud for granted, have some doubts about the nature of this type of marriage settlement.

<sup>52</sup> *J. Yeb.* VI 6, 7a (= *J. Ta'an.* IV 9, 69c; *J. Meg.* I 6, 70c). This tradition reached the editors of the Bab. Talmud in a confused form. Only the part concerning Rabbi Judah the Prince's annulment of the fast of *Tish'ah Be-'abh* is quoted in a similar manner (*B. Meg.* 5b) but with the transmitters of the tradition inverted. Our problem appears in the Bab. Talmud under the names of R. Yohanan (most probably on account of his decision in the Synagogue of Caesarea) and Resh Laqish (cf. note 55).

(*setham Mishnah*) and so a woman is not obliged to fulfil the precept of "be fruitful and multiply" (for this reason she has no legal right to her *Kethubbah*). To this there is, however, an addition by Rabbi Judah the Prince; "if she asks for divorce because she wants to remarry, she has the right to do so" (but without collecting her *Kethubbah*). The Babylonian Talmud does not have this addition by Rabbi Judah the Prince, but instead a new concept was introduced; "When she comes with a claim" (about old age) which is interpreted in the affirmative sense, then she collects her *Kethubbah*. This development is due to the acceptance of the *Tosefta*, which adds "he has to divorce and pay the *Kethubbah*".<sup>53</sup> The Palestinian Talmud does not know of this *Tosefta*. R. 'Ammi (in the name of Resh Laqish) explains the reason for the ten years' compulsory waiting period before a divorce on grounds of childlessness by reference to the same biblical verse which is used in the *Tosefta*,<sup>54</sup> which would be impossible if it had been known as a tannaitic source. As a parallel to this tradition of R. 'Ammi in the name of Resh Laqish, we find explicitly: "He must divorce and marry another woman".<sup>55</sup> It cannot be accidental that none of these sayings of R. 'Ammi speak about the *Kethubbah*; this rather points to the real opinion of R. 'Ammi having been that in such cases there is no *Kethubbah*, following the dictum of Rabbi Judah the Prince.<sup>56</sup>

From this analysis we may achieve a clearer understanding of the quotations of R. 'Ammi in the Bab. Talmud.<sup>57</sup> All three refer to cases when the husband does not want to divorce his wife after ten years of childless marriage, claiming that she was not commanded to be fruitful and multiply. In the first and third cases "she is to be trusted", i.e. if she insists on her right to remarry (according to Rabbi Judah

<sup>53</sup> B. Yeb. 64a; *Tos. ibid.*, VIII 4 (ed. ZUCKERMANDEL p. 249). The concept of "when she comes with a claim" is an abstraction from the story (misinterpreted according to this *Tos.*) of R. 'Ammi, harmonized with the cases of R. Yoḥanan and R. Nahman (Yeb. 65b).

<sup>54</sup> J. Yeb. VI 6, 7c; cf. note 53.

<sup>55</sup> *Gen. Rab.* XLV, 4. The fact that Resh Laqish does not mention the *Kethubbah* makes it logical to attribute to him the opinion: "The *Halakhah* is not according to R. Joshua b. Baroqa". Cf. n. 52.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. n. 52. The reason that R. 'Ammi's sayings are not recorded in the Pal. Talmud is that they do not add anything significant to the dominating view expressed by Rabbi Judah the Prince.

<sup>57</sup> Yeb. 6ab. His words were, however, harmonised with other sources (cf. n. 53) to suit the literary need of the *Sughya*.

the Prince), her arguments are trusted more than his claims.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless she is not entitled to her *Kethubbah*.<sup>59</sup> In the second case "he must dismiss her and give her her *Kethubbah*." The innovation here is that he must give her her *Kethubbah*, for a simple divorce she could get even without his taking another wife, if she insists on remarrying. R. 'Ammi is not motivated by a regard for monogamy, but while agreeing in general with the right of remarriage (without the *Kethubbah*), in this particular case when a husband takes a second wife, he holds that he is compelled to repay her marriage settlement. This decision is also based on the same reasoning: only the man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply; all the time that the fulfilment of it depended on her, she had some hope, but when he takes a second wife her chances of children are nullified, since her husband may be "saved" by his other wife. From earlier times it is reasonable to believe that such a psychological background existed.<sup>60</sup>

To fortify the argument for universal practice of monogamy in both Palestine and Babylonia it is sufficient to quote one instance. Concerning the compulsion to divorce a wife after ten years of childless marriage,<sup>61</sup> there are many Babylonian 'Amora'im who discuss the matter but none of them raises any objections by trying to allow polygamy in this case. There is even the extreme opinion that while in other cases (e.g., blemishes developed in the husband after marriage) she may be allowed to stay with him if she so wishes, in this case she must be divorced.

<sup>58</sup> In the first case 'Alfasi (*ad loc.*) tries to explain away the difficulty by quoting a Gaon who holds that R. 'Ammi refers to the "first Mishnah" (*Ned.* XI 12, B. *ibid.*, 90a). Cf. also *Tos. ad loc.*, s.v. *Shebbeyno lebheyneh*. All the harmonising answers, however, do not explain why we need R. 'Ammi's decision if, even without this claim, she is entitled to her *Kethubbah*. It has to be borne in mind that the explanation of R. 'Ammi's words (*Ma'i ta'ama*, etc.) does not belong to him but occurs in a *Sebhara*.

<sup>59</sup> The discussion about receiving a *Kethubbah* from five successive husbands (*J. Yeb.* VI 6, 7c) cannot be explained as successive demands after ten years of childlessness in each case. If that were the case, she would be past the age of child-bearing. Here, then, are cases where the husbands divorced her of their own wish. Otherwise there is no sense in the question of demanding back the *Kethubbah* from the first husband, because she would be entitled to it in any case. (Cf. *Tos. on Git.* 46b s.v. 'omer lah).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. n. 41. There is a story about R. Simeon b. Yoḥai (*Cant. Rab.* on i: 4; I 31) and a childless couple who came before him to be divorced, but instead of divorcing them he reconciled them and they had children. There is some similarity also in the advice of Rabh Huna (*J. Ned.* XI 13, 42d); "They should make a feast etc." This last example is however doubtful, since the Pal. Talmud does not explain (as the Bab. Talmud does) "Heaven between me and you" as marital infidelity, but rather as an oath.

<sup>61</sup> B. *Keth.* 77ab.



It is impossible to presume that Rabha contradicts R. 'Ammi. While the Bab. Talmud opposes them to each other for the purpose of analysing the *Sughya*, it is almost certain that their original sayings were not meant in this sense, and that only for the final literary redaction were their respective sayings made into a controversy. Not only do we never find elsewhere in the Talmud a controversy between them, but Rabha always accepts the authority of R. 'Ammi.<sup>62</sup> Rabha's words "a man may marry as many wives simultaneously as he can afford to maintain" are merely his own way of repeating the ancient tradition about this legal freedom. In another connection he states<sup>63</sup>: "it is a merit to put away a bad woman". She may have had a great amount of money for her *Kethubbah*, the husband's inability to raise which makes her divorce impossible. Therefore Rabha adds: "the best way to get rid of her is to marry a rival (*Ṣarah*), who will be a thorn in her flesh". It may be that Rabha's own experiences prompted such expressions,<sup>64</sup> but there is no evidence that these opinions were practically applied. We do know that his private life was completely monogamous.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless it must be noted that Rabha's attitude towards the question of monogamy marks some deviation from the general current of talmudic thought. His dicta represent an unrestrictedly free approach, which could easily be interpreted as advocating unlimited polygamy.<sup>66</sup>

Turning now to a debated passage in the Bab. Talmud<sup>67</sup> concerning which much ink has been spilt,<sup>68</sup> one has to admit that the crucial problem has not yet been solved. Both Rabh and Rabh Nahman, whom the passage alleges to have advertised on their arrival in Ardashir or Shekhanneṣibh respectively "who will be (my wife) for a day", were considered the greatest sages of their generation. Even if it could be proved that polygamy was widely practised in Babylonia, it would still be hardly expected that outstanding sages would

<sup>62</sup> B. *Giṭ.* 63b; B. *Bath.* 10b. In the last instance we see clearly that he discounted his own opinion because R. 'Ammi was angry.

<sup>63</sup> B. *Yeb.* 63b. cf. *Tos. ad loc.*, s.v. *Ṣarathah beṣiddah*.

<sup>64</sup> B. *Ber.* 56a.

<sup>65</sup> B. *Yeb.* 34b; B. *Bath.* 12b.

<sup>66</sup> The only case of a polygamous marriage not explicitly motivated by levirate obligation or childlessness, appears before the Court of Rabha (*Ket.* 80a). The whole problem will be given further investigation.

<sup>67</sup> B. *Yom.* 18b; *Yeb.* 37b.

<sup>68</sup> All histories of the period deal with it. R. MARGALIOU in his monograph (*Man haweya leyoma*) (*Sinai* vol. XI (XXI) nos. 124/5 p. 176 ff.), discusses previous articles on the subject. A later article is that of S. KRAUSS (*Sinai* vol. XII (XXII) nos. 133/4 p. 299 ff.).

choose to resort to such a base and immoral form of it.<sup>69</sup> Despite the rich biographical data in the Babylonian Talmud we do not find even one allusion to any of the 'Amora'im having lived in polygamy<sup>70</sup>; it is therefore highly improbable that these anecdotes about Rabh and Rabh Nahman were meant literally. To brush aside such arguments—even if they derive from an apologetic motive—is not justified from a scholarly point of view.<sup>71</sup>

We have no justification for dismissing this source without an exhaustive study, since its historical significance can hardly be overestimated. The biographical data of the two sages serves to illuminate the obscurity of the problem.<sup>72</sup>

Rabh's piety and saintliness are widely attested in the Talmud,<sup>73</sup> and the legends which created a halo of miracles around his personality and even around his grave<sup>74</sup> attest a popular admiration accorded only to an immaculate *Hasidh*. The institution of marriage was moreover hallowed by him as a union sanctified by God, which should not be profaned by the slightest sign of dissolute behaviour. The dictum "even a superfluous conversation between a man and his wife will be remembered after death",<sup>75</sup> can leave no doubt about his rigorous sanctification of matrimony. Similarly, in legislation, Rabh was very strict about a chaste and proper form of marriage. Transgressors were flogged in his court for contracting marriages in a licentious form

<sup>69</sup> Even in Islam, where polygamy is legitimate and commonly practised, the counterpart of this type of temporary marriage, the *Mut'a*-marriage, is looked down upon as but a legal fiction to legalise prostitution. Cf. *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (ed. HARTSMA, WENSINK etc.), Vol. II, p. 774 ff.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. A. N. Z. ROTH, *op. cit.* p. 116; R. MARGALIOUTH, 'Olleloth (Short Talmudical Researches) (Jerusalem, 5707) § 5, 6.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. BARON, *op. cit.* pp. 226, 410 n. 11. While the solutions of both Rabbi MARGALIOUTH and the late Prof. KRAUSS (cf. n. 68) may be challenged, their method and approach is correct. MARGALIOUTH's suggestion, that this act was a preventive move in order to evade the Persian royal offer to be entertained by concubines, is far fetched. There is no historical proof that any such offer could be mandatory. KRAUSS' resolution is even weaker. If it be the case that these facts were mistakenly recorded, and dealt originally with tenancy (*Tos. B. Meş. VII 28*, ed. ZUCKERMANDEL p. 390) and not with marriage, the whole reliability of the talmudic tradition is jeopardised. Even BLOCH's hypothesis could be accepted if such radical methods are permissible.

<sup>72</sup> Allegations of the difference between preaching and practice (cf. e.g. *Mt. xxii: 3*), based on polemical motives, must be rejected. This subject is dealt with in my article on "Hypocrisy" (soon to appear). Cf. also my article on "Fasting" *JJS IX*, p. 25 ff.

<sup>73</sup> B. *Ta'an.* 21b. There is an interesting gaonic tradition about his "Ten matters of Piety" (*Sha'arey Teshubhah* § 178; *Yuhasin*, part II, s.v. Rabh, ed. FILIPOWSKY p. 180). Whether this is an authentic tradition, or rather a reconstruction of talmudic sources, is irrelevant for our problem.

<sup>74</sup> B. *Meg.* 5a; *Yeb.* 45a; *San.* 47a, etc.

<sup>75</sup> B. *Hag.* 5b.

or even for marrying without previous arrangements (*Shiddukh*).<sup>76</sup> Despite the custom, widely spread at this time, of betrothing wives by means of a messenger, Rabh was of the opinion that one is forbidden to marry a wife without seeing her first<sup>77</sup>—clearly intending to impose an ethical sanction on the marriage rites.

Rabh Nahman can also be safely described in the same manner as Rabh. While the Talmud does not mention him so frequently, there is quite a lot of evidence about his saintly character. "One of the pious of Babylonia"<sup>78</sup> is not meant as an honorary title but describes a man of unusual sanctity, altruism and honesty, particularly noted for his desire to go far beyond the letter of the law.<sup>79</sup> There is a story that R. Nahman once rebuked a *Tanna* in these words:—"It is unseemly to say 'since the death of Rabbi [Judah the Prince] the virtue of sin-fearing has perished', since I am still alive." His boasting about his being a "sin-fearer"<sup>80</sup> is not a sign of pride, but rather an insistence on a virtue greatly revered by him. From his praise by R. Isaac<sup>81</sup> we learn that he was gifted with all the virtues and qualifications a man can ever achieve. In another instance<sup>82</sup> he points to himself, for practical purposes, to indicate himself as an example to be followed. Rabh Nahman could not have done such things—even if we assume that he was not particularly modest—unless he were certain that his efforts to eliminate error were of an extra ordinarily high standard.

Looking at the family lives of these two sages, we find certain striking similarities. Rabh's wife was a peculiar woman who did her aggressive utmost to displease him in his diet.<sup>83</sup> We find many expressions of Rabh which indicate his resentment.<sup>84</sup> There must

<sup>76</sup> B. *Yeb.* 52a; *Qid.* 12b, The Pal. Talmud quotes this tradition in the name of Samuel (J. *Qid.* III 10, 64b) but in this respect the Bab. Talmud is the more reliable.

<sup>77</sup> B. *Qid.* 41a. It is very doubtful whether the sarcastic advice given to Rabh 'Assi (B. *Pes.* 113a), "don't marry two (wives), but if you do so, marry a third", was given by Rabh (cf. RABBINOVICZ, *Variae Lectiones, ad loc.* Some MSS read *naqaf* instead of the "nasabh" of the printed edd. which makes it very doubtful whether it deals with marriage at all).

<sup>78</sup> B. *Meg.* 28b.

<sup>79</sup> cf. L. JACOBS, *The Concept of Hasid etc.*, JJS VIII (1957), p. 149 ff.

<sup>80</sup> B. *Sof.* 49b (the end of the tractate).

<sup>81</sup> B. *Ta'an.* 5b.

<sup>82</sup> B. *San.* 5a.

<sup>83</sup> B. *Yeb.* 63a. According to the definition of *Beth Hillel* (end of *Git.*), even a lesser offence may serve as cause for divorce.

<sup>84</sup> When he saw in the house of his uncle, R. Hiyya, who was similarly unlucky, that he brought her presents (B. *Suk.* 46b; *Yeb.* 63a, cf. also *Ber.* 15a), he resisted. His fierce exclamation "Any evil but not a mean wife" (*Shab.* 11a) betrays the depth of his emotions.



have been some extraordinary circumstances which prevented him from putting her away. Rabh explained the verse "I will provoke them with a vile nation" (*goi nabhal: Deut. xxxii: 21*) as meaning a "bad wife who has a great *Kethubbah*".<sup>85</sup> To his son he gave the practical advice "when you marry, descend a step (in the social scale) for your wife".<sup>86</sup> It is not far fetched to assume that these words of Rabh reflect the unhappy experience of his own life. He had to bear the ill temper of his wife because of her fabulous dowry, which he would have to repay for her *Kethubbah*, and secondly because of her aristocratic descent, involving social connections which would make divorce out of the question.

Rabh Nahman's fate was not much better. Yalta, his wife, was so bad tempered that she could break many barrels of wine in her wrath, which was easily kindled even by minor insults. Despite all this her husband suffered silently and tried to please her by appeasement.<sup>87</sup> Being a learned woman she caused him quite a lot of embarrassment by her witty but also sharp tongue. She is mentioned in the Talmud as being proficient in halakhic matters, and there can hardly be any doubt that she often interfered in her husband's academic activities by being ambitious and proud.<sup>88</sup> His indignation is expressed against women in general when he says bitterly: "while a woman speaks she weaves". Taking into consideration the fact that this was said regarding Abigail and David (1 *Sam. xxv: 31*) it denotes falseness and disloyal wit. Another saying of his<sup>89</sup> completes the picture: "pride does not become a woman well". One feels beneath the general tone of these expressions the suppressed emotions of a hen-pecked husband. Rabh Nahman could not give more positive expression to his feelings, being as he was the son-in-law of the Exilarch.<sup>90</sup>

The tragic family life of these two saintly men is most probably the source of the anecdotes told about them. But are these sources to be taken literally? Not only do their personalities make the contraction of such temporary marriages impossible to credit in them, but the sources themselves indicate that their so-called advertisement for

<sup>85</sup> B. *Yeb.* 63b.

<sup>86</sup> J. *Qid.* VI 4, 65d.

<sup>87</sup> B. *Ber.* 51b.

<sup>88</sup> B. *Qid.* 70a-b.; *Hul.* 109b; *Nid.* 20b etc.

<sup>89</sup> B. *Meg.* 14b.

<sup>90</sup> B. *Hul.* 124a; *Qid.* 70a B. *Bath.* 65a. We find him often in the house of the Exilarch, *Erub.* 39b; *Suk.* 10b; B. *Meg.* 66a; *Ket.* 94b.

a temporary mate never resulted in a consummated marriage.<sup>91</sup> Both Ardashir and Shekhannešibh were within the limits of the Jewish settlement, and it is improbable that they were considered as suitable hiding-places where men of their standard might have their will *incognito*. While the great centres of learning were chiefly (at least in Rabh's times) on the Euphrates, these two localities on the Tigris were frequently visited by sages including Rabh and R. Nahman.<sup>92</sup> Ardashir was a town of learned Jews, who were even held up as an example in ritual questions.<sup>93</sup> In any case it was in the close vicinity of Mahoza which was, *circa* 250 C.E., a flourishing centre of learning because R. Yosi b. Hama lived there; and it probably had an educated community even in Rabh's times.<sup>94</sup> Shekhannešibh, on the other hand, where Rabh Nahman found refuge when Nehar-De'a was destroyed, was most probably his dwelling place for a time in his youth as he came there in the company of (his teacher) Rabbah b. 'Abbuha.<sup>95</sup>

As far as our information goes there was no basic difference in social and political conditions between the various provinces of Babylonia. Even presuming that temporary marriages originated in Parsee culture,<sup>96</sup> there is no reason why Ardashir and Shekhannešibh should have been the chosen places for it any more than the whole Sassanid kingdom. Besides, as we have already seen, the extremely polygamous environment had very little effect on Babylonian Jewry; it is therefore most unlikely that such a particularly reprehensible type of polygamy should find an echo among these saintly scholars.

Despite our inability to believe in the possibility of such a practice, nevertheless the reliability of the tradition attributing certain "proclamations" on this matter to Rabh and Rabh Nahman cannot be

<sup>91</sup> In *Yoma* 18b the story comes after a passage in which Rabh advises on the behaviour of a lodger by which he may avoid discrediting himself: this is not reconcilable with the story. In *Yeb.* 37b the passage ends with a tannaitic dictum "it is prohibited to marry with the intention of divorce". The whole discussion—while interpolating later authorities—indicates that, even for the editors of the Talmud, it was impossible to connect these "advertisements" with actual sexual relations.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. A. NEUBAUER, *La Géographie du Talmud* (Paris, 1868) pp. 358, 363.

<sup>93</sup> *B. Git.* 6a; *'Erub.* 57b.

<sup>94</sup> Epistle of Sherira III 2 (ed. A. HYMAN p. 69). Cf. NEUBAUER, *op. cit.* pp. 356-7.

<sup>95</sup> Sherira, *ibid*; GRAETZ: *Geschichte* <sup>2</sup>, pp. 295, 489.

<sup>96</sup> Whether the *Mut'a*-marriage among the Sunnites was a Parsee inheritance or a variant reading of the Koran is not for us to discuss. Similar forms of marriages were common in old Arabia, (cf. n. 69) as well as in other parts of the ancient world. Cf. WESTERMARK: *History of Human Marriage* (London, 1925), Vol. III p. 267ff.

glossed over. Probably in a moment of distress, when they could bear their misfortunes in silence no longer, they took the extreme course of threatening their wives by the use of their perfectly legitimate rights.<sup>97</sup> Naturally, such an announcement asking for a temporary wife could serve as a threat to their wives only if they could be made to believe that the announced intention would be carried out. In normal conditions it is hard to believe that, in the monogamous society of Babylonian Jewry, a suitable candidate could be found to respond to such an 'announcement'. In order to give force to their threatenings they had to change the scene. Of all the places they visited,<sup>98</sup> they had to choose those which were famous for their exoticism and extravagance. We know very little about Ardashir, but since it was but three miles distance from Mahoza which was a famous place, its inhabitants may have been similar in character and tastes to the people of Mahoza. The fabulous extravagance, riches, prodigality, sensuality, drunkenness and gluttony of both sexes in Mahoza are fully attested by the Talmud.<sup>99</sup> There could be no more appropriate place for Rabh to choose to make his "announcement" sound genuine. Rabh Nahman on the other hand, who served as the head of the academy in Mahoza for some time,<sup>100</sup> chose for his purposes a place unknown to his wife. Shekhanneṣibh, which was famous for its scoffers who tried with irresponsible irony to undermine the trust of others,<sup>101</sup> was most probably used as a background for improbable stories. Since popular imagination usually exaggerates such fables, it was convenient to Rabh Nahman to choose this place for his "announcement" so as to make it credible. During the generations of oral transmission the main part of the tradition only remained, while its background and motivation were consigned to oblivion.

So far we have not found any striking difference between Palestine and Babylonia concerning polygamy. The Bab. Talmud does not reveal any significant source which could point to polygamous practice. Among all the legal cases dealing with *Kethubbah* or in-

<sup>97</sup> cf. nn. 63-66.

<sup>98</sup> cf. nn. 94, 95. Rabh is especially famous for his journey, B. 'Erub. 100b; Qid. 25b; Hul. 95a; *ibid.*, 110a, etc.

<sup>99</sup> B. Ber. 59a; Shab. 12a; 32b; 59b; 112a; R. Hash. 17a; Ta'an. 26a; Ket. 66b etc.

<sup>100</sup> B. Giṭ. 39a; cf. A. Hyman, *Toledoth Tanna'im we-'amora'im*, III pp. 932, 933.

<sup>101</sup> B. Pes. 112b. *Leysanutha* in the sense also of *vile*, as in the Bible (Ps. i: 1). Cf. also 'Ab. Z. 18b, 19a.



heritance,<sup>102</sup> there is not even one involving a polygamous marriage.<sup>103</sup> Being already married was considered an impediment to the acquiring another woman, even in case of a levir when the marriage had not yet even been consummated.<sup>104</sup> The pressure exerted on the widow to release, by *Haliṣah*, the "husband" to whom she was entitled, is proof that the social environment was monogamous.

Moreover, the very terminology of the Bab. Talmud also postulates monogamy. The term *Ziwwug* (etymologically=*pairing*) is widely used, with a distinction between first and second marriage.<sup>105</sup> The expression "a single man who cohabits with an unmarried woman" has the same connotation.<sup>106</sup> The polite expression for wife current in Babylonia, *debhethehu* (=she of his house), seems also to point to monogamous practice.<sup>107</sup> This expression is very frequently used for wives of *Tanna'im*, *'Amora'im*, and even anonymously.<sup>108</sup>

Seeing that monogamy was both practised and, as regards morality, expected, one wonders why we do not find any explicit statement in its favour. Why was polygamy not condemned in stronger words and why does all the legal literature make use, constantly and consistently, of ponderous polygamous terms? If it is the case that the Rabbis favoured monogamy, and yet did not explicitly advocate it; and if, moreover, they tried to keep alive, at least academically, the biblical tradition of polygamy in its literal sense, against their own convictions and practice, there can be no doubt that they must have done so consciously.<sup>109</sup> Jewish sectarians claimed to recognise a biblical commandment in monogamy; to counterbalance this heresy, the Rabbis clung rigidly to ancient legal freedom as expressed in the law,

<sup>102</sup> E.g., the one concerning the children of Ḥama (*Ket.* 49b).

<sup>103</sup> This cannot be a mere coincidence since we know from talmudic times that "there is no *Kethubbah* without strife" (*B. Shab.* 130a). The Talmud does not anticipate any argument about כְּתוּבָה בְּגִין דְּכִרְיָן, which could hardly be expected if we think in terms of polygamy. There is one case of strife between two wives before the court of Rabha (cf. n. 66; this case may be one of childlessness). If polygamy were the rule, we would expect many cases of disputed inheritance between children of different mothers.

<sup>104</sup> *Yeb.* 64a. cf. A. N. Z. ROTH, *op. cit.* p. 119.

<sup>105</sup> *B. Sof.* 2a; *Git.* 90b; *San.* 22a etc.

<sup>106</sup> *B. Yeb.* 59b and parallels. Despite the fact that this is a *Baraita* (cf. *J. Yeb.* VI 5, 7c, 8a), if the expression had had no social significance it would have been changed into "One who etc." Cf. also n. 29.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. *Yom.* I 1 "*betho* means his wife". The Talmud (13a-b) adds, "he may have one house and not two". The idiom is current also in Hebrew: "I never called my wife by any name but *bethi*." (*Shab.* 118b).

<sup>108</sup> *Tanna'im*: *Ber.* 27b; *San.* 82a and parallels; *Ber.* 10a; *B. Meṣ.* 49b, 84b (several times), etc. *'Amora'im*: *Yeb.* 63a and parallels; *Shebhu'oth* 9b; *Ned.* 23a, etc. Anonymously: *Git.* 63b; *Ket.* 62b, etc.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. BARON, *loc. cit.*

even if it was out of keeping with their own ethical feeling. It seems that, although they were opposed to polygamy on grounds principally moral,<sup>110</sup> because the sectarians had proscribed polygamy on the basis of an alleged biblical injunction, they could not themselves openly and explicitly condemn it. Social conditions did not warrant such radical preaching, since in reality Jewish family life was, as a rule, monogamous. They were thus in the happy position of being able to afford to retain in their legal doctrine the traditional right of polygamy, and this academic tendency was even emphasised, so as "to lend no support to the words of them that say"<sup>111</sup> that monogamy was a biblical commandment.

It must be made clear that we do not here refer to any particular sect, but rather to the common heterodox tradition which most probably existed parallel to the pharisaic one until the Middle Ages on the fringes of Jewry.<sup>112</sup> The existence of such a multiple sectarian movement, with common features characterised by a rigorously ascetic tendency especially in matters of sexual relationship, and basing their customs on Scripture (perhaps on variant readings), is a probability attested by recent discoveries.<sup>113</sup> The impact of this sectarian co-existence left its mark even on the talmudic literature.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Cf. nn. 20, 23.

<sup>111</sup> As, e.g., in *Hag. II 4. Men. X 3*.

<sup>112</sup> We do not propose to go back to the notion, now refuted, by which the Karaites are identified with the Sadducees. (cf. GEIGER: *Das Judentum u.s. Geschichte*, II, p. 55 ff. J. FÜRST, *Geschichte d. Karäertums* (Leipzig, 1862), vol. I, p. 8 ff.) On the other hand there is some evidence for influence, and it seems that 'Anan (or even 'Abu 'Isa) legalised and codified certain ancient heterodox customs, cf. H. H. BEN-SASSON, *The first of the Karaites etc.*, *Zion* XV (1950) p. 42. One should not completely disregard the Karaites' own testimony about their affiliation to the Sadducees. In this connection it is also very interesting that they identified Jesus' prohibiting divorce with the Sadducees' teaching (A. HARKAVY, ed. *Kitāb al-anwār wal-marākib*, *Memoirs of the Oriental Dept. of the Imper. Russ. Archeolog. Society*, VIII, St. Petersburg 1893, p. 305 l. 9. This is also repeated by Hadassi, cf. W. BACHER, *JQR* (o.s.) VIII (1896), p. 436). This boasting about such a relationship can be understood only if it is based on tradition.

<sup>113</sup> On the connection between the Qumran sect and the Samaritans, cf. P. W. SKEHAN, *Exodus in the Samaritan Rescension from Qumran*, *JBL* LXXIV, p. 182 ff. Cf. also R. NORTH, *The Qumran Sadducees*, *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* XVII, p. 164 ff.

<sup>114</sup> Despite the refutation of GEIGER's main thesis about ancient *Halakhah* and its influence on *Beth Shammai*, etc., many of his arguments about Pseud. Jonathan including Sadducean, Samaritan or similar elements (cf. *Qebhuṣath Ma'amarim*, Berlin 1877, p. 112 ff.) are still valid. Cf. H. ALBECK, *External Halakhah in the Pal. Targumim and 'Aggada*, B. M. LEWIN Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem 1940), p. 93 ff. Cf. n. 134.

It is only the constant struggle against this heretical influence that can throw light on our problem.<sup>114a</sup>

The Zadokite or Damascus Document<sup>115</sup> bases its prohibition of polygamy on the interpretation of two verses, i.e., *Gen. i: 27* and *vii: 9*. The earlier Samaritans<sup>116</sup> and Karaites<sup>117</sup> forbade it on similar grounds. We have no literary remains of the Sadducees, but if there existed an ascetic trend amongst them, which is more than probable, then perhaps the Karaite tradition about Sadducean monogamy is based on historical evidence.<sup>118</sup>

It is quite safe to assume that Christian monogamy is based on the same inheritance of heterodox exegesis. This is the probable reason for the absence of any explicit reference to monogamy in the words of Jesus; it is rather taken for granted. Jesus, after prohibiting divorce says: "Whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery".<sup>119</sup> If polygamy were permitted, why should the marriage of a second wife after divorce be considered adultery?<sup>120</sup> At least the Jewish Christians were known to be completely monogamous.<sup>121</sup> The assertion that certain parts of the N.T. take the polygamy of the layman for granted on the basis of the postulate that only clergy need be "the husband of one wife",<sup>122</sup> is as lacking in

<sup>114a</sup> This theory about a common widespread movement of nonconformity in an ascetic and puritanical manner of life is attested by patristic sources as well. cf. M. BLACK, *The Patristic Accounts of Jewish Sectarianism*, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester, XLIV (1959), 285 ff.

<sup>115</sup> IV 19—V. 1. ed. C. RABIN, (Oxford, 1954), p. 19f. L. GINSBERG (*Eine unbekannte jüdische sekte*, MGWJ LV (1911), pp. 689-91) bases this prohibition on *Lev. xviii: 18* which is doubtful. RABIN in any case goes too far in claiming that the two verses mentioned are 'asmakhta only. If it were so, the main verse relied upon would certainly be mentioned.

<sup>116</sup> J. A. MONTGOMERY, *The Samaritans* (Philadelphia, 1907) p. 43. Scholars so far have not noticed the Samaritan term for marriage זבוג (*sic*) which proclaims its monogamous origin (cf. nn. 27, 105). Though they do not practise monogamy any more, this term is still widely used in Samaritan marriage contracts. Cf. M. GASTER, *Die Kethubbah bei den Samaritanern*, MGWJ LIV (1910), p. 174 ff. p. 433 ff. etc. cf. also Z. FRANKEL: *Einfluss d. Pal. Exegese*, p. 252. Cf. nn. 124, 134 etc.

<sup>117</sup> From Elijah Bašyatchi's 'Addereth 'Eliyyahu it seems that they used the verse *Lev. xviii: 18*. (cf. n. 115). Cf. L. NEMOY, *Karaite Anthology* (Yale, 1952) p. 246. NEMOY's note on p. 379 is meaningless, as this passage speaks about monogamy. Accordingly his introduction (p. xxiv) should also be corrected. Cf. S. POZNANSKI, *REJ* XLV (1895), p. 185 n. 6.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. J. MARKON, *Texte u. Unters.* (Petersb., 1908) p. xviii, n. 1.

<sup>119</sup> *Mt. v: 32; xix: 9; Mk. xii: 19 ff. Lk. xvii 18.*

<sup>120</sup> Cf. D. DAUBE, *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism* (London, 1956) p. 75.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. H. J. SCHOEPS, *Ehebeverftung u. Sexualmoral d. spätern Juden-Christen*, *Studia Theologica* II, pp. 99-101.

<sup>122</sup> 1 *Tim. iii: 2, 42; Titus i: 6*. Cf. DAUBE, *op. cit.* p. 76.



foundation as to propose that since the "widow be taken into the number" could apply only to one "having been the wife of one man",<sup>123</sup> others were living in polyandry. There is no doubt that these expressions speak about successive, and not simultaneous wives. Not only did the church dignitaries practise a more restricted type of monogamy, but some sects also had such practices.<sup>124</sup> While a second marriage after the death of the spouse was not considered adultery, it might be regarded as a "spot, wrinkle or blemish", from which the Church as a whole must be spared,<sup>125</sup> and the clergy even more. Origen,<sup>126</sup> speaking about such immaculateness, counts remarriage among these "spots". To complete the picture, we have to mention also those who considered remarriage as fornication.

Athenagoras uses the same words of Jesus<sup>127</sup> as an argument against a second marriage even in the case of the death of one's wife.<sup>128</sup> The only part of this heterodoxy in Christianity<sup>129</sup> relevant to our problem is its proof that this verse was understood strictly as implying monogamy. Tertullian,<sup>130</sup> who is even more radical in this instance, is still more significant in our investigation because from him we can learn on what Old Testament verses they based their insistence on monogamy. In third century Christianity this is very important, since speaking of Christians at this period it is more convenient to refer to the classical passages in the words of Jesus.<sup>131</sup> Jesus himself quotes the Hebrew Bible: In common with other sectarians he quotes *Gen. i: 27*,<sup>132</sup> but the main argument is based on

<sup>123</sup> 1 *Tim.* v: 9.

<sup>124</sup> According to Epiphanius (*Haeres.* XIII), some of the Dositheans abstained from a second marriage (others never married). If this is a Samaritan inheritance, could we perhaps trace this type of monogamy to their common origin? Among Christians, Athenagoras and Tertullian advocate such monogamy (even after the death of the wife). Cf. nn. 128, 135.

<sup>125</sup> *Eph.* v: 27, 31. Verse 31 is the classical text on which the Church based its prohibition of polygamy. For clergy, cf. nn. 122-123. Cf. ORIGEN, *Comm. Matt.* xiv, 22.

<sup>126</sup> *Hom. Luc.* XVII (ed. Lommatsch, Berlin, 1835) vol. V p. 151. His attitude towards the polygamy of laymen does not concern us.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. n. 119.

<sup>128</sup> *Legatio pro Chris.* XXXIII (Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum, ed. GALLANDIUS, vol. II pp. 33-4).

<sup>129</sup> Cf. K. VON PREYSING, *Ehezweck u. zweite Ehe bei Athenagoras*, Theol. Quartalschrift CX (1923), p. 115 ff.

<sup>130</sup> In particular he is very outspoken regarding a second marriage after the death of the spouse in his treatise devoted to this subject (*De Monogamia*). Cf. the following notes.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. n. 119.

<sup>132</sup> *Mt.* xix: 4; *Mk.* x: 6.

*Gen. ii: 24*.<sup>133</sup> This verse was quoted not according to the Massoretic Text but in the form "and they *twain* shall be one flesh".<sup>134</sup> This reading does not differ basically from the Massoretic Text, since "they" implies that the subjects are man and wife; nevertheless, the addition of the word "twain" gave more force to the use of it as a basis for prohibiting polygamy. It is natural that Tertullian uses these verses to propagate his extreme opinions on monogamy.<sup>135</sup> However, Tertullian does not refrain from using the other two verses used by other sectarians, i.e., *Gen. i: 27*,<sup>136</sup> and *vii: 9*.<sup>137</sup> Even if Tertullian does not in all his writings represent the Catholic view,<sup>138</sup> on the question of monogamy he differs only in that while the Church was against simultaneous polygamy, he tried to ban even successive remarriage, i.e., after the death of the spouse.<sup>139</sup>

Such biblical exegesis ran definitely counter to traditional pharisaic teaching and the manner in which the Rabbis understood the meanings of these texts. Since their own moral convictions prevented their giving expression to any outright opposition to monogamy, the least they could do to oppose such heretical interpretation was at any rate to uphold the theoretical feasibility of polygamous freedom.

There are some analogous cases which support this theory. To

<sup>133</sup> *Mt. xii: 5; Mk. x: 7, 8.*

<sup>134</sup> The Samaritan Pentateuch renders וְהָיוּ מְשֻׁנָּהם לְבָשָׁר אֶחָד (cf. n. 116). Such must have been also the text of LXX and Symmachus. Pseudo-Jonathan renders it וְהָיוּ תְרוּיָהוּן (cf. n. 114). It is interesting to note that *Jubilees* iii: 7 does not have such a version.

<sup>135</sup> *Monogamia* 4, where he concludes his argument: Siquidem propheticum dictum est: et erunt duo in unam carnem, non tres, neque plures. Ceterum iam non duo, si plures. Similarly in *De exhortatione castitatis* 5, where he adds: In utraque degenerat, qui de monogamia exorbitat. He later cites Lamech as an example of one who was punished (*Gen. iv: 24*) because of his polygamous life. Cf. n. 23.

<sup>136</sup> In *Ad Uxorem* I c. 2 he bases his argument on *Gen. i: 27*, saying: Nam et Adam unus Evae maritus, et Eva una uxor illius, una mulier, una costa. Cf. n. 20.

<sup>137</sup> *Monog. 4*: Etiam in ipsis animalibus monogamia recognoscitur, ne vel bestiae de moechia nascerentur, ex omnibus, inquit, bestiis ex omni carne duo induces in arcam, ut vivant tecum masculus et femina; erunt de animalibus volatilibus secundum genus, et de omnibus serpentibus terrae secundum genus ipsorum; duo ex omnibus introibunt ad te, masculus et femina uno et una. It is irrelevant for our purposes whether he is alluding to *Gen. vi: 19* or *vii: 9*.

<sup>138</sup> *Ad. Uxor.* was written about 200 when he was still a Catholic. *Exhort. cast.* (204-212) already betrays his sympathy with Montanism. Only *De monog.* was written from a Montanist point of view. Cf. G. N. BONWETSCH, *Die Schriften Tertullians nach. d. Zeit ihrer Abfassung untersucht* (Bonn, 1878), pp. 57-61.

<sup>139</sup> Neque enim refert, duas quis uxores singulas habuerit, an pariter singulae duas fecerint. Idem numerus coniunctorum et separatorum (*Monog. 4*). cf. H. PREISKER, *Christentum u. Ehe*, etc. (Berlin, 1927), p. 197 ff. It is also possible that some Christians who did not differentiate between these types of monogamy, or those who expected such strict monogamy at least from the Church dignitaries (cf. nn. 122, 125), made wild accusations about the polygamy of the Rabbis, because of their allowing remarriage after the death or divorce of the wife.

touch only on cases of sexual ethics there are three other instances in which the Rabbis had to controvert similar sectarian exegesis. Attention must be drawn to the problems of divorce, marriage between uncle and niece, and intermarriage, regarding which similar implicit polemic existed, because its motivation illuminates the obscurities which surround polygamy.

We have already dealt with Jesus' words on the subject of divorce,<sup>140</sup> since they are the source also for his views on monogamy. Even if we do not accept critical opinion that the words "except it be fornication" are not authentic,<sup>141</sup> it is still hard to harmonise them with opinions prevalent among the Pharisees (*Beth Shammai*).<sup>142</sup> We cannot enter into the theological background of Jesus' reform, but it must have been of major significance.<sup>143</sup> The whole discussion with the Pharisees shows that they were not interested in details of legislation, but that they "tempted" him with principles.<sup>144</sup> The main issue was, as in polygamy, the sectarian interpretation. It may even be that the Sadducees agreed with this exegesis, since the discussion was only with the Pharisees.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Cf. n. 119.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. J. WELLHAUSEN, *Evang. Mat.* (Berlin, 1904) p. 21.

<sup>142</sup> *Gif.* IX 10. *Beth Shammai* were motivated, as were the Rabbis in general, by the desire to avoid divorce (*Ket.* 82ab). Cf. nn. 26, 41, 60. By contrast, Jesus comes to restore the divine order ("from the beginning it was not so") which had been corrupted ("Moses because the hardness of your hearts suffered, etc.") *Mt.* xix: 9, *Mk.* x: 6, 5. Even according to the opinion that *Beth Shammai* were the representatives of the older *Halakhah*, his teaching cannot be reconciled with the Jewish view.

<sup>143</sup> It is not the idea of a divine concession to human weakness that is alien to Pharisaism (a similar opinion is expressed in the Talmud B. *Qid.* 21b) but its theological motivation. Cf. n. 142. This is the reason why the Church Fathers had such difficulty with these verses in trying to explain away changes in the will of God (Cf. Origen, *Hom. Num.* XVI 5; Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* IV 34), or the difference between yielding to the "hardness of the heart" and not yielding to "the weakness of the flesh" (cf. Tertullian, *Monog.* 14). It is small wonder that even modern harmonisers avoid dealing with these verses of Jesus.

<sup>144</sup> In these cases it is not even mentioned that he spoke "with authority and not as the scribes" (*Mk.* i:22). In any case ἐξουσία is not meant as רשות (cf. DAUBE, *op. cit.*, p. 205 ff.), as we can see its usage in *Mk.* i: 27. This δυνάμει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι and its authority is rather in the sense of πνευματική (power standing in his command) to do (or to teach) supernaturally or prophetically. This function was never regarded as falling within the purview of סמיכה. While there is a distinct line drawn between חכם and סופר, as proved by LIEBERMAN (*Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*, p. 26 ff.), and ALON (*Toledoth Ha-Yehudim, etc.*, I p. 303 ff.), the N.T. hardly shows a strict differentiation (cf. *Mk.* xii: 38-40, *Lk.* xx: 46-47; xi: 39, 52; *Mt.* xxiii: 7-8; cf. also *Lk.* xi: 46; *Mt.* xxiii: 3-4).

<sup>145</sup> The early Karaites also testify that the Sadducees and Christians forbade divorce altogether. References in SCHECHTER's *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, I p. XIX.



The mutilated fragment in the Zadokite Documents<sup>146</sup> is not clear. Nevertheless most scholars agree that it speaks about divorce, which is dependent on the permission of the "overseer".<sup>147</sup> This may be identical with the "fornication" of the N.T., which has previously to be proved by the authorities. The Karaites also placed similar limitations upon divorce.<sup>148</sup> On the other hand the Elephantine papyri also give the impression that divorce was a court case.<sup>149</sup> It may be that such was the sectarian procedure, to prove adultery in court. This heterodox *Halakhah* also found its way into Pseudo-Jonathan.<sup>150</sup> As in the case of polygamy, the sectarians' ascetic tendency to limit divorce did not lie far from the Rabbis' own moral conviction. But in order to uproot the heretical exegesis they had to stress their own. R. 'Aqiba, who is famous for his ideally happy monogamous and lifelong marriage, would be the last one from whom we would expect a statement that "finding a fairer one" is legitimate cause for divorcing a wife.<sup>151</sup> Only in the light of these sectarian controversies could such a view arise, in order to assert the full extent of the implications of the orthodox exegesis.

Uncle-niece marriage is considered incest by all the sectarians.<sup>152</sup> Unfortunately, the reason for rabbinic encouragement of such marriages has not always been understood. The explanation that the Rabbis encouraged such marriages to promote endogamy<sup>153</sup> does not hold water. In talmudic times, when tribal divisions had long been outdated, marriage between relatives was not especially praiseworthy. Moreover, the belief that such kin-marriages were of Roman origin and were part of a matriarchal system is also unfounded.<sup>154</sup> Similarly

<sup>146</sup> p. XIII, ll. 16-20.

<sup>147</sup> It is very possible that the word before *וּכְּנָס לְמִנְהָ* was *הַעֲדָה*, which could be *שְׁפָטִי הָעֲדָה* (as on p. X 1. 4) thus meaning that the divorce is limited to a court procedure.

<sup>148</sup> Stressing the word *כִּי* in *וְגוֹי* in *Deut. XXIV 1* and permitting divorce in cases of adultery only. Cf. AARON B. ELIJAH, *Gan 'Edhen* (Eupatoria, 1866), 154d.

<sup>149</sup> *בעֲדָה*. Cf. *The Aramaic papyri discovered at Assuan* Ed. by SAYCE & COWLEY (London 1906) pap. G, 1. 22. (=ed. COWLEY (1923), no. 15, p. 45). S. FUNK (Jahrbuch d. jüd.-lit. Ges., Frankfurt a-M., 1909, VII, p. 378), who wanted to prove from this the ancient origin of divorce before a court, achieved the opposite effect, since the talmudic *Halakhah* does not require it.

<sup>150</sup> Who adds to his translation of *Deut. xxiv: 1* *קִדְּם בִּי דִּינָא 1*.

<sup>151</sup> *Git. X 10*. Cf. *Shab. 64b*. cf. A. GEIGER, *Urschrift etc.* p. 156.

<sup>152</sup> All references are to be found in KRAUSS' article: *Die Ehe zwischen Onkel und Nichte*. Studies in Jewish literature in honour of K. Kohler (Berlin, 1913), p. 165 ff.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. KRAUSS, *loc. cit.*

<sup>154</sup> Modern sociology does not any longer take the hypothesis of matriarchy seriously.

it is impossible to minimise the extent of uncle-niece marriage among the Pharisees, and to explain the attack on this practice in the Zadokite Documents as pharisaic polemics against the Sadducees.<sup>155</sup> L. Ginzberg rightly explained this passage<sup>156</sup> as an attack by the sect on the Pharisees, and in the same way the Rabbis attacked the sectarians by encouraging such marriages.<sup>157</sup> From the Zadokite Document<sup>158</sup> we can see that they derived their prohibition from *Lev.* xviii: 13, but drew an analogy between men and women. Other verses are not mentioned. There is one instance only in which Jepheth b. 'Ali quotes, in the name of 'Anan, *Lev.* xviii: 18.<sup>159</sup> This enables us also to understand why the Rabbis speak about the daughter of a sister and not of a brother. Since the main purpose was to controvert their heretical exegesis, and these verses were about a sister, the attack also came in the same manner.

Despite the fact that the Rabbis held the view that "on one who has intercourse with a Gentile the zealots take revenge", they severely deprecated the interpretation of *Lev.* xvii: 21 in this sense.<sup>160</sup> The sectarian nature of this interpretation is attested by the *Book of Jubilees*.<sup>161</sup> The Karaites had the same exegesis,<sup>162</sup> and it even crept in to Pseudo-Jonathan.<sup>163</sup>

These implicit polemics of the Rabbis against sectarian biblical exegesis was a general attitude, adopted in order to defend their own traditional interpretation of the Torah, which was endangered by heretical schism. Despite the great similarities of their common ancient stock, these sectarians differed (as did, e.g., the Karaites amongst themselves) and the reaction of the Rabbis developed according to the needs of time and environment.

To illustrate this we may take an example from another sphere. It

<sup>155</sup> Cf. C. RABIN, *Qumran Studies* (Oxford, 1957) p. 91 f. Uncle-niece marriage is not an isolated case. In addition to that mentioned by KRAUSS and RABIN, we know about the brother of R. Gamaliel (B. *Yeb.* 15b), R. Yose Ha-Gelili (*Gen. R.* XVII 3), etc.

<sup>156</sup> *Eine unbekannte jüd. Sekte. MGWJ* LV (1911), pp. 696-9.

<sup>157</sup> *Tos. Qid.* I 4; *Ned.* VIII 7; B. *Yeb.* 62a, 63b. *Gen. R.* LXXX 4 etc.

<sup>158</sup> V. 1. 7-11.

<sup>159</sup> אחות in the sense of niece. Cf. S. POSNANSKI, *REJ* XLV (1903), p. 186.

<sup>160</sup> *Meg.* IV 9. Both Talmuds (B. *Meg.* 25a; J. *San.* IX 7) mention a *Baraita* of R. Ishmael in this sense. But this is rather in a figurative way, and not as exegesis. Cf. [ME'IR] ISH-SHALOM, *Beth Ha-Talmudh*, I (Vienna, 1881), pp. 336-7.

<sup>161</sup> XXX 7-10.

<sup>162</sup> SCHECHTER, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, II p. 32; A. HARKAVY, *Studien u. Mitteilungen aus d. Kais. Offent. Bibliothek*, VIII (St. Petersburg 1903) p. 207.

<sup>163</sup> וּמִן זֶרַע לֹא תֵּתֶן בְּתֻמְיָהָ לְצִיד בֵּת עַמְּמִין לְמַעֲבָרָא לְפֻלְחָנָא וּבִרְחָא. Cf. CH. ALBECK, *Bericht d. Hochschule f. d. Wissenschaft d. Judent.*, XLVII (1930), p. 55, 193.

was the ancient custom from the time of the Temple to recite the Ten Commandments during prayers,<sup>164</sup> but because of the heretics they had to discontinue it. In this case the explicit reason, "because of heretics", was stated in a *Baraita*.<sup>165</sup> Nevertheless, when this ground ultimately became meaningless, and since there were no heretics in Babylonia, there was a wish to return to the ancient custom. Two attempts to do so are recorded; one about the end of the third, and the other about the end of the fourth century.

In the case of monogamy the polemic tension was implicit and it is therefore hard to determine for how long it remained a conscious one. Once this consciousness was lost in oblivion the strict line between monogamous practice and academic polygamous freedom became confused.<sup>166</sup> This, and the polygamous environment which continued for many centuries, may account for the partial revival of polygamy in medieval times.

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<sup>164</sup> B. *Ber.* 12a.

<sup>165</sup> It is doubtful whether they understood the nature of this heresy in Babylonia. The Pal. Talmud (*Ber.* I 8, 3c) describes the heretics as claiming that only the Ten Commandments were revealed to Moses on Sinai. This description could hardly fit Jewish-Christians.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. n. 66.



## Further Evidence of Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud

SOME years ago I attempted to produce evidence that the Babylonian Talmud is a literary work and that a careful examination and analysis of relevant passages demonstrates that its redactors used such things as literary devices in order to heighten the effect of the argument.<sup>1</sup> If this theory can be substantiated adequately its importance for talmudic criticism is clear. For one thing, it will prove conclusively the soundness of the reasoning of the medieval Spanish school and many modern scholars to the effect that the Talmud was committed to writing by its redactors, and not at some subsequent period.<sup>2</sup> The following is an attempt to further the argument by a study of a number of *sugyoth*.

(1) At the beginning of tractate *Berakhoth* a *Baraita* is quoted<sup>3</sup> in which it is said that there are three reasons why one should not go into a ruin: because of suspicion (i.e., that one has an assignation there), of falling debris, and of demons. To this the *Gemara*<sup>4</sup> asks, why say because of suspicion? It would be sufficient to say because of falling debris (i.e., if one reason covers every case, what need is there for another reason?). The answer given is that the reason of suspicion is required in a case where the ruin had only recently fallen in. Here the reason of falling debris does not apply, and the reason of suspicion is required. But, asks the *Gemara* further, the reason of demons would surely suffice? To this the answer is given that the reason of suspicion is required in the case where two people enter the ruin (because the demons do not attack more than one). If there are

<sup>1</sup> *Evidence of Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud*, JJS, III, 4, 1952, pp. 157-162; cf. my review of ABRAHAM WEISS's *Le-Heqer Ha-Talmudh*, *ibid.*, Vol. VII, 1 and 2, 1956, pp. 114-117.

<sup>2</sup> A summary of the two views on this subject is given by H. STRACK, *Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash*, Philadelphia, 1945, pp. 18-19. By far the most able argument for both the *Mishnah* and the *Gemara* having been written down by their respective redactors is that of WEISS, *Dor Dor we-doreshaw*, New York-Berlin, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 216-7, Vol. III, pp. 243-248. WEISS rightly points out the virtual impossibility of generations of students remembering such a massive work as the Talmud by heart; and although reference has been made in this connection to the phenomenal feats of memory of which Oriental people are capable, and the fact that latter-day scholars do frequently know the Talmud by heart, there is all the difference in the world between memorising a written text, no matter how bulky, and recalling all the exact details of thousands of complex arguments that never had been recorded in writing.

<sup>3</sup> *Ber.* 3a.

<sup>4</sup> *Ber.*, *ibid.*

two, the *Gemara* asks, surely there would be no suspicion? To which the reply is given, that when both are licentious there is occasion for suspicion. Thus the reason of suspicion is required where there are two licentious people and the ruin is also new. Here there is no danger from falling debris, and the demons are powerless; but there is suspicion.

Having accounted for the reason of suspicion, the *Gemara* goes on to ask, why is the reason of falling debris required? Would it not be sufficient to state the other two reasons, because of suspicion and demons? To this the answer is given that the reason of falling debris is required where there are two people, both being respectable. Here there is no suspicion and no fear of demons, but there is the danger of falling debris.

We have now accounted for two of the reasons, suspicion and falling debris. But, the *Gemara* asks, why is the reason of demons required? The answer is given, it applies when two decent people go into a new ruin; here there is no breath of suspicion and no danger from falling debris. But if there are two people, asks the *Gemara*, there is no danger from demons? To which the answer is given that in a specially haunted place there is in fact danger from demons even when two people are present. Thus the reason of demons is required to cover the case of two decent people who enter a new ruin which is haunted by demons. Here there is no danger from falling debris, because the ruin is new, and no grounds for suspicion, because the two people are decent. But in a haunted spot there is danger from demons even though two people are present.

Finally, the *Gemara* states that "if you like" it can be said that the reason of demons is required in the case of a single man entering a new ruin situated in the fields outside the town. Here the reason of falling debris does not apply for the ruin is new. Nor does the reason of suspicion apply for a woman would not venture into the fields to meet him. But the danger from demons is present.

If the letter *S* is made to denote "suspicion", *F* "falling debris", and *D* "demons" we can sketch the *sugya* in the following diagrammatic form:

(a) *Baraita*

3 reasons = *S*, *F* and *D*

(b) Why *S* if *F* and *D*?

Answer: new (∴ no *F*)

two (∴ no *D*)

but *licentious* ( $\therefore S$ )

(c) Why *F* if *S* and *D*?

Answer: *two* ( $\therefore$  no *D*)

*respectable* ( $\therefore$  no *S*)

(d) Why *D* if *S* and *F*?

Answer: *new* ( $\therefore$  no *F*)

*two* and *respectable* ( $\therefore$  no *S*)

but *haunted* ( $\therefore D$ )

(e) (Alternative to *d*)

*new* ( $\therefore$  no *F*)

*field* ( $\therefore$  no *S*)

*single* ( $\therefore D$ )

Now it must be obvious to the reader that this *sugya*, far from being a *verbatim* report of a spontaneous discussion of the *Baraita* in the Babylonian schools, has been carefully edited and so arranged that one point follows naturally from the other. The logical question with which to begin the discussion would have been, given the reason of suspicion, the first of the three, why are the other two required? But if this were asked the answer would have been that the reason of falling debris is required where there are two, and the reason of demons where the ruin is a new one and the two are licentious or, in the alternative suggestion, where the ruin is in the field. This latter scheme would have covered the whole ground and adequately explained why all three reasons are required; but there would have been no opportunity for the skilful thrust and parry that are of the essence of the talmudic *pilpul*. The more simple form appears to have been rejected in favour of a more contrived approach in order to make the *sugya* a literary work of art rather than a prosaic elaboration of the *Baraita*. It is to this *artificial* aspect of the *sugya*, to this cautious resolve not to reveal too much at once in order to heighten the effect of the ultimate *dénouement*, that the present article calls attention.

(2) The *Mishnah*<sup>5</sup> rules that a woman is acquired in marriage in one of three ways, by *Money* (i.e., the delivery of an object of value into her hand), by *Deed* (the delivery into her hand of a bond of marriage) and by *Intercourse*. The *Gemara* quotes Scriptural authority for these three, and then proceeds to demonstrate that none of the three methods can be derived from any one of the others. The



*Gemara* then asks: One could not be inferred from another; yet let one be inferred from two others (i.e., each one possesses certain properties which may be the deciding factor: but seeing that these are different in each case, it would be plausible to assume that any one of the three can be derived from any two of them, for the properties of the two are different and cannot, therefore, be the deciding factors).<sup>6</sup> The *Gemara* asks: Which could be inferred? Should Scripture omit [acquisition by] *Deed*, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others (*Money* and *Intercourse*), their pleasure is great. That is to say, both *Money* and *Intercourse* confer pleasure, and it may be that the act of acquisition for marriage must be one which confers pleasure. *Deed*, which confers no pleasure, may not be valid, seeing that it cannot be derived from the other two which have a common factor that *Deed* does not possess. Consequently, it is necessary for Scripture to mention *Deed* explicitly. The *Gemara* goes on to ask: Let Scripture omit *Intercourse* and let it be inferred from the other two. The answer is given that *Money* and *Deed* possess a common factor, which *Intercourse* does not, and this may be the deciding factor. This factor is the greater powers of acquisition possessed by both *Deed* and *Money*, for they give title to lands and slaves. Hence *Deed* cannot be derived from the other two, nor can *Intercourse*. But, proceeds the *Gemara*, let Scripture omit *Money* and let it be inferred from *Deed* and *Intercourse*. (For the factor of "powers of acquisition" cannot be the decisive one, seeing that *Intercourse* does not possess it. Nor can the factor of "pleasure" be decisive, seeing that *Deed* does not possess it. The decisive factor must be that these two have powers of acquisition elsewhere. And in that case *Money*, too, ought to be a means of acquisition in marriage.) To this the answer is given that *Deed* and *Intercourse* possess compulsory powers, for there are cases when these two can acquire without consent (*Deed* in the case of a woman to be divorced, who can be given her bill of divorce without her consent and thus "acquire" herself; and *Intercourse* in the case of levirate marriage, where the brother's wife is acquired by intercourse even against her will). But we nowhere find that *Money* has such compulsory powers and it consequently cannot be derived from the other two, for they have a factor in common, not possessed by *Money*, which may well be the deciding one. Should you argue, continues the *Gemara*, that *Money*, too, has compulsory

<sup>6</sup> Cf. my article *The Talmudic Hermeneutical Principle of Binyan 'Abh and J. S. Mill's "Method of Agreement"*, *JJS*, IV, 2, 1953, pp. 59-64.

powers (for a Hebrew maidservant may be sold by her father against her will), nevertheless we do not find this in conjugal matters. Hence *Money* cannot be derived from the other two, for they have a common factor, not possessed by *Money*, namely, that they both have compulsory powers in conjugal matters.

If the letter *M* stands for *Money*, *D* for *Deed*, and *I* for *Intercourse*, the *sugya* can be represented diagrammatically as follows:

(a) Let Scripture omit *D*.

Answer: *D* cannot be derived from *M* and *I* because these possess the factor of *pleasure*.

(b) Let Scripture omit *I*.

Answer: *I* cannot be derived from *M* and *D* because these possess the factor of *acquisition*.

(c) Let Scripture omit *M*.

Answer: *M* cannot be derived from *D* and *I* because these possess the factor of *compulsion*.

(d) Objection: But does not *M* also possess this power in the case of the Hebrew maidservant?

Answer: Yes, but not in conjugal matters.

As in the first example, the *Gemara* does not follow the logical order. Logically, the first question ought to have been: Let Scripture omit *Intercourse* (the third in the list given in the *Mishnah*) and let it be inferred from the first two, *Money* and *Deed*. To this the answer would have been given, it must stand, because *Money* and *Deed* have greater powers of acquisition. The question then would have been if *Intercourse* cannot be inferred from the others let it stand with one of the others and let the third be inferred. This would have eventually reproduced the argument as we have it, but with one important difference; the element of working up gradually to a climax. For it will be seen that the common factor of *Money* and *Intercourse* (pleasure) is a more obvious one than that of *Money* and *Deed* (powers of acquisition). This latter is not too strong for, in fact, *Intercourse* also has powers of acquisition in levirate marriage, but not with regard to land and slaves. The common factor of *Deed* and *Intercourse* (compulsion) is weaker still, as the *Gemara* objects, for the Hebrew maidservant can in fact be acquired by money against her will. Consequently, the *Gemara* deliberately adopts the illogical procedure of beginning with the middle one of the three (*Deed*), as if to say: *Deed* certainly cannot be derived from the other two, and even

*Intercourse* cannot be derived from the other two, but, not only this, even *Money* cannot be derived from the others. (A careful comparison of this passage with the one from *Berakhoth* above will serve to substantiate the argument. In *Berakhoth* the *Gemara* asks that the *first* in the list be omitted, here that the *middle one* in the list be omitted. In both cases the logical order would have been, let the *last* one be omitted.) Again we have an example of a contrived *sugya*.<sup>7</sup>

(3) We turn now to an aggadic passage in which the same method is evident. In the discussion<sup>8</sup> as to whether the dead know of happenings on earth, three stories are quoted in support of the view that they do know, and in each case the proof is refuted. First, the story is quoted of a certain pious man who stayed in the cemetery on New Year's eve and heard two spirits conversing. One of them said she was unable to move about freely in the spirit world because her mother had buried her in a matting of reeds instead of the customary linen shrouds. On the next New Year's eve the saint again stayed the night in the cemetery and heard the conversation repeated. In a moment of indiscretion he related the happenings to his wife who, in her quarrel with the dead girl's mother, taunted the latter that her daughter was buried in a matting of reeds. On the third New Year's eve the saint tried to repeat his experience but overheard the spirits say that they must be silent because their conversation had been overheard by the living. From which it appears that the dead do know of events on earth: otherwise how did the spirits know that their conversation had been overheard? To this the answer is given that perhaps some other man after his death went and told them.

Another attempt at proof is made by quoting the story of Ze'iri whose landlady, with whom he had deposited some money, died while he was away on a visit to the college. He went to the cemetery and asked her where she had left the money. After telling him, she asked him to instruct her mother to send her comb and eye-paint by the hand of a certain man who was about to die. From which it would seem that the dead do know what happens on earth, otherwise how could she have known that the man was dying? There is no proof from this, the *Gemara* retorts, for it may be that *Dumah*, the angel

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the *sugya* in *B.Q.* 5b where Rabha suggests that the argument in the *Mishnah* is a contrived one, exactly as we have suggested is the case in this and many other passages of the *Gemara*, cf. *Tos. ad loc.*, s.v. *lehilkhotheyhen*. Whether Rabha's interpretation of the *Mishnah* is historically correct is beside the point. The fact is that for this 'Amora the "contrived" method is so familiar that it may justify its use in his interpretation of the *Mishnah*.

<sup>8</sup> *Ber.* 18b.



presiding over the dead, announces to the dead beforehand when they are about to receive an addition to their ranks.

The story is then told of the father of Samuel who had some money belonging to orphans and who died before he could inform his son of the whereabouts of the money. Samuel obtained admission to the Academy on High and observed that his father was weeping. On inquiring for the cause of the tears Samuel was told that it was because his father knew that he, Samuel, was soon to die. From which it appears that the dead do know of events on earth. To this the answer is given that there is still no proof, for it may be that for a man of exceptional learning and piety such as Samuel a proclamation is made in Heaven beforehand.

The scheme of the passage is as follows:

(a) First proof—story of the saint.

Refutation: It may be that a man who had died in the meantime conveyed the information.

(b) Second proof—story of Ze'iri.

Here it cannot be, as above, because a man who died had possibly conveyed the information; for the fact that a stranger was dying was no concern of the woman.

Refutation: *Dumah* may inform them.

(c) Third proof—story of Samuel.

Here it cannot have been *Dumah*, for Samuel was not actually dying; his father knew that he would die *soon*.

Refutation: It may be that of a man of Samuel's eminence the dead are informed long before his death occurs.

It is abundantly clear that these three stories, whatever their origin, have been placed together in this way in order to preserve the pattern of working up to a climax: there is no proof from the story of the saint, but what about the story of Ze'iri? And even if you explain this by *Dumah*, what of Samuel?<sup>9</sup>

Considerations of space forbid the detailed analysis of more passages but it will be found that very many Talmudic *sugyoth* lend them-

<sup>9</sup> It is worthy of note that in practically every example of a *sugya* in which a succession of proofs are recorded (with the usual formula of *ta shema'*, "come and hear", used of an amoraic proof, and *meythebhey*, "they raised an objection", used of a tannaitic proof) these are quoted in a progressive series, as in the example given here. The following instances may be mentioned, but there are many more: *Pes.* 2a-b, 7a-b; *B.Q.* 15a-b; *B.M.* 4a-5a, 6a-7a, 8a-9b, 10b-11a, 21b-22b, 24a-b, 27a-28a, 30a; *Beṣ.* 17a-b, 17b-18a; *Hull.* 4b-5a, 8a, 9b-10a, 10a-b, 16a-b, 28a-b, 28b-29a, 29b-30a, 30a-b.

selves easily to this kind of investigation once the point has been taken and the method grasped.

A further note may here be added, though I would not place too much reliance on this factor. Some indication that the Talmud in the form that we possess it is a literary work rather than a collection of reports of verbal debates is the fact that the opening sections of the various tractates are generally much greater in size than other sections, and these serve as introductions to the matters discussed in the tractates. This is partly due to the arrangement of the *Mishnah* in which the first chapter of a tractate is generally of an introductory nature. But even where the discussion on the *Mishnah* does not demand it the *Gemara* in the opening sections generally manages to introduce such extraneous material as is required for the understanding of later passages. It goes without saying that this more or less artificial arrangement of the material for utilitarian purposes bears the stamp of the literary stylist rather than the natural spontaneity of the verbal debater.<sup>10</sup>

The Rabbis criticise King David for referring to the *Torah* as his "songs".<sup>11</sup> Scripture, for them, was primarily the source of religion

<sup>10</sup> The first chapter of the following tractates is the longest chapter in the tractate: *Ber.*, *Sabb.*, *Yoma*, *Suk.*, *Beṣ.*, *R.H.*, *Ta'an.*, *Meg.*, *Hag.*, *Yeb.*, *Keth.*, *Ned.*, *Soṭ.*, *Qidd.*, *B.M.*, *Sheb.*, *'A.Z.*, *Hor.*, *Zebh.*, *Bekh.*, *'Arakh.*, *Tem.*, *Ker.*, *Me'il.*, *Nidd.* Of the remaining tractates, the first chapter is the second longest in *'Eruv*. It is the second longest in *Pes.*, where the second chapter is longer but this deals with different subject matter. It is the second longest in *M.Q.* The third chapter is longer, but likewise deals with different subject matter. In the tractate *Nazir* the first chapter is the third longest, but this tractate is really a continuation of *Nedarim* and there is little need for new introductory material. The first chapter is the second longest in *Giṭṭin*. Chapter four is longer, but contains much extraneous material on *Takkanoth*. The first chapter is the second longest in *B.Q.* The seventh chapter is much longer but this, too, is an introductory chapter to the laws of theft dealt with in the latter part of *B.Q.* *B.B.* is in a category of its own because of the lengthy commentary of *Rashbam* from the third chapter, which makes the pages much longer. But by far the longest chapter is the third and this introduces a new subject. The first chapter of *Sanh.* is the third in length. Of the two which contain more pages, the seventh deals with different subject matter and the last is mainly aggadic and consequently contains a good deal of new material. The three chapters of *Makk.* all deal with different subjects and have only a slight connection with each other. The first chapter of *Men.* is the third in length. The two longer chapters, three and four, deal with extraneous matters. In tractate *Hull.* the first and third chapters are of approximately equal length and the topics dealt with are quite different. Too much reliance cannot be set on these figures. It must be realised that generally the *Mishnah* itself contains introductory material in the first chapters. The length of each chapter has been assessed according to the pages in the printed editions and these vary according to the amount of commentary on a page. But with these reservations the figures are revealing.

<sup>11</sup> *Soṭ.* 35b.

and morals, the record of the divine will for mankind. But this has not prevented even those who accept their teaching from discovering literary merit in the Book of books. By the same token, the fact that the Rabbis were interested mainly in discussing the word of God and applying it to the life of their people need not blind us to the recognition of the literary form and style of their greatest monument, the Babylonian Talmud.

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## *Muhammad's Inspiration by Judaism \**

Lawrence Kostoris Lecture, read at the Institute of Jewish Studies, Manchester, on 30th June 1958.

MUHAMMAD'S indebtedness to Judaism and his relations with the Jews of Arabia have been studied in many books and articles. However, as Professor Arthur Jeffrey rightly remarked in a recent article on qoranic research, we still have no satisfactory comprehensive study on the subject. In addition, most of the work done concerns Muhammad's relations with the Jews of al-Madina, to whom indeed countless references are made in the chronologically later parts of the Qor'an, as well as in the historical records and the religious literature of the Muslims. It is, however, the beginnings of Muhammad's prophetic career, his original inspiration and his preaching in his native town of Mecca, which count. To this period and to the questions how, and how far, Muhammad was inspired at that time by Jews and Judaism, our lecture today is devoted.

Although I am addressing an Institute of Jewish Studies, I may be allowed to approach the subject from the point of view of the Islamist. My main and original concern is a true understanding of the Qor'an. What I am trying to do is to find a plausible, coherent explanation for the many puzzling and seemingly contradictory facts which emanate from a minute analysis of our sources about Muhammad's beginnings. For this purpose we ask: Did Muhammad have personal contact with a member or members of another religion in his native town of Mecca in the crucial years when he became a prophet? Who were his mentors? And, if these were Jews, what kind of Judaism was represented by them? Thus our study, although originally undertaken to provide an explanation of problematic passages occurring in the Qor'an, will not only scrutinise the relations of Islam to the older religions, but form an inquiry into a most interesting and significant phase of Judaism itself.

Our knowledge about the Jews in Arabia before Muhammad (*a*) from talmudic literature (*b*) from epigraphic evidence (*c*) from Christian and particularly Muslim sources, is very considerable, and has been elucidated by many studies. Still a new, synthetic, and critical investigation of this subject, too, would be highly desirable. Of course, this cannot be undertaken in this lecture. However, it is

\*The lecture is printed here as it was read, and therefore no annotations are provided. The author will treat the subject in a wider context, accompanied by full documentation, on another occasion.

imperative to mention a few salient facts, in order to put our inquiry into the proper historical context.

In the *Sifre*, a tannaitic Midrash to *Deuteronomy* (xxxii: 2), we read: "When God revealed Himself to give the Torah to Israel, he did so not in one language, but in four: in Hebrew, in Greek, in Arabic, and in Aramaic." This clearly shows that at the early date of this source—second or third century—the Torah had been translated not only into Greek and into the language of the Targum, Aramaic, but also into Arabic. That translation most probably was not committed to writing; however, this does not mean that it was not fixed by oral tradition, just as were the later *Sharḥs*, or Arabic bible translations, which were popular among Jews in Islamic times, in addition to the classical Arabic bible translation of Sa'adya.

The testimony of the *Sifre* is corroborated even by an older source; I am referring, of course, to the New Testament; in the *Acts* of the Apostles (ii: 11), from the story of the miracle of Pentecost, we learn that Arabic-speaking Jews and proselytes had made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem already at a time before the destruction of the Second Temple.

There seems to be an allusion to an Arabic bible translation in the Qor'an itself. In *Sura xli: 43/4*, Allah addresses Muhammad with the following words: "Nothing has been said to you that has not been said to the messengers before you . . . If We (i.e., Allah) had made it (i.e., the Qor'an) in a foreign language, they would have said: 'Why are its verses not made distinct, foreign and Arabic?'" Obviously, this passage makes sense only on the assumption that both Muhammad and his audience knew, as a matter of normal routine, that the Torah was read in Hebrew and translated verse by verse into Arabic.

However, in Judaism, the most telling indication of any phenomenon is always to be sought in religious *law*. In fact, the *Halakhah* makes special provisions for the Jews in Arabia, both with regard to ritual law, the observation of the Sabbath, and family law, the marriage contract. It allows Jewish women in Arabia to go out on the holy Sabbath bedecked with their heavy jewellery and stipulates that in Arabia, where at that time the Jews, unlike their co-religionists in Palestine, normally did not possess land, camels and incense might serve as a security for the sums to be paid in the case of a divorce or a husband's death. Nothing could illustrate more effectively how important a section of the Jewish people lived in Arabia at that time.



The epigraphic evidence is of different kinds. I confine myself here to one, the old South-Arabian, Sabaean—from Sheba, which is Yemen—or Himyaritic inscriptions. They tell us about judaized South-Arabian kings, i.e. kings who did not invoke any more, as had been usual, a plurality of gods, but one God, who was called *Rahmān*, the All-merciful—as is well known, the official name of God in the Babylonian Talmud. In two inscriptions, this *Rahmān* is styled expressly as *Rabb-Hūd* or *Yahūd*, the God of the Jews. Our knowledge of this epigraphic material has been enormously enlarged through the discoveries made by the Anglo-Belgian expedition to Arabia in 1951/2 and the subsequent publication of the newly found inscriptions by Gonzague Ryckmans, of Louvain, Belgium. We have now inscriptions, in considerable number, of judaized Himyarites from both the middle of the fifth century and from the beginnings of the sixth, about fifty years before Muhammad's birth.

The importance of these inscriptions consists not only in their number and geographical and chronological distribution but in the missionary zeal and drive for expansion expressed in them. Thus, inscription Ryckmans No. 508, after having told much about wars, bloodshed, and even the destruction of churches by the Jewish king, Joseph 'As'ar, formerly known only by his Arabic nickname *Dhu-Nuwas*, concludes with the prayer: "May Thy mercy, Thou Merciful One, embrace the whole world, for Thou art the Lord." In another inscription, R. 520, the dedicators pray for a good life and a good death, which implies a belief in a world to come, as well as for sons fighting for the name of the All-merciful—the first indication of the idea of the Holy War on Arab soil. In connection with the judaized South-Arabian King Joseph, Christian sources tell us about Jewish rabbis from Tiberias—then the capital of Jewish Palestine—who guided and instructed the king.

Muslim accounts of the Jews of Arabia are, of course, our main source of information. They reveal to us that an unbroken chain of Jewish settlements stretched from the border of Palestine to al-Madina, which originally was a town of *Kōhanīm* and still was inhabited at the time of Muhammad by, among others, two priestly clans. That *Kōhanīm* should live together was nothing exceptional at that time, when the re-erection of the Temple was still a tangible hope and the priests tried to preserve, to a certain extent, the laws of priestly purity. Such priestly towns were found not only in Palestine but even in such far away places as the isle of Jerba off the coast of

Tunisia or the town of Yazd in the very heart of Persia. In Yemen, Jewish villages, inhabited exclusively by *Kōhanīm*, have existed up to the present time. A few days ago, while studying the Gaster Collection of manuscripts in the British Museum, I came across a document from a little Egyptian town, signed by seven *Kōhanīm*, three Levites, and only two Israelites.

The Muslim sources tell us also about Jews being found in Yemen at the beginnings of Islam and their close connection with the Jews of North Arabia—the way between the two led through Mecca, Muhammad's birthplace. They also mention Jewish settlements in Eastern Arabia, i.e., near Babylonia, then the main seat of Jewish learning, and give many details, some fanciful, but many trustworthy, about their way of life.

Thus the scene is set for the pursuit of our quest of the nature and extent of Muhammad's inspiration by Judaism.

Muhammad was one of the great men of all times. We call a man great, if he left an indelible mark on the course of history and if that influence was at least partly to the good. Muhammad was the creator of a religion, a literature, and a state, all three of which deeply affected the destinies, the beliefs, and the thinking of a considerable part of mankind. With Muhammad something definitely new came into history, and it stands, therefore, to reason that the man himself had an original, intrinsically creative mind. Things being so, is it reasonable to assume that Muhammad had mentors who guided his first steps and provided him with the material and even the basic ideas of his historic mission?

The answer to this question is comparatively simple: it is given by the express evidence of the Qor'an itself. In the early controversies between Muhammad and his compatriots, who refused to believe in his message, frequently reference is made to a man or men from the *Banu 'Isra'il* or Children of Israel—Muhammad never used the word Jew or Christian, as long as he was in Mecca—who could be asked, or, according to the Meccans, who was the source of Muhammad's knowledge. Thus we read in *Sura xxv: 5–6*: "The disbelievers say: 'This is nothing but a fraud which he has devised—namely Muhammad's assertion of the heavenly origin of his message—and others have helped him with it.' They have said too: 'These are old-world tales, which he has written down for himself; they are recited to him every morning and evening'."

This means to say that the Meccans had been exposed to missionary preaching before. The tales of the prophets and God's punishments with which Muhammad tried to frighten them were nothing new to them. Only Muhammad—they asserted—made a more detailed study of them, helped by others. Likewise, in *Sura* xvi: 105, Muhammad quotes his adversaries as saying: "It is only a human being who teaches him." That means: not God. On this, Muhammad gives the naive, but as we shall presently see, extremely significant answer: "The language of him they hint at is foreign, but this is clear Arabic speech."

Very often Muhammad himself alludes to these foreigners, e.g. in the illuminating passage *Sura* xxvi: 192-9: "Verily this is a revelation of the Lord of the Worlds . . . in clear Arabic speech. Is it not a sign—a proof—to them that the learned of the Children of Israel know it? If We (Allah is speaking) had sent it down through one of the foreigners and he had recited it to them, they would not have believed it." Muhammad challenges his adversaries by saying: "Ask the Children of Israel" or "Ask the people of the book" (xvi: 43; xxi: 7). Moreover, God Himself advises Muhammad to ask the Children of Israel whenever he was in doubt.

It is illuminating to study at least one such instance. In *Sura* x: 90ff., Muhammad makes Pharaoh, while pursuing the Children of Israel through the Red Sea, suddenly repent and exclaim: "I believe that there is no God but He in whom the Children of Israel believe," upon which Pharaoh was saved and made—as Muhammad adds enigmatically—a "sign" for the future generations. The explanation of this passage is to be found in *Pirqē de-Rabbi 'Eli'ezer* 43, where Pharaoh's sudden conversion is adduced as a proof of the miraculous efficacy of repentance. The conversion itself is demonstrated in the *Pirqē de-Rabbi 'Eli'ezer* by the wonderful *Derash* or juxtaposition of *Exodus* v: 2: "*Who* is the Lord that I should listen to His word?" and xv: 11: "*Who* is like unto Thee, O Lord?" With the same word "Who," with which Pharaoh had expressed his haughty disbelief, with this same word he made his confession. The *Pirqē de-Rabbi 'Eli'ezer* is a comparatively late Midrash. But as this homily is based on a Hebrew pun, it cannot have been borrowed from outside.

Now, when Muhammad used this *Derash* as a "sign" demonstrating how even the most hard-boiled sinner and tyrant could be saved by repentance, he was opposed by his listeners. Was not Pharaoh the main villain in the piece? Was it not expressly said in the Bible:



"Pharaoh's chariots and his host hath He cast into the sea?" Of course, the Meccans had not read the Bible. But they were widely travelled people. It is expressly said in our sources that when Meccan merchants once came to Alexandria, they were put up in the guest-house of a church there. The same, we may assume, happened elsewhere, in churches as well as in synagogues, e.g. when they were guests of Samau'al, the Jewish prince of Taima, and other Jews or Jewish communities renowned as hosts in pre-Islamic Arabs. Now, the walls of the churches and synagogues were covered at that time with paintings; the Muslim Oral Tradition puts into the mouth of Muhammad the saying: "Whitewash your mosques and do not cover them with paintings, as do Jews and Christians." One of the most favourite themes of those murals in the houses of worship as we know, e.g., from Dura-Europos, was the drowning of Pharaoh and his hosts in the Red Sea. Therefore, when Muhammad told his story of Pharaoh's conversion and salvation, he was challenged: "What do you say? We have seen with our own eyes that Pharaoh was drowned." Perhaps, Muhammad himself remembered having seen such a picture and began to have doubts. Therefore, Allah says to him immediately after this story, x: 94: "If you are in doubt as to what we have sent down to you, ask those who recite the Book before you," i.e., in this case, ask your Jewish mentors—as the direct allusion to the *Midrash* just quoted proves.

The passages adduced are sufficient evidence of the fact that Muhammad, during his formative period, was in close contact with people whom he regarded as well versed in the Hebrew Scriptures and as competent to testify as to the true contents of God's revelation to mankind.

However, even without these express statements, an analysis of the most ancient sections of the Qor'an would lead to the same result. For, on the one hand, Muhammad untiringly repeats his belief—which corresponded to fact—that nothing was said by him which had not been contained in the previous revelations of God. On the other hand, many details from Jewish sources are mentioned or alluded to already in the older chapters of the Qor'an. (Much of this material was collected by the late Professor J. Obermann in his contribution to the Princeton volume "The Arab Heritage".) These two facts can be reasonably explained only on the assumption that Muhammad actually had some opportunity to make himself acquainted with those

details, as well as to become convinced that he had a true knowledge of the previous religions.

There is even more in this. When one reads, say, from the fifty oldest chapters of the Qor'an, one first gets the impression that they were unconnected, only partly intelligible ejaculations of a rather disorderly mind. However, this impression is entirely misleading. It is caused by Muhammad's use of poetic forms and also of many of the expressions in vogue in the oracles of the pre-Islamic Arabic soothsayers. Closer examination reveals that, from the very beginning, Muhammad's teachings were a comparatively well-organised body of ideas, arguments and postulates. As twenty years later, at the end of his prophetic career, we do not find more, and perhaps even less, consistency and coherence in his preachings, it stands to reason that the rather accomplished system of religious thought, which we find in the ancient parts of the Qor'an, had come to him, so to speak, pre-fabricated, as an organic whole. His own contribution was his prophetic zeal, with which he grasped that gospel and recognised in it a revelation given to him immediately from Heaven.

There seems to be a discrepancy between the fact that Muhammad had teachers and his sincere belief that he was the bearer of a revelation by God or an angel. There is no doubt about Muhammad's sincerity. In later phases, he perhaps abused sometimes the miracle of his prophetic authority. However, in the beginning, the many doubts which he himself records in the Qor'an are the best proof for his overall sincerity. The seeming discrepancy which we have noted finds its explanation in the Qor'an itself, in the passages we have just quoted and many others to the same effect. It was *the miracle of language*, the fact that he promulgated in clear Arabic what he had heard from his master in broken speech, which convinced Muhammad that it was God and not those foreigners who spoke through his mouth—the Arabs had a special word for the dialect spoken by the Jews: *Raṭn* (cf. Hebrew *raṭan*). Over twenty times he emphasises that Allah made a Scripture in Arabic so that his countrymen would be able to understand it (xliii:3–4) and that his Qor'an was clear, was in clear language, *lisān mubīn*, *kitāb mubīn*, and I wonder whether we do not have here an echo of *Zephaniah* iii: 9: "Then I shall turn to the nations a *clear language* that they may all call upon the name of the Lord."

There was another, and to my mind, most decisive factor which strengthened—or perhaps aroused—in Muhammad the belief that

he was a messenger of God: *the direct encouragement by his own teachers*. We shall come back to this extremely important point at the end of our lecture. Here it may be sufficient to quote one telling verse (Allah speaks—as everywhere in the Qor'an): "Those to whom We have given the Book—i.e., the Bible—know that it—namely Muhammad's message—has been sent down from your Lord in verity. Therefore, you—i.e., Muhammad—be not of those who doubt."

Before trying now to define with some precision who it was that had been the friendly mentors of Muhammad, we have to outline the basic tenets of Muhammad's gospel during the earliest phase of his prophetic career. As often with great men, he was obsessed by one basic idea: the trembling fear that the end of the physical world was at hand, the day of resurrection was coming, and—as Muhammad was by nature a leader who was concerned not so much with himself as with his people—that the terrible day of judgement would find the Arabs unprepared, whereas all the foreigners who lived in or around Arabia had their Book, their Holy Scriptures, which told them what to do to be saved.

From this basic idea everything else was derived. Essentially, there was only one postulate: To believe in the message of the "Warner"—as Muhammad styled himself—and to humiliate oneself before God, the Great Judge. This contrite self-humiliation was expressed in prayer, preceded by the purifying of the body, and accompanied by prostrations and long vigils of standing up in meditation during the night. Even the giving of alms was conceived to be a means "to seek the face of God" as the qoranic phrase has it (xcii: 19; lxxvi: 9), most probably echoing the talmudic interpretation of *Psalm* xvii: 15: "By almsgiving I shall see your face" (*Babha Bathra* 10a). There was only one sin, essentially: haughty disbelief in bodily resurrection and subsequent heavenly judgement, and arrogant self-reliance on one's riches and social position.

The main contents of the ancient *Suras* of the Qor'an are descriptions not of Hell and Paradise—this comes in later periods—but of the terrors of the day of Resurrection, and also of God's unfailing justice and goodness—the word "Mercy" is not yet used at that time. Only a few moral commandments are mentioned in the older sections of the Qor'an such as, help to the needy, decency in business (not to cheat, not to lie), and, in one place, sexual chastity (lxx: 22). However, it is not the *number* of moral injunctions which counts, but



the *spirit*. Muhammad's original message was pervaded by the prophetic enthusiasm of ethical monotheism, the idea of the personal responsibility of man before God.

As far as his own apostolate was concerned, Muhammad asserted that prophets with similar messages had been sent to other peoples, to each people a man "who was a brother of them". Those who were haughty disbelievers, like Pharaoh or the people of Noah, were destroyed by floods or other disasters.

All this sounds, of course, very familiar to Jewish ears. Nevertheless, while inquiring where Muhammad got all these ideas and details from, we have first to reckon with the possibility of Christian mentors. It is true, in the near neighbourhood of Muhammad there were not many Christians around. However, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Abyssinia, which were under Byzantine rule or influence, were then predominantly Christian, and important Christian communities were at that time in Yemen and particularly in Babylonia-Iraq, although those countries were under the actual or nominal rule of Persia, the great enemy of the Byzantines.

Thus, while asking about the origin of Muhammad's main idea, the terrors of the day of Resurrection, of course, we know that the belief in the resurrection of the dead was one of the basic tenets of rabbinic Judaism and is canonized most prominently in the second of the eighteen benedictions of the daily prayer: "Blessed be He that resurrects the dead." However that event is envisaged not with terror, but as the reverse: as "*Yeshū'āh*," *salvation*; for the righteous regard the world to come as a better world than this. I understand that the church at that time held the same view. All this explains Muhammad's belief that the people of the book were cared for, as far as the Day of Judgement was concerned.

I understand, however, in particular from the writings of the late Swedish historian of religion, Tor Andrae, that in the circles of the Syriac and Coptic monks and hermits, a trembling fear of the Day of Judgement was cultivated as the main incentive of piety, while prostrations and long vigils were common practice. In addition, a number of affinities between the nomenclature and the literary patterns of the Qor'an and of Syriac Christian literature have been noted, such as the wonderful expression "meeting God," which is not known to me from Jewish sources, or the way in which Muhammad sometimes concludes his stories about the Prophets, *Salāmun 'ala 'Ibrāhīm*, "Peace over

Abraham," etc., which was used also by the great Syriac preacher Afrem (Ephraem)—died 363—in his *Mēmre* or poetical discourses.

Of course, one has to be very careful with conclusions from such evidence. Thus Tor Andrae lays much emphasis on the fact that Muhammad, while stressing the suddenness with which the day of Resurrection will arrive, uses the expression: "It comes like the blinking of the eye"—a phrase used for the same purpose also by Ephraem Syrus. However, in Muhammad's time the Jews used exactly the same words in their daily prayer—three times a day—in exactly the same connection, in the second benediction devoted to the Resurrection of the dead, For this concludes, according to the Palestinian rite, which then certainly was accepted in North Arabia, with the words: "And bring about Your salvation", i.e., the resurrection of the dead, "as quickly as the blinking of the eye", וישועתך כהרף עין, במהרה תצמיח בִּיאָה מַחִיָּה הַמָּתִים. Nevertheless, I believe it has been proved that Muhammad's language was influenced to a certain extent by the religious idiom known to us from Syriac Christian literature.

Concerning Muhammad's doctrine of prophecy, i.e. his assertion that many prophets had been sent to many peoples with the same message and the same truth as himself, a Judæo-Christian origin has often been assumed. However, a detailed analysis of the passages concerned shows that there is nothing in the Qor'an in this respect which could not be explained as material from ordinary rabbinic or perhaps also Christian sources adapted to the needs of religious propaganda among pagans. Nevertheless, it would be correct to assume a certain Judæo-Christian attitude in early Islam, namely the belief that all revealed religions were equally true.

It seems, however, entirely impossible to assume that Christians, or even Judæo-Christians, should have been the mentors of Muhammad. For in the fifty to sixty oldest chapters of the Qor'an, the figure of Christ and everything else Christian is completely absent. During his whole creative period in Mecca, Muhammad mentions or alludes to Jesus six times, as against 108 in which Moses is mentioned, and mostly in connection with detailed stories. Moreover, when we scrutinise the earliest appearance of Jesus in the Qor'an, *Sura* 43, we see that it was not Muhammad, but his adversaries who brought up the subject first. For when Muhammad began, in the second period of his prophetic activities, to attack the little gods of Mecca, the pagans argued: "What do you want? Even of the people of the Book there are some who adore a god besides Allah." This accusation is

refuted by Muhammad with the assertion that Jesus was only a true servant of God and by other interesting arguments, which fall, however, outside the scope of this lecture.

Against this, it is evident that from the very beginnings, Muhammad regarded Moses as his only and immediate predecessor in the revelation of a heavenly book. Thus we read in *Sura* xlvi: 12 and in xi: 17: "Before it—the Qor'an—there was the book of Moses . . . and this is a book confirming it in Arabic language." In the same chapter, the true believers say: "We have heard of a book coming down from Heaven after the book of Moses." Even more telling is *Sura* xxviii: 49 (Allah speaks): "When the Truth is coming down to them from us, they say: 'Why was there not given the like which was given to Moses?' " i.e. if Muhammad's claim that he had received a book from Heaven was true, why did he confine himself to short discourses instead of producing a proper book on parchment such as was known as the book of Moses. To this Muhammad retorts: "Did they not disbelieve in what was given to Moses formerly?" They say: "Two impostors, who mutually assist one another; verily, we reject them both." I do not believe that there could be imagined a more express testimony to both the Jews' and Muhammad's religious propaganda and the intimate connection between the two.

To be sure, the *Suras* just quoted are from a later Meccan period. However, even during Muhammad's phase of prophetic activity, when he still indulged in the enigmatic style of the Arabian soothsayers, we have the same situation. Thus he opens *Sura* 95 with the oath by the mount of Sinai and the Holy city of Mecca. For the pre-Islamic sanctuary of Mecca, the *Ka'ba*, was always regarded as holy by Muhammad. *Sura* 52 begins with an oath by Mount Sinai, the Book written on Parchment and "the House frequented," the *Ka'ba*. This juxtaposition of Mount Sinai and the Book written on Parchment on the one hand with Mecca and its sanctuary on the other, clearly indicates that the Arab prophet regarded himself from the outset as the immediate successor of the Hebrew one who had received his book on Mount Sinai.

We come now to our last question: What was the type, what was the outlook of those Jews or, as Muhammad said, "a section of the people of Moses, which guided with Truth" (*Sura* vii: 159), i.e., guided Muhammad himself and approved his doings?

They certainly were full of missionary zeal. For this purpose, they



adapted their message to the Arab environment. First, Moses' revelation itself was located by them in an Arab place, Wadi Tuwa. Secondly, the legendary ancient Arab peoples, like 'Ad and Thamud, which had vanished and were represented by the poets as models of human transitoriness, were described by them as deterrent examples of wicked, disbelieving peoples, like the haughty Pharaoh or the contemporaries of Noah, who, according to the *'Aggada*, did not listen to his warnings.

Finally, having given up the hope of fully Judaizing the immense and barbaric masses of the Arabs among whom they lived and were active, they decided to spread the word of God in a way suggested by *Deuteronomy* xviii: 18, "I shall raise up for them a prophet amongst their own brothers." That is why we read so often in the Qor'an in connection with those Arabic peoples: "To 'Ad we sent their brother so-and-so (incidentally, he is called Hud, which, as we know now from the Himyarite inscriptions, means nothing else but Jew), to Thamud their brother so-and-so, to Madyan—which is Midian—their brother so-and-so" (*Sura* vii: 65, etc); and that is why Muhammad himself is called in the Qor'an *an-Nabi al-Ummi*, Hebrew: **נביא אומות העולם** Prophet of the Gentiles; this is a conception frequently found in talmudic literature, referring of course to the past. The mentors of Muhammad made this idea a practical instrument for the propagation of Monotheism in their own time.

There remains a last question. As we have seen in Muhammad's original preaching, the Day of Judgement was envisaged with fear rather than with hope; it was described as a scene of punishment rather than of salvation and beatitude. Contrariwise, in the talmudic literature, the Resurrection of the Dead was regarded largely as an occasion for redress of the injustice and sufferings of this world. Does not this contrast militate against the assumption that Muhammad's first mentors were Jewish?

In answer to this question, one has to bear in mind first that in talmudic literature, too, there are found very many stories showing how the most prominent pious scholars and communal leaders were trembling in apprehension of their appearance before the Heavenly Judge. It may well be that the group of Jewish missionaries active in Arabia emphasised this aspect of Judaism, especially as it was more suited to religious propaganda than the acquiescence in ultramundane reward.

However, it is also possible and by no means far-fetched to assume

that some Jewish groups had themselves come under the spell of monastic piety and even adopted some of its practices and religious vocabulary. We have similar phenomena in the twelfth century, when the powerful movement of the *Hasidhē 'Ashkenaz*, "the pious ones of Germany," undoubtedly betrayed the impact of their Christian environment; or, when, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the great religious reformer Abraham Maimonides, the worthy son of a great father, and his circle frankly acknowledged their debt to Muslim Sufism.

There exists a third possibility. In these days of research on the Dead Sea Scrolls, one may ask whether the Jewish missionaries working in Arabia did not belong to some Jewish splinter group, which was somehow related to the community which produced those writings. There are indeed some significant points of contact, to which I have drawn attention in my book *Jews and Arabs, Their Contacts Through the Ages* (New York 1955), while recently Professor C. Rabin has elaborated the subject in his *Qumran Studies*.

Nevertheless, I must emphasise that the type of religiosity represented in Muhammad's original message is by no means sectarian or esoteric, but "orthodox" and of a general human appeal. In addition, it contains a considerable number of reminiscences of talmudic literature. Consequently, the most plausible answer to the question "what type of Judaism was cultivated by Muhammad's Jewish mentors?" is a combination of the first two possibilities weighed before: a group emphasising certain aspects of Judaism for missionary purposes, and perhaps being under the influence of Christian monastic pietism.

In any case, it stands to reason that the idea of using a medium, "to raise up a prophet amongst their own brethren" for the Arab tribes was not the brainwave of a single man, but a line of action adopted by a whole group. For contemporarily with Muhammad, there appeared Arabian prophets both in Yemen and in Eastern Arabia, countries with important Jewish populations at that time. The prophets of Yemen and Yamama in Eastern Arabia failed, Muhammad succeeded. That group, we may imagine, made various trials. It was the genius of Muhammad, his religious and political genius, which fanned the spark that had been put in him into an eternal blaze and certainly made guidance by his well-meaning Jewish mentors rapidly become redundant.

Nevertheless, the devoted work done by that modest group of "the people of Moses", who most probably were simple, pious men with

little learning, bore rich fruit. It finally resulted in conveying the message of ethical monotheism to a very large section of mankind and in bringing many nations within the orbit of a civilisation very much akin to Western Christian civilisation. Thus it contributed both to the elevation and to unification of mankind.

However, even from the narrower point of view of Jewish history, Muhammad's mentors worked not in vain. Of course, Muhammad, when moving northward to al-Madina, encountered large Jewish settlements led by scholars, who by no means could be expected to accept a very inadequately informed gentile as a prophet sent by God to confirm the Torah. In addition, the rich plantations and date-groves of the Jewish settlements, which stretched from al-Madina to the border of Palestine, were too tempting a prey for the Muslims who had had to give up their houses in their native Mecca. As is well known, Muhammad attacked all those settlements and expelled or subjected or destroyed their inhabitants. Thus, for the Jews of Northern Arabia, the effect of the missionary zeal of Muhammad's Jewish mentors was disastrous.

The reverse was the case with the Jewish people as a whole. At that time, the destinies of the Jewish people had reached their lowest ebb. It groaned under the crushing persecutions of a bigoted, decaying church, and the likewise decayed anarchy of the disintegrating Sassanid empire. It was Islam which saved the Jewish people. This fact was fully recognized by the Jews themselves, as we may learn from a section of the *Nistaroth de-Rabbi Shim'on ben Yoḥai*, which was composed in early Islamic times. There, the angel Meṭaṭron shows Rabbi Shim'on ben Yoḥai the *Malkhuth Yishma'el*, the empire of the Arabs, and explains to him that "God would raise up for them a prophet according to His Will," and that they would conquer Palestine and resettle the Jews there in great honour. As is well known it was the Muslims who brought the Jews back to Jerusalem, after they had been forbidden access to it for 500 years.

Thus, both from the point of view of world history and that of Jewish history, those simple, pious men whose missionary zeal and activities we have been able to discern in the Qor'an, have indirectly achieved far more than they perhaps ever dreamed of.

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## The Kavvanoth of Prayer in Early Hasidism

THE mind of the Kabbalist at prayer confronts not the God of traditional religion, but the whole Sephirotic Universe. As he progresses through the fixed prayers, the utterance of each and every word or phrase is expected to cause a particular zone on the Sephirotic map to flash into his contemplative consciousness. Moreover, this system of *Kavvanoth*, particularly in its Lurianic version, has a strong magical flavour<sup>1</sup> arising from the assumption that human contemplative recollection of Sephirotic processes taking place in the Divine realm is capable of contributing to, and is indeed instrumental in, activating the very same Divine processes.

The Kabbalist's contemplative journey through the zones in the Sephirotic world is not left to the wanton choice of the contemplative traveller but requires extreme discipline and follows clearly charted routes. The strict progression of the *Kavvanoth* is the very opposite of religious anarchism. The mystic's contemplative thought is not allowed to float indiscriminately or in an irresponsible, arbitrary and capricious way, but is supposed to follow an exact chart directing every movement of the contemplative mind during prayer.

From the situation described a problem inevitably arises: The fixed texts of the traditional Jewish prayers reflect the religious world of Judaism in the first centuries C.E., the time of their formulation. They were left unchanged by the Kabbalists, along with all other Jews, in deference to the well-known conservative tendencies of Jewish mystics.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, while the Kabbalist uttered the prayers in

<sup>1</sup> G. SCHOLEM, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 1955<sup>2</sup>, p. 277: "That the doctrine of Kawwanah in prayer was capable of being interpreted as a certain kind of magic seems clear to me; that it involved the problem of magical practices is beyond any doubt." Both an orthodox scholar of the type of A. BERLINER (*Randbemerkungen zum täglichen Gebetbuche*, 1909) and a protagonist of reform like H. G. ENLOW (in his valuable though not exhaustive survey: "Kawwanah: the Struggle for Inwardness in Judaism", *Studies in Jewish Literature in honor of Kaufmann Kohler*, Berlin, 1913, pp. 82-107) appear to be irritated by the magical implications of the Kabbalistic Kavvanoth of prayer. For a historical understanding of the doctrine of Kavvanoth in Kabbalah cf. G. SCHOLEM, *Der Begriff der Kawwanah in der alten Kabbala*, *MGWJ*, vol. 78 (1934), pp. 492-518, Enc. Jud. vol. ix, coll. 714-717 and in his *MTJM passim*, see Index s.v. *Kawwanah*. Kavvanah in the sense of Kabbalistic meditation is omitted altogether in BEN YEHUDA's *Thesaurus*, vol. v, pp. 2301-02. In view of the fact that this specific technical sense of the term certainly overshadowed in later Hebrew usage all other meanings of the word, the omission is rather baffling and I can make no suggestion that could explain it.

<sup>2</sup> SCHOLEM, *MTJM*<sup>2</sup>, p. 29 and idem, "Religiöse Autorität und Mystik", *Eranos Jahrbuch*, 1957, pp. 246ff.

their traditional wording, his contemplative mind would be at large in an entirely different religious landscape. He had to re-interpret all the elements of a religious conception which he had left behind in terms of his Kabbalistic piety revolving round the Sephirothic system and its emanative or copulative intricacies. In other words: it is not the original concern of the petitionary prayer that was at the forefront of his contemplative interest, but the new religious fascination of Sephiroth,<sup>2a</sup> their emanations and re-emanations, the descent and ascent of the "upper worlds" or the holy copulation between the male and female aspects of the Sephirothic Universe.

But the Kabbalist had to pay a high price for the retention of the traditional formulations of his prayers. It was the price of a certain divorce between the text of the prayer he was uttering and its contemplative meaning. The psychology behind the technique of *Kavvanoth* during prayer is still a riddle to the student of Kabbalah. Was mind completely separated from lips except in so far as the spoken word of prayer acted as a springboard for the contemplative journey to the "corresponding" Sephirothic realities? The co-ordination between the minute literary units of the prayer-text and their corresponding meditations was certainly such as to exclude the primary meaning of the text from the threshold of the contemplative mind—at least in terms of normal, every-day-life psychology. But did this exclude the literal meaning of the prayer from the mind of the Kabbalist who lived in a state of consciousness more complex than the normal? Can one assume that there were two levels in the mental activity of the Kabbalist working simultaneously, a dichotomy of mind which enabled him to follow on a conscious level—though not on a contemplative one—the thread of the text and at the same time to pursue, on a contemplative level, his rapidly shifting mental concentrations? I would be inclined towards the latter interpretation and assume rather that the co-existence of the two levels is the main clue to the psychology of *Kavvanoth*. This would explain why it is reported to be so

<sup>2a</sup> There is a great deal of truth in what is quoted in Luria's name: דאיתא בהאר"י ולח"ה אם האדם אינו מכוון כוונת התפלה ע"ד האמת כל עוד שמכוון יותר שואל פרס מרב יותר (Zeebh Wolf of Zytomierz, Or ha-me'ir, 1798, i: 7a). The petitionary character of the statutory prayers is repeatedly stated by the same author: הנם שכן סדרו לנו בסדר תפלתנו כתבנו בספר פרנסה כתבנו בספר פליה ומחילה וכדומה, הנראה שכל עצמת של השאלה רק לצורך הנשמי, וכיון שכן כל עוד שיכוין בתפלתו יותר אי שואל פרס יותר (*ibid.*, iii: 34b) "*Gashmi*" in this context obviously stands not merely for "material" but for "human", i.e. anything for the benefit of man, whether material as *parnasah* or spiritual as *selihah* and *mehilah*.

extraordinarily difficult to acquire the meditative technique of prayer with *Kavvanoth* and become a well-trained practitioner of this art.

The Kabbalistic method of *Kavvanoth* is founded on the "paradox of solitude and community". It is an aristocratic art practised by the Kabbalists within the praying community of simple, plebeian worshippers of the non-Kabbalistic fashion. The usual setting of the Kabbalistic *Kavvanoth* is thus in the solitary practice of the exceptional individual who is outwardly embedded in the prayer-life of his community. The large gathering of the synagogue would never be capable of reciting the prayers with meditative perfection; this is why the Kabbalist, even though praying in a synagogue and thus participating in corporate worship, will practise the *Kavvanoth* in a climate of mental isolation—to say nothing about the unavoidable time-lag between the community praying at a non-meditative pace and himself enveloped in lingering *Kavvanoth*.

However, the solitary meditations of the Lurianic system of *Kavvanoth* was put to practice in a communal setting in the small Jerusalem group called *Beth El*. It was founded by the great Yemenite Kabbalist R. Shalom Sharabi in the eighteenth century. To-day it consists of about thirty members of a Kabbalistic *élite* centred round a synagogue which used to be in the Old City of Jerusalem before the Arab-Israeli war. Its members are called *Mekhavvenim* i.e. those who pray with meditation. The "holy order" endeavoured from its inception to remove the method of *Kavvanoth* from the original setting of aristocrats meditating among ordinary worshippers and transformed the whole practice of *Kavvanoth* into a corporate reality among the select group with their three daily prayers conducted in long sessions of several hours each. As we know from the vivid description of a son of one of the members of this order, Ariel Benison,<sup>3</sup> this predominantly Sephardi community of the *Mekhavvenim* used to practise the art of meditation during prayer rapt in complete silence and only later was cantillation introduced to accompany the silent *Kavvanoth* of the members.

Another congregation of meditating Kabbalists, near in both time and place to the rise of Hasidism, was the famous '*Klaus*' of Brody.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *The Zohar in Moslem and Christian Spain*, London, 1932, pp. 245-46. Cf. also the description of the synagogue in *Iggeroth ha-rabh Cook*, vol. ii, p. 68-70 (No. 414).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. SCHOLEM, *MTJM*<sup>2</sup>, p. 328. N. GELBER, *Toledoth Yehudey Brod*, Jerusalem, 1955, p. 62 ff.



Its members were also called "Ḥasidim" but in an older meaning of the word. The members of this group, like the members of Beth El in Jerusalem, were Kabbalists of the highest repute, and to belong to their Beth Midrash was a hall-mark of profound Kabbalistic learning. This community provided a fertile soil for the fine intricacies of corporate meditative prayer. The members of the Klaus were explicitly exempt from the ban pronounced against Ḥasidim in Brody in 1772. In the text of the ban the Kabbalists of the Klaus are characterised, in contrast to the new Ḥasidim, as "learned in both the exoteric and esoteric teachings, their main preoccupation being the exoteric"<sup>5</sup> . . . famed for their piety, [people] who know their Master and who direct themselves in the way of truth. מפורסמים בחסידות, יודעים רבונו ומכוונים על דרך האמת.

In the first part of this passage "famed for their piety" etc. the word "piety" (*hasiduth*) is certainly not a vague expression thrown up carelessly, but chosen deliberately to hint at the association of this Kabbalistic aristocracy with the type of 'true' Ḥasidim, that religious type of ascetics who largely constituted pre-Ḥasidic Ḥasidism.<sup>7</sup> Similarly the closing part "and they direct themselves in the way of truth" has a technical meaning. The "way of truth" (*derekh ha-'emeth*) is a widely used circumlocution for Kabbalah. One did not need to be a Kabbalist accustomed to eliciting hidden allusions in order to understand the formula in this sense. It was a commonly used reference to scores of Kabbalistic commentaries described as being "*al derekh ha-'emeth*". Similarly, the expression *mekhavvenim* seems to be used in its Kabbalistic technical sense meaning not simply 'directing themselves' or 'intending' but 'meditating' or 'practising *Kavvanoth*'. Thus the concluding passage of the sentence, in which the mainly Yiddish text of the ban falls back on Hebrew, characterises the Kabbalistic circle of the Klaus of Brody as true Ḥasidim who meditate in Kabbalistic fashion. This is in emphasised contrast to the common Ḥasidim, against whom the ban is directed, and who are obviously considered not to be doing so. It is not stated that the meditations in question which the true Ḥasidim practised, and which the new Ḥasidim, by implication, did not, were meditations of prayer and not, for instance, meditations during the practice of *mišvoth*

<sup>5</sup> In contradistinction to the Ḥasidim who were ill-famed for their neglect of the study of the Talmud.

<sup>6</sup> *Zemir 'Ariṣim*, end.

<sup>7</sup> SCHOLEM, *MTJM*<sup>2</sup>, p. 331.

(*kavvanoth ha-miṣvoth*). But since the ban deals at length with habits of prayer among Ḥasidim and is motivated by an attempt to wipe out certain peculiarities pertaining to them, e.g. their lack of respect for the prayer times laid down by the *halakhah*, etc., and since the phrase in question appears in such a context, its interpretation in the sense of meditations of prayer rather than meditations accompanying *miṣvoth* is beyond doubt. By implication it would appear that the Ḥasidim in 1772 did not practise *Kavvanoth* of prayer, a result which will be corroborated by the analysis of the relevant Hasidic texts.

Already before the sudden collapse of the practice of the *Kavvanoth* in the early phases of Ḥasidism, the elaborate Lurianic system of meditation during prayer suffered a severe crisis in the Sabbatian movement of the seventeenth century. Nathan of Gaza, the first theologian of this heresy, abolished the whole system of Lurianic *Kavvanoth* in 1666, basing his abrogation on the claim that a system of *Kavvanoth* which had been worked out for pre-Messianic times was utterly unsuitable, even impermissible, at the dawn of the Messianic epoch. Anyone practising such a system was compared by him to "someone doing weekday work on the Sabbath".

One may say that the latent revolutionary attitude of Sabbatian religious thought exhibits a more radical break with tradition in the question of the *Kavvanoth* than in any other field. Certainly, the halakhic system of commandments and prohibitions was not thrown overboard at this comparatively early phase of the Sabbatian movement. But the radical abolition of *Kavvanoth* in prayer was an expression of the latent revolutionary forces in Sabbatianism, which scored a full victory at this point of least resistance in the texture of traditional Judaism. The *Kavvanoth* of prayer, the ripe fruits of meditative prayer-life according to the Lurianic Kabbalah, fell first victim to the Sabbatian sensation of a new epoch.<sup>8</sup> The Ḥasidic movement witnessed a somewhat similar abrogation of this meditative practice. Since the motives which led the Ḥasidim to eliminate the *Kavvanoth* were entirely different from those which had brought Sabbatianism to the same result, there is hardly any need to point out that no historical connection existed between the two parallel phenomena.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. G. SCHOLEM, *Shabbethai Ṣebhi*, vol. I, pp. 225-26; vol. II, pp. 412-14. Only two years later, in 1668, the abrogation of the whole Halakhic system was advanced precisely with the same argumentation of weekdays—Sabbath, cf. SCHOLEM, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 704.

In any event, the Lurianic tradition of *Kavvanoth* was not wiped out suddenly when Ḥasidism emerged in the history of Jewish mysticism. The *Siddur ha-'Ari*, the great prayer-book of Isaac Luria containing the *Kavvanoth*, was reprinted in Ḥasidic circles. The famous prayer-book of Shabbethai of Raszkow, who perhaps did not belong to Ḥasidism yet had close personal contact with Israel Baalshem (quoted several times in his commentary on the prayer-book), was in essence but a reproduction of the Lurianic *Siddur* with the traditional *Kavvanoth*.<sup>9</sup>

One cannot find any clear-cut statement or declaration of principle on the question of the *Kavvanoth* of prayer from the earliest days of the Ḥasidic movement.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the position of Israel Baalshem himself concerning the practical question of *Kavvanoth* during prayer is rather obscure. He did not explicitly oppose *Kavvanoth* of prayer. On the other hand, we do not know whether he practised them himself. I have already called the Kabbalistic prayer meditations an aristocratic art. The practice of the elaborate technique of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth* was by necessity confined to the limited number of a spiritual *élite* who could cope with the immense intellectual task of countless contemplative flying visits to precisely charted points of the Sephirothic Universe, the mental map of which was at the finger-tips of every well-trained Kabbalist.

It is very doubtful whether Israel Baalshem himself was fully qualified as a Kabbalist to become one of those initiated into the mysteries of meditative prayer-life. Both his Kabbalistic and Talmudic knowledge seems to have consisted of some bare elements drawn from the secondary sources of then popular anthologies. His Talmudic education appears to have been based mainly on '*Eyn Ya'aqobh*, an anthology of the haggadic passages of the Talmud collected by the sixteenth century Italian Talmudist R. Jacob ibn Ḥabib, which had

<sup>9</sup> Printed for the first time by the Ḥasidic printer in Korzec in 1797.

<sup>10</sup> I have not been able to rely to any extent on previous work in the field of Ḥasidism. No treatment of the subject of *Kavvanoth* of prayer in Ḥasidism exists. M. BUBER's essay "Kawwana: von der Ausrichtung" (*Die chassidischen Bücher*, Berlin, pp. 149-156) does not touch on the subject of *Kavvanoth* of prayer. Even the thorough analysis in T. YSANDER's *Studien zum Besten Ḥasidismus*, Uppsala, 1933, pp. 177-185 deals with the concept of *Kavvanah* as the devotion of prayer only, but does not differentiate between the devotional and the meditative aspects of Ḥasidic prayer and thus the whole Kabbalistic background of the meditative method of prayer and its subsequent Ḥasidic overthrow, the basic thesis of the present study, remain unnoticed.



become a standard work for the untutored with good intentions.<sup>11</sup> Similarly his scanty Kabbalistic knowledge was possibly drawn from widely read Kabbalistic anthologies. People with so limited a knowledge were certainly not considered well equipped for the rather involved meditative art of *Kavvanoth* during prayer.

In what follows we shall have to consider two different kinds of testimony about Israel Baalshem's position regarding the *Kavvanoth* of prayer. Both of them are derived from secondary sources. The first source is the legendary biography of Israel Baalshem, published 1815, over half a century after its hero's death. Despite this time-lag we have in it a fairly reliable source of the life and *milieu* of the founder of Hasidism, and not a late fabrication projecting contemporary problems and attitudes into an earlier period. The second and more

<sup>11</sup> In spite of A. HESCHEL's remark (*HUCA*, vol. XXIII (1950-51) part II, p. 20) implying the acceptance by him of the legendary idea of Israel Baalshem's hiding his great knowledge from his brother-in-law, I think that there can be little doubt about the relative illiteracy of this charismatic figure. I should go further and venture to describe him as what was popularly called " 'Eyn Ya'aqobh Yid' ". His scope of education emerges fairly clearly from what his legendary biography describes were his reading habits. There is a striking consistency in the implications of the various stories. On a journey his companions read passages to him from a book which they had with them on the journey and which was, as our text says, " either *Mishnayoth* or 'Eyn Ya'aqobh or the *Zohar* (*Shibhhey*, p. 59). On Saturday night a relative of Israel Baalshem reads to him from 'Eyn Ya'aqobh (ibid., 84-85). The course of education of a Hasidic 'am-ha-aref according to the detailed description of the *Shibhhey* (p. 124) contained the following stages: *Mishnayoth*, 'Eyn Ya'aqobh, *Musar*-books and the *Zohar*. But this is almost identical with the reading matter of Israel Baalshem himself. The *Shibhhey* relates that his secretary, Şebhi, read the *Zohar* to him and Israel Baalshem repeated it with great enthusiasm (p. 79). A noticeable feature of these descriptions is that Israel Baalshem does not study the books himself but others read aloud to him from the books, a habit which is certainly not inductive to great intellectual absorption and is no doubt outside the traditional pattern of study of the contemporary Talmudic scholar. The *Shibhhey*'s Hebrew expression for this intellectual activity is not to 'study' or 'learn' (*lilemod*) but to 'say' a particular text (*lomar Zohar*, *lomar* 'Eyn Ya'aqobh, in Yiddish: 'zogen'). It is of course a perfectly adequate form of reading for pneumatic purposes as indeed it is indicated in the various passages of the *Shibhhey* the purpose of the reading was (particularly p. 59, also pp. 84-85), but one has to emphasise that this was certainly not the way in which the traditional *Talmid Hakham* would engage in study. The other important point which emerges is the fact that the haggadic anthology 'Eyn Ya'aqobh figures predominantly on the short list of books with which the founder of Hasidism would occupy himself. It is not without significance in this connection that nearly every Talmudic citation which occurs in Israel Baalshem's *dicta* occurs also in 'Eyn Ya'aqobh and could have been drawn from this secondary source instead of from the Talmud itself. That Israel knew his Talmudic passages not from a detailed study of the Talmud but rather from this famous anthology becomes more probable in view of the fact that sometimes when a Talmudic text in 'Eyn Ya'aqobh differs from that of the Talmud itself, Israel Baalshem quotes the Talmud according to the 'Eyn Ya'aqobh version.

direct body of sources of information is a number of scattered passages in the writings of his disciples, who either quote his teachings *verbatim* or describe behaviour reflecting his views. The scarcity of material compels one to make use also of certain fragmentary and clumsy traditions. From all this analysis no consistent concept of *Kavvanoth* of prayer seems to appear and the picture which emerges of Israel Baalshem's views and practice is somewhat vague. The evidence predominantly suggests that he had abandoned *Kavvanoth* as a method of meditation in the strict Kabbalistic sense, or rather never practised them at all.

There is no vast amount of biographical testimony which could be collected and from which some preliminary conclusions could be drawn. The most important passage of the *Shibḥey ha-Besht* regarding the place of the *Kavvanoth* in the prayer-life of Israel Baalshem is the following:

"I have heard from R. Falk that when R. Gershon of Koty came abroad from Palestine to marry off his son, he said incidentally: thank Heavens, I crossed the sea, let me go to my brother-in-law the Baalshem Tobh. He arrived there on Friday. The Baalshem stood up and was [engaged] in the afternoon prayer and he prolonged his prayer until stars came out.<sup>12</sup> R. Gershon also prayed from a prayer book of R. I. Luria.<sup>13</sup> Afterwards [R. Gershon] read the [weekly] portion twice with translation,<sup>14</sup> then he asked for cushions which were brought, and he lay down to rest. On Friday night during the meal R. Gershon asked his brother-in-law the Baalshem Tobh: 'Why did you prolong the prayer so much? I too prayed with *Kavvanoth* and read the [weekly] portion twice with the translation, then I had to lie down to rest, while you were standing and trembling and making gestures!' For he [R. Gershon] wanted to elicit some statement from him. But the Baalshem remained silent and answered him nothing. And he asked him repeatedly. So the Baalshem Tobh replied: When I come to the words 'He revives the dead' . . . and I meditate the *Kavvanah* of *Yihudim*, then the souls of the dead come in their thousands and in their tens of thousands, and I have to discuss with each one of them

<sup>12</sup> A remark designed to give authority to the Ḥasidic custom of very late *Minḥah*? There is no other evidence that the custom was established as early as the lifetime of the founder of Ḥasidism, but there is no evidence to the contrary either.

<sup>13</sup> i.e. a prayer-book with the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*.

<sup>14</sup> It is a religious duty to read twice on every Sabbath the weekly portion of the Law and the traditional Aramaic version of Onqelos, cf. *Shulḥan 'Arukh*, *Orah Ḥayyim*, chapter 285.

why he was cast out of his heavenly place.<sup>14a</sup> And I effect a *Tiqqun* for him, pray for him and uplift him . . . And they are so numerous, that if I wished to uplift them all, I would have to stand in the *Shemoneh 'Esreh* prayer for three years".<sup>15</sup>

In its further development the story proves to be describing one of those situations recurrent in the legendary biography in which representatives of higher halakhic or kabbalistic knowledge put Israel Baalshem to the test. In these circumstances it is apparent, at least in the opinion of the *Shibhḥey*'s author, that R. Gershon's remark "I too prayed with *Kavvanoth*" was an ironical jibe at Israel Baalshem's assumed incapacity to meditate due to his scanty knowledge of Kabbalah. Israel Baalshem at first ignored the question,<sup>16</sup> but eventually betrayed that it was not the Lurianic *Kavvanoth* of prayer which kept him so long in prayer. He rather busied himself with some highly individual meditative operations of his own devising which he was willing to put at the disposal of his brother-in-law.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14a</sup> We can observe in Hasidic circles a curious fascination with the secrets of one's own soul and its spiritual vicissitudes. This inquisitiveness is articulated in three questions: (a) what is the "root" of one's soul; (b) what was one's crucial sin during the preceding phase of the transmigration of one's soul, or (c) which is one's sin in the present phase, a sin which, if unattended, will cause the soul to transmigrate further. This psychological interest came down to Hasidism from earlier generations brought up on the Lurianic version of the doctrine of metempsychosis. In Hasidism this interest exuberated and was connected with the institution of Ṣaddiqism, as it was the *Ṣaddiq* who was able to satisfy it. For the Lurianic antecedents cf. G. SCHOLEM, "Seelenwanderung und Sympathie der Seelen in der jüdischen Mystik", *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, xxiv (1956), pp. 55 ff. and the passage from Moses Zacuto quoted by R. J. Z. WERBLOWSKY, "Das Gewissen in jüdischer Sicht", *Das Gewissen* (Studien aus dem Jung-Institut Zurich vii), p. 113. For the phenomenon in Hasidism see the instructive passage in *Or ha-meir*, ii: 58b-59a; cf. also *Shibhḥey ha-Besht*, pp. 7, 56, 59, 64. I hope to discuss this subject in greater detail on some future occasion.

<sup>15</sup> *Shibhḥey*, p. 64-65. Note the irreverence in the behaviour and expression of R. Gershon towards Israel Baalshem, which the Hasidic writer does not conceal though the whole affair is supposed to have taken place after R. Gershon's *'aliyah* to Palestine, i.e. long after his alleged acceptance of Israel Baalshem's spiritual authority. Cf. my remarks on the relationship between Israel Baalshem and R. Gershon in my article in *JJS*, vol. viii: (1957), pp. 211-12. From the text of the *Shibhḥey* quoted above it is plain that its author did not consider R. Gershon "converted" to Israel Baalshem as late as his journey from Palestine to his previous home. As to chronology of this journey cf. A. HESCHEL, *HUCA*, vol. xxiii (1950-51), part ii, p. 41 but cf. G. SCHOLEM, *Shetey 'Iggaroth, Tarbiš*, vol. xxv (1956) p. 430-31, note 4.

<sup>16</sup> A parallel situation is to be found in *Shibhḥey*, p. 104, where he is asked by Rabbi Abraham Abba to answer halakhic questions, but evaded the demands of the questioner just as he does here. As to the identity of the questioner cf. I. HALPERN, *Pinqas va'ad 'arba' arašoth*, Jerusalem, 1945, p. 531.

<sup>17</sup> The same R. Gershon persisted in dismissing Israel Baalshem's pneumatic claims on the grounds of the latter's not being sufficiently educated, cf. J. G. WEISS, *JJS*, vol. viii (1957), p. 211.



A second example of prolonged meditative prayer on the part of the Baalshem Tobh without *Kavvanoth* is the following, reported similarly in the *Shibhhey*:

"I have heard in the name of R. 'Eliyyahu of Sokolwka:<sup>18</sup> When he was still a youngster, living in Miedzyboz,<sup>19</sup> he heard once that the Baalshem Tobh said, 'He who wishes his prayer to reach Heaven, let him pray with me word for word!' And R. 'Eliyyahu did so. When the Baalshem Tobh said 'Adon', he said so too, and when he said 'Olam' he too said 'Olam',<sup>20</sup> until the whole prayer was ended. And they did so for a long time. Once the Baalshem Tobh reached in the *Pesugey de-zimra*<sup>21</sup> the verse 'false is the horse for deliverance' (*Psalms* xxxiii: 17) and he repeated it several times lingering over it for a long time. [R. 'Eliyyahu] said it with him the first time and afterwards wondered what he was meditating upon in this verse. So he looked up the book *Mishnath Hasidim*,<sup>22</sup> but there were no *Kavvanoth* [for this verse]. So he ceased to pray with him. One day he came to the Baalshem Tobh's house. The Baalshem saw him and said to him: 'Eliyyahu, you have ceased to pray with me!' He told him that it was because he said that verse several times. He replied that 'it happened that a Jew on the highway on Friday could not reach a village before the Sabbath and spent the Sabbath in a field. It became known to a robber that a Jew was spending the Sabbath in a field, and he rode on a horse to find and kill him. By saying this [verse] I put him off the track so that he would not find him.'"<sup>23</sup>

Here the Baalshem is confronted not by a Kabbalist of high standing who does not deem him qualified to pray with *Kavvanoth* as on the previous occasion, but by a young boy who naturally expects the lengthy prayer of Israel Baalshem to result from the use of Lurianic *Kavvanoth*. But the Baalshem disappoints him. The sequel to the story reveals a similar state of affairs as above: The Baalshem turns out to have been engaged in meditations but decidedly not of the Lurianic type. While repeating the verse "false is the horse for deliverance", he was deeply involved in an experience of clairvoyance concentrated on saving a Jew. Here again the Baalshem is caught in an improvised method of meditation during prayer while the outward appearance of lengthy prayer would convey to the onlooker an

<sup>18</sup> In the county of Braclaw.

<sup>19</sup> The town in which Israel Baalshem settled and died.

<sup>20</sup> The morning prayer (*Shaharith*) commences with the words *Adon 'Olam*.

<sup>21</sup> A series of psalms in the first part of the morning prayer.

<sup>22</sup> Written by the Italian Kabbalist Emmanuel Hai Ricchi who belonged to the Lurianic school. His book is a summary of the Lurianic Kabbalah. The part called *Maphteah ha-kavvanoth* (Amsterdam, 1740, p. 34 ff.) is a most elementary *vademecum* for prayer with *Kavvanoth*.

<sup>23</sup> *Shibhhey*, p. 100.



impression of adherence to the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*, from which the Baalshem was in fact far removed.

Thus far the legendary material about the Baalshem, many details of which are open to doubt but which is nevertheless authentic in its core.<sup>24</sup> In neither case is Israel Baalshem explicit in denouncing the Lurianic method of meditation, but in practice he is clearly interested in more individual meditations directed at more concrete and proximate aims than the Sephirotic ones of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*.

The highest degree of authenticity can be accredited to traditions of Israel Baalshem written down by his disciple R. Jacob Joseph of Polonne. What can one learn on our subject from the teachings transmitted in his name by this disciple? The following tradition is quite unequivocal. In it, as in the legendary biography, Israel Baalshem is not abrogating the Lurianic method of *Kavvanoth* but is rather silently discarding it in favour of a more emotional and direct, though less disciplined and less complex meditative prayer-life.

"I have heard from my teacher [Israel Baalshem] that R. Neḥunya ben ha-Qanah even after he knew all the *Kavvanoth*, used to pray like a one-day-old child, etc.<sup>25</sup> And my teacher explained that in the matter of prayer and the worship of God there were two aspects: (a) the 'left' [i.e.] that the Holy One, blessed be He, repels one and (b) that God's 'right' hand draws one close. And the matter is expounded in *Tur 'Orah Hayyim*, ch. 5, where the author wrote that one should have in mind [*yekhavven*] the name of God as it is pronounced 'Adonay, meaning that He is the Master of All, and one should have in mind [*yekhavven*] the name of God as it is written *YHVH*, meaning that He was, He is and will be, and keeps in existence (*mehavveh*) all the Worlds. Therefore, when a man says with an understanding heart 'Blessed art Thou', then God is face to face with him. And as to the interpretation of the Tetragrammaton, its meaning is that He was, is and will be and keeps in existence [*mehavveh*] all the Worlds and gives life to all

<sup>24</sup> I have restricted myself here to examples of *Kavvanoth* of prayer only. There is ample evidence in the *Shibhhey* concerning other *Kavvanoth* being employed by Israel Baalshem. Cf. pp. 16, 101.

<sup>25</sup> The enigma of this fantastic quotation which, naturally, does not occur anywhere in Talmudic or Midrashic literature, was solved by R. Shimeon Menahem Mendel Wandek in his valuable though uncritical collection of Israel Baalshem's "complete" dicta, both authentic and apocryphal (*Sefer Baalshem Tobh*, 2 vols., Lodz, 1938, vol. I, p. 180, note 126, where the author suggests that R. Neḥunya ben ha-Qanah is erroneously substituted for R. Samson of Chinon, who is quoted by R. Solomon Luria (*Responsa* No. 98) to the same effect. This identification is certainly correct. It would be of some value to decide whether the mistake was made by Israel Baalshem or whether he found it already in his sources.

souls, through the mentioning of this [Divine] name. Is there an enjoyment superior to this, speaking with the King, King of the Universe, face to face? As it is written (*Cant.* i: 2), 'Let Him kiss me with the kisses of His mouth,' and then this state [*behinah*] is called 'His [God's] right hand will embrace me' [*ibid.* ii: 6]. This is not the case if one's sins separate one from one's Maker, in which case when saying 'blessed art Thou' a wayward thought [*mahash-abhah zarah*] interposes itself between oneself and one's God, and the thought irritates him with the vanities of his dealings in this world and he cannot concentrate [*lekhavven*] and he is deprived of the marvellous enjoyment of 'Let Him kiss me with the kisses of His mouth'. Then this state [*behinah*] is called 'the left hand of the Holy One, blessed be He' . . . Thus there are two states, 'right' and 'left', and the wise man has eyes in his head to understand and realise whether the time is appropriate to concentrate [*lekhavven*] within the inner mystery, and to enjoy it as mentioned above. This is good. But if he sees that he is within the mystery of littleness [*qatnuth*]<sup>26</sup> and he cannot concentrate [*lekhavven*] because wayward thoughts overwhelm him, then he should pray like a one-day-old child from a written text [*kethabh*] as my teacher testified about himself: that for a while he had been in a 'foreign country' [*'eres 'ahereth*] in this respect; that the above-mentioned [high state of concentration] had left him; and that he used to attach himself to the letters [*ve-hayah*<sup>26a</sup> *medabbeq 'asmo 'el ha-'othiyyoth*]. And he said that when he was praying from the written text and was attaching himself to the letters, he would uplift the '*Asiyyah*'<sup>27</sup> . . . And so he ordered a person to do this until he returned to his high level.<sup>28</sup>

This certainly reliable tradition in the name of Israel Baalshem starts with the statement that Rabbi Nehunya ben ha-Qanah after having learnt all the *Kavvanoth* did not make use of them in prayer. In other words the *Kavvanoth* of prayer, an outstanding feature of Kabbalistic tradition, existed for Israel Baalshem on paper only. His special method, a technique which he developed for use during both prayer and study,<sup>29</sup> is called "attachment of oneself to the letters." Its core is an extreme atomisation of the text of prayer or study into its ultimate elements, i.e. (in Hebrew) the consonants. The technique of meditation consists in gazing rapt upon each letter. Atomised letters of the Hebrew alphabet are highly capable of serving as the medium

<sup>26</sup> On this psychological term and its meaning see G. SCHOLEM, "*Devekuth*", etc., *Journal of Religion*, vol. XV (1950), pp. 130-34 and J. G. WEISS, "R. Abraham Kalisker's Concept of Communion with God and Men", *JJS*, vol. VI (1955), esp. pp. 91-92.

<sup>26a</sup> I emended *yihyeh* of the printed text to *ve-hayah*.

<sup>27</sup> The last of the four "worlds" of emanation.

<sup>28</sup> *Kethoneth Passim*, p. 43, a-b.

<sup>29</sup> On contemplation during study cf. G. SCHOLEM, "*Devekuth*" etc., *Journal of Religion*, 1950, p. 123 ff.

of meditation, because for the traditional Jew the alphabet of the holy language is of metaphysical origin and importance.

In this atomisation the literal meaning of the sentence evaporates, and the letters which constitute the words and sentences after becoming meaningless through atomisation are a psychologically effective inducement to the performance of meditative exercises. This method is a patently visual one and the Baalshem Tobh explicitly recommends the use of a visual inducement in the form of a printed text by the aid of which one performs the meditative exercises. In structure this method is not far from the medieval technique of Abraham Abulafia, who recommended the even more sacred four letters of the tetragrammaton in its various vocalised forms for the purpose of meditation.<sup>30</sup> The method of the Baalshem is somewhat clumsier. The differently vocalised forms of the tetragrammaton are meaningless in themselves, whereas the texts on which Israel Baalshem would perform his exercises have first to be deprived of their literal meaning in order to become the abstract vehicle which is needed for the meditative movements of the soul. But we must realise that the Baalshem's method is far removed from the Kabbalistic doctrine of *Kavvanoth* during prayer, particularly from its Lurianic version.

The interesting thing is that this much advertised method of prayer is considered by Israel Baalshem himself to be an inferior one. It is the method of prayer in the state of mind called *Qatnuth* which amounts to anything from lack of concentration to deep depression.

A second fully authentic tradition from the pen of the same disciple:

"I have heard in the name of my teacher on the matter of prayer and its *Kavvanah* and the *Yihudim*, by means of which man must attach himself.<sup>31</sup> And it is known that he [i.e. man] is a microcosm and through the awakening below awakening above is brought about. And 'abundance' [*shefa* 'Divine emanation'] will be sent down to the level of the man who concentrates [*mekhavven*] on it, and he receives the 'abundance'."<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Cf. G. SCHOLEM, *MTJM*<sup>2</sup>, p. 132 ff.

<sup>31</sup> *she-šarikh le-qashsher eth-‘aşmo ba-hem*, i.e. by which man accomplishes *debhequth*; the other possibility of translation "to which he must attach himself" would also make sense. In this case it would be a construction like "*ledabbeq (‘aşmo) el ha-othiyoyoth*". The idiom *le-qashsher ‘aşmo* is widely used in early Hasidic texts and is synonymous with *le-dabbeq ‘aşmo*. So far no attention has been paid to the fact that *debhequth* and its derivations are not the only technical term for contemplation employed by Hasidic writers. *Hithqashruth*, *le-qashsher ‘aşmo*, etc. are used almost as frequently. Whereas *debhequth* is an old-established term going back to the philosophical translators of the Middle ages, *hithqashruth* seems to be a more recent coinage.

<sup>32</sup> *Toledoth*, 90b.



In this passage the precise nature of *Kavvanah* in prayer is left undefined. On the face of it Baalshem could mean the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*. The magical aspect of the Lurianic concept is certainly present, though rather than affecting the Sephirotic world the *Kavvanoth* act in this case upon the real world of the worshipper. One thing is clear: *Kavvanah* has become a vehicle of the central Ḥasidic virtue of *debhequth*.

Rather surprisingly another completely isolated tradition makes Israel Baalshem advocate the practice of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*, though perhaps not wholeheartedly:

"The Baalshem of blessed memory saw that it was necessary to pray with *Kavvanoth* and found only the *Kavvanoth* of R. Isaac Luria, and so they prayed of necessity according to those *Kavvanoth*."<sup>33</sup>

Although this collection of traditions originating from the circle of R. Raphael of Berszada contains some authentic traditions of the Balashem, a critical evaluation of this particular piece could hardly lead to defending its genuineness. The doubtful character of the tradition seems to be indicated not only by its complete isolation in presenting Israel Baalshem as a protagonist of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth* but also by the fact that it is quoted in order to support the claim for superiority of certain editions of the prayer book. For the text continues: "Therefore one must only pray from the *nosah* of the prayer book of Luria in the Lemberg edition or in the prayer book of R. Shabbethai [of Raskow],<sup>35</sup> not from other *noshaoth* which are in the new prayer books."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Pe'er la-Yesharim*, Jerusalem, 1921, p. 19a, § 211.

<sup>35</sup> A Kabbalistic prayer book with Lurianic *Kavvanoth*. It contains several traditions of Israel Baalshem's religious customs but none from the sphere of *Kavvanoth*.

<sup>36</sup> *Pe'er la-Yesharim*, *ibid.* Another dubious source would appear to present Israel Baalshem as opposed to the *Kavvanoth* of prayer. The following tradition is somewhat obscure and as it stands perhaps self-contradictory, and certainly open to various interpretations. I dare not say what its exact tendency is but nevertheless wish to call attention to it. "In the month of Elul a man must prepare himself for Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Shmeril of blessed memory said the name of Rabbi Nahman [of Horodenka?] that in Elul he [R. Nahman] used to pray every day with *Kavvanoth*. The Baalshem Tobh sent word to him to stop doing so, for one did not know whether one would pray with those *Kavvanoth*, because the war was God's; nevertheless one must prepare oneself, for one must not rely on a miracle." (M. J. GUTMAN, *Torath R. Pinhas mi-Korzec*, Bilgorai, 1931, p. 18). The "war" referred to is probably the "war" with the wayward thoughts (*mahashabhoth zaroth*). A rapidly changing strategy is needed in dealing with these cf. *Toledoth* p. 172a. Does the Baalshem mean to say in this tradition that *Kavvanoth* depend greatly on a special frame of mind, i.e. on the changing mood of the worshipper? This impressionist concept of *Kavvanoth* is patently not in tune with the Lurianic teaching.



In the body of writings which have come down in the name of the Great Maggid R. Dobh Baer, there are some pertinent expressions reflecting the new evaluation of *Kavvanoth* during prayer. With him started the virulent campaign against the *Kavvanoth* of prayer in their original Kabbalistic form. This disintegration of the old meaning of *Kavvanoth* and the emergence of a new concept based on the emotional values of a revivalist movement can be traced back to two statements of the Great Maggid which exercised a paramount influence on the question in Hasidism. The first statement is in the literary form of a parable. Its tendency is self-evident, in spite of the clumsy formulation and the somewhat confused symbols:

"This resembles [*mashal*] a door which one opens with something which can break iron. Thus the ancients [*qadmonim*] employed in meditation the *Kavvanah* [*hayu makhavvenim kavvanah*] suitable for each thing. [But] now that we have no *Kavvanah*, only the breaking of the heart will open [the door] to everything."<sup>37</sup>

The division between the 'ancient ones' and 'we' does not imply any revolutionary consciousness of time as one might have inferred. It is utterly different from the deep sensation of the renewal of time found in the Sabbatian repudiation of *Kavvanoth* where there is a consciousness of a *caesura* in history; while here it is merely a literary form subordinate to the need to justify the abandonment of old ways. The formula itself has a long history in halakhic thought and was occasionally used also in early Hasidism to overthrow practices which, though recommended by great authorities of earlier generations, were now thought to stand in the way of piety.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Or *ha-emeth*, 14a. A variant of this parable in a more elaborate form is quoted by R. Meshullam Phoebus in his epistle printed in *Liqqutey Yeqarim*, Lemberg, 1792, p. 27b, also in *Kether Shem Tobh*, towards the end of vol. I. (For a translation see below, p. 188). A variant of the parable is quoted by R. Benjamin of Zaloscie in his *Torey Zahabh*, Mohylow, 1816, p. 57b. "In the name of the preacher of the community of Miedzyrzecz our teacher Dobh. There are people who open the lock with a key, but he who has no key must break the door and the lock with something strong which can break iron. Thus the ancients [*rishonim*] used to open all the gates which have been closed since the destruction of the Temple with keys, i.e. with special *Kavvanoth* for every single gate. This is not so in later generations when the power of the *Kavvanoth* is not in our hands, and we must break all the locks without keys but only with the breaking of our evil hearts".

<sup>38</sup> The apology stating that the present generation is weak and incapable of great mental effort has in Hasidism wellnigh become a literary idiom which covers up the departure from established practice. It comprises, for example, the argument of a later generation of Hasidim against the early Hasidic practice of re-integrating wayward thoughts (*mahashabhoth zaroith*) into the stream of contemplation, cf. *Liqqutey Yeqarim*, Lemberg, 1792, p. 21b. The same formal argument was used in the little tractate "*Darkhey Yesharim*" by R. Menaḥem Mendel of Przemyślany for justifying a reduction of the time given to the study of the Torah for the sake of practising *debhequth*.

The second statement by the Great Maggid against *Kavvanoth* does not employ the argument of new times, but advocates the new values of *debhequth* and enthusiasm as superceding and indeed embracing the old ones. The magical implications of *Kavvanoth*, which greatly faded in Ḥasidism, are still discernable in the new concept of *Kavvanoth* of prayer as put forward by the Great Maggid:

"He who meditates [*mekhavven*] in prayer on all the *Kavvanoth* he knows can do no more than meditate on those *Kavvanoth* which are known to him. But when he says each word [of the prayer] with great attachment [*hithqashsheruth*] all the *Kavvanoth* are by that very fact [*me'asman u-me'alehen*] included since each and every letter is an entire world. When he utters the word with great attachment, surely those upper worlds are awakened, and thus he accomplishes great operations [*pe'ulloth gedholoth*]. Therefore, a man should see to it that he prays with great attachment and enthusiasm [*behithqashsheruth ubhe-hithlahabhuth gedholah*].<sup>39</sup> Then surely he will accomplish great operations in the upper worlds for each letter awakens [things which are] above."<sup>40</sup>

The metamorphosis which took place in the meaning of *Kavvanoth* at the advent of Ḥasidism, and more explicitly after the Great Maggid, consists in this—that an originally intellectual effort of meditation and contemplation has become an intensely emotional and highly enthusiastic act. The changes in the meaning and function of *debhequth* which occurred in Ḥasidism are parallel to the changes to which the *Kavvanoth* of prayer were subject in the same movement. If, as Scholem put it, in Ḥasidism thought was transformed into emotion, one is justified in saying that similarly in Ḥasidism *Kavvanoth* were de-intellectualised: they lost the intrinsic meaning they had had in Kabbalah, i.e. that of a series of highly specialised, technically focused and singularly intentional acts of the contemplative mind. Their intellectual character thus lost, they have become but one of the various synonyms of *debhequth*, that ubiquitous and multifarious Ḥasidic concept. This is small wonder, since Ḥasidism did its best to amalgamate all ideals of religious psychology into its central obsession of *debhequth*. All religious passion of the mind in early Ḥasidism was concentrated on this single aspect of mental communion with God, while all other aspects of religious life were either shown to be identical with *debhequth* or simply ignored altogether in the intense heat of *debhequth*-piety. Just as faith, (*'emunah*) was deprived in early

<sup>39</sup> For *hithqashruth* cf. above, note 31. Note the juxtaposition of *hithqashruth* and *hithlahabhuth* in the text.

<sup>40</sup> Or *ha-emeth*, 64a. Cf. the non-committal passage *ibid.* 25a.

Hasidism of its special psychological and religious physiognomy and became equated with *debhequth*,<sup>41</sup> so was the fate of Kabbalistic *Kavvanoth*. With all religious energies canalised in one compelling direction, *Kavvanoth* of prayer were interpreted—one might well say, were interpreted away—as *debhequth*.

Indeed, there was no other way for Hasidism but this. The metaphysical map of the *Sephiroth* of the Kabbalists had become blurred for them. Not only could its details not be seen with accuracy, but the whole Sephirotic world had lost its original significance and could consequently not serve as an object of religious meditation during prayer. With the fading of the “gnostic” aspect of the Sephirotic Universe from the mind and heart of the Kabbalist, the original *Kavvanoth* became meaningless and their disintegration was inevitable. This may be one of the reasons why the Hasidim re-shaped and re-motivated the concept of *Kavvanoth* in such a way that it was changed beyond recognition.

In conclusion, I propose to discuss one isolated tradition in the name of Israel Baalshem which would attribute to him an outspokenly negative attitude to *Kavvanoth*. This tradition was written down by R. Ze'ebh Wolf of Zytomierz, a disciple of the Great Maggid, in his work *'Or ha-Me'ir*. I did not refer to it in discussing Israel Baalshem's views as I surmise that it reflects later opinion:

“I heard in the name of the Baalshem Tobh, may his memory be blessed in life everlasting, that he related on this [i.e. the practice of *Kavvanoth*] the following parable: A man wants to eat and he craves for certain foods which please him. He then sees lying in a high place the food he likes but his hand cannot reach it, hence in imagination he pretends to himself that he is eating it [*mekhavven ke-'illu 'okhel*].<sup>42</sup> It turns out that his pretence [*kavvanah*] does not help him, for the more he pretends [*mekhavven*] the hungrier he becomes. Similar are those men who employ in meditation grand and lofty *Kavvanoth* [*mekhavvenim kavvanoth nora'oth ve-ramim*] . . . For their mind cannot reach there, since they are so remote from the meditation [*kavvanah*]. Thus what did it avail him? It is

<sup>41</sup> רביקות הוא, *Toledoth*, 129a, 195b; *Šafenath Pa'aneah*, 94a.

<sup>42</sup> The reader will realise that I have rendered the Hebrew *le-khavven* and *kavvanah* here and in other passages given in English translation, by several English words, e.g. to have in mind, concentrate, meditate, pretend, etc. according to the context. That this should be necessary, and indeed possible, is a clear indication of the fact that the character of the word as a technical term disintegrated in the hands of the Hasidic writers.



much better for him to refrain from intruding into a place too high for his rung and ability [*erko ve-hassaghat*].<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Korzec, 1798, p. 12a. All bibliographical questions relating to the early editions of *Or ha-meir* have been dealt with in an exemplary fashion by A. TAUBER, *Defusey Qores, Qiryath Sefer*, vol. ii, pp. 221-23 and vol. iv, p. 286. I give references according to what Tauber's paper proved to be the first edition. He did not, however, discuss the question of authorship. The book consists of homilies delivered by R. Zeebh Wolf in oral form and arranged according to the weekly portions. The circumstances of the composition of the book are not quite clear. The *haskamoth* only mention that the book originated in the author's sermons and the printer had the permission of the author's heirs to publish the material, but on the literary formation of the manuscript (date of the colophon and, according to Tauber, date of completion by the author: 1796) they remain silent. Only R. Lebh ben Joseph, *abh beth din* in Dzydlow, uses the expression *hibber* in connection with R. Zeebh Wolf (מורה"ר זאב). This would indicate a clear literary authorship in the usual sense, i.e. that the author himself committed to writing in Hebrew his sermons either before or after delivering them in Yiddish. On the other hand, it is possible that a disciple or disciples of the author were responsible for translating the sermons from the original Yiddish into Hebrew and editing them as was customary in early Hasidic circles. Cf. my preliminary remarks on this custom in *JJS*, vol. VIII (1957), p. 208. One receives the impression that the book is a literary document of uniformity of style. Its verbosity is not indicative of short notes taken down by disciples. Expressions like the following would hardly be suitable for a disciple merely recording his master's teachings: וכמו שאני עתיד לבאר את זה . . . ; (ii: 36b) וזכר רמותי בהקדמות הקדמות . . . ; (ii: 11a) לקמן א"ח . . . ; (iii: 49a) ותדברים עתיקים ולית מי להבין עכ"ז לא מנעתי מלכתוב כמו תוכן הכוונה (ii: 36a) this last passage does not refer to the text of *Or ha-meir* itself but to a quotation within it. Moreover some expressions permit conclusions as to the literary personality of the author. Though he probably made use of his sermons, nevertheless he wrote the work as one literary unit, and considered it as such, as can be seen particularly from the extensive system of accurate cross-references. This does not mean, of course, that everything was written down exactly in the order in which we have it in print, e.g. ii: 18a כאשר הארכנו מזה בדרוש שבועות and *Derush shabbu'oth* is pp. ii: 62b ff. A. WALDEN, *Shem ha-gedolim*, s.v. *Or ha-me'ir* quotes Isaac Jehuda Yehiel Safrin of Komarno, who expressed his doubts about the genesis of the book. According to the latter's *Nethibh Mišvotekha*, Jerusalem, 1947, pp. 100-101, the book was written down by an anonymous *shohet* and not by R. Zeebh Wolf himself. I. Y. Safrin also quotes his father-in-law R. Abraham Mordekhai of Pinczow who was an eye-witness of the author's dissatisfaction with the *shohet*'s work, when this was brought to him for inspection, S. DUBNOW, *Toledoth ha-Hasiduth*, vol. II, p. 203, note 4 quotes Walden and mentions that a similar Hasidic tradition was recorded by E. S. Zweifel in his *Shalom 'al Yisrael*, vol. I, p. 50. In fact, Zweifel's tradition is in all probability not an independent one but drawn from Walden's *Shem ha-gedolim*, which was published in 1864, several years prior to the publication of Zweifel's work (1868), and Zweifel was no doubt acquainted with it. Since Walden derived his information from Safrin, ultimately all doubt about R. Zeebh Wolf's authorship goes back to that simple passage in Safrin's *Nethibh Mišvotheykha*. But Safrin's testimony should be considered against the background of the malicious bibliographical gossip scattered over all the works of this prolific writer and vitriolic critic. Very many of his bibliographical remarks are intended to discredit famous Kabbalistic and Hasidic works or parts thereof. Safrin's pneumatic methods of literary criticism on questions of authorship need not concern us here; on the other hand I would not like to commit myself as to whether events which Safrin says he had witnessed himself or about which he relates the evidence of eye-witnesses are in fact reliable, and so it is in the case under discussion. I would not suggest that Safrin made up

*Continued at foot of next page*



This unequivocal and radical rejection of the practice of *Kavvanoth* has no parallel in those traditions of Israel Baalshem which are certainly authentic. On the other hand, it has many parallels in the sayings of the Great Maggid and his disciples. R. Ze'ebh Wolf bases Israel Baalshem's objection to *Kavvanoth* on the incapability of the worshipper to use them—an argument which was current, as we have seen above, in a slightly different version in the Great Maggid's circles. Unless very considerable argument can be advanced for concluding that the tradition in question is genuine after all, we have all reason to cast serious doubt on its authenticity as emanating from the Baalshem. Embedded as it is in a long discussion in the book 'Or ha-Me'ir on the uselessness of *Kavvanoth*, the tradition seems rather to reflect the climate of opinion in circles deriving their inspiration from the Great Maggid than to represent Israel Baalshem's own view.

As a practical measure of gradually building up and consuming the emotional resources of prayer-life, a *régime* of rationing of emotion and devotion was devised in early Hasidism which aimed at the careful planning of the emotional ebb and flow during prayer, thus controlling the devotional energy so that the worshipper was not exhausted by losing too much devotion on the preparatory phases before reaching the peak of his daily prayer.

"I have heard it from my master [Israel Baalshem] . . . that one ought to fortify oneself before prayers in order that one may have mind [*mohin*] for prayer . . . And this by means of Psalms and *Torah* with which one should occupy oneself at the commencement. Consequently, when one stands up to pray, one has a mind for it . . . There is, however, the case when one multiplies reciting Psalms or *Torah* before prayers and, as a result, has no mind for prayers. This, then, is the significance of what was said 'it is all one whether a man does much or little, if only he directs his heart towards Heaven', i.e., that he has a mind for prayers . . ." <sup>43a</sup>

<sup>43a</sup> *Toledoth* 83a, cf. parallel passage *ibid.* 145 b. The quotation "It is all one" etc. is from *Mishnah Menahoth* xiii: 2, *B. Berakhoth* 5b.

the story of the *sho'het* handing over the manuscript of the book to R. Zeebh Wolf; but the circumstances might have been much simpler, e.g. that R. Zeebh Wolf had his own manuscript copied by the *sho'het* and was dissatisfied with the work done; Safrin, preoccupied as he was with exposing literary forgeries, immediately drew serious bibliographical conclusions on hearing a second-hand account of this in itself perhaps trivial story. It is obvious that one would wish to learn of the exact circumstances in which the book came into existence, particularly since it contains a great number of quotations from Israel Baalshem and the Great Maggid.

The aim of this planning of a devotional curve can be described as the coincidence in time of the emotional climax of the worshipping individual with his utterance of that section of the prayer which is considered the holiest. The advice is still more unequivocally formulated in the *Şawwa'ah* about the technique of economizing in emotion in order to "save strength" and attain the high tide of sense of *debhequth* at the right place of the prayer:

"Let a man not recite many Psalms before the prayer in order that he may not weaken his body and find himself unable to recite the most important prayer, relative to the duty of the day, i.e., the hymns and the *Shema'* and the prayer [of '*Amidah*] with great attachment, because he had spent his strength before the prayer on other things . . . [Similarly,] on the Day of Atonement, before the *Ne'ilah* prayers, one ought to recite the *Maḥzor* in littleness [of emotion] in order that afterwards he may be able to say his prayers with attachment."<sup>43b</sup>

By contrast, R. Ze'ebh Wolf seems to care little for curbing his radically subjective approach to matters of prayer. He has no interest in carefully calculating and correctly timing the worshipper's mounting emotion in prayer. Its sudden eruption in the course of the prayer is welcome at any time. As against the background of the more sober views of Israel Baalshem and the *Şavva'ah*, the following passage in '*Or ha-Me'ir* appears as the recommendation of subjective abandonment in prayer and of immersion in the abysmal depths of emotional orgies:

"And behold the Men of the Great Synagogue, by the magnitude of their enlightenment, established for us the matters of the order of prayer in accordance with the emanation of the Worlds, '*Aşiluth*, *Beri'ah*, *Yeşirah*, '*Asiyyah*, corresponding to which there are four sections of prayer . . . , as indicated in the *Kavvanoth* of R. Isaac Luria . . . So also their lofty wisdom demanded with regard to the order of the totality of the rungs [*madregoth*]. Thus they arranged . . . unifications and copulations [*yihudim ve-ziwwugim*] of prayer, each one in its proper place.: in the verse, '*Shema'*', unification [*yihud*] as shown in the [*Lurianic*] *Kavvanoth* while afterwards the three first benedictions [of the '*Amidah*] with their proper *Kavvanoth* belonging there; then the twelve middle ones, [benedictions of the '*Amidah*] with their proper *Kavvanoth* followed by the mystery of prostration. Thus demanded their lofty wisdom, because they were sages, who comprised the totality of the generations after them until the coming of our Messiah soon and in our days. Now, however, in our generation, with our diminished hearts, when none possesses knowledge of the quality of the

<sup>43b</sup> *Şavvaath ha-Ribhash*, beginning.

*Kavvanoth* properly, to be able to harmonise his own feelings [*middothaw*] by a stirring up and enthusiasm [*hith'oreruth vehithlahabhuth*] in prayer so that each *Kavvanah* of the prayer finds itself in its proper place. At times he will awaken his heart with such great enthusiasm as almost to make his soul depart and become oblivious to any movement in the world, and he is attached [*mequshshar*] both with his 248 members and 365 veins to Him Who is blessed. And he should know that just then is the real unification which is due in the verse 'Hear, O Israel'; to him it happens immediately at the commencement of prayer, or occasionally in the middle of it or at the end. However, when [reciting the prayer] he reached the mystery of unification of 'Hear, O Israel', he has not yet felt the high tide [of emotion]. Since the high tide [of emotion] came to him at the end of prayer or by chance at the commencement of prayer, and when he comes to the verse 'Hear, O Israel', this tide has already come to an end and finished. The general rule is that he, who desires to approach the service of the heart which is prayer,<sup>43c</sup> let his heart be perfect with God in order to meditate with the strength of his understanding so as to feel the high tides at any place in the prayers, at the beginning or in the middle or at the end, when enthusiasm falls upon him; when he utters words with fear and love to attain to the departure of his soul, there is the real point of unification of his prayer in his individual way [*le-'erko*], and there the high tide comes to an end, wherefore he says the remainder of his prayers not with due exertion as before; that is to say, the main aspect of his unification incumbent upon him had come to an end for him. But all this depends on the individual character of every one of Israel and on where the place of his soul is in the upper worlds. Although according to the order of the rungs the unification should be with abandon of soul in the '*Shema*.' this is [only] in the generality of all the worlds and in the generality of all generations. But as far as a particular soul of the House of Israel is concerned the aspect of his unification depends upon his [own] high tides, whether these are strong or weak and where the place of his soul is, accordingly the unification of his prayer occurs, when he is awakened with enthusiasm for God with fear and love . . ."<sup>43d</sup>

R. Ze'ebh Wolf fulminates against the unjustified use by the unworthy of *Kavvanoth* of prayer. The use of these must have persisted sporadically in Hasidic circles, although R. Ze'ebh Wolf does not specify the location of the abuse, whether in circles of *Hasidim* or of *Mithnaggedim*. From his general approach however it clearly transpires that his criticism is directed against hasidic circles as he was one of the first *Ṣaddiqim* to transfer their target of criticism from the

<sup>43c</sup> B. *Ta'anith*, 2a.

<sup>43d</sup> *Or ha-Meir*, ii: 109b.

*Mithnaggedim* to their own flock.<sup>43e</sup> His most pertinent passage against *Kavvanoth* is perhaps this:

" . . . For indeed he, who has not bent his neck in divine service even though he be a learned scholar having perfect knowledge of all the *Kavvanoth*, he should know that he has not tasted yet the taste of prayer . . . Because he has failed to grasp the difference between his right hand and his left, viz., the nature of the *Kavvanah*. Certainly the Men of the Great Synagogue did not intend this, when he with his small perception and comprehension imagines that he meditates the *Kavvanoth* of Luria: 'Wherefore is there a price in the hand of a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it'.<sup>43f</sup> I vouch for it that had he but a rudiment of the fear of Heaven, he would most certainly be afraid for himself to seek and to look into the *Kavvanoth*, which reach heaven, while he himself stands below, ignorant of even one single word concerning the *Kavvanoth* of R. Isaac Luria, and if the Lord will, we shall yet speak in the following chapters on this subject to rebuke them to their face, those who consider themselves also to have a hand and a name among the great ones and to recite their prayers from the prayer-book of Luria . . . and to meditate *Kavvanoth*. It would be good for them, if they merely recited the prayers according to the simple meaning of the words and not give occasion for alien meanings to meddle with the combination of their letters and words, which they utter in a perfunctory way. Then it would indeed be well with them."<sup>43g</sup>

Instead of the complex method of intellectual concentration involved in the Kabbalistic *Kavvanoth* R. Ze'ebh Wolf himself advocates a simplified emotional method based on the predominant religious mood of each unit of the prayer:

"He whom God endowed with understanding will know that the essential *Kavvanah* [*'iqqar ha-kavvanah*] is only the one which a man derives for himself [*loqeah le-'ašmo*] from the meaning of the verse

<sup>43e</sup> See e.g., i: 5a, i: 60b his criticism of the view held by what he calls vulgar masses that movements of the body during prayer drive out wayward thoughts. Such pieces of criticism by both Hasidic and anti-Hasidic authors are relevant to the historian: research will have to reconstruct on this basis the features of a popular Hasidism. By this I do not mean popularized Hasidism but a body of teachings, tenets and practices of anonymous provenance which had a sub-literary and oral existence among the Hasidic masses. These teachings were never expressed in adequate literary *media* by the *Šaddiqim* or recorded by their literarily minded disciples. Nevertheless the existence of popular Hasidism can be inferred from references to it in the literary works of the movement. This popular Hasidism comprised widely held views and practices based on or derived from genuine Hasidic doctrines or attitudes and also many religious views too radical for survival in the more disciplined and more responsible "upper" literature of Hasidism. Research in an amorphous body of teachings, the existence of which can only be deduced from the implied or overt criticism of it in Hasidic literature and in anti-Hasidic polemic, must obviously be tentative.

<sup>43f</sup> *Prov.* xvii: 16.

<sup>43g</sup> *ibid.* ii: 34a.



[*kavvanoth ha-pasuq*]. Thus he induces in himself the Love of God or the Fear of God according to the meaning [of the verse]. Then in the next verse he concentrates on another *Kavvanah* and derives for himself another aspect to arouse his heart to utter his words before God 'in Love and Fear'; consequently he will pray with fervour and enthusiasm."<sup>44</sup>

This patently amounts to a new concept of *Kavvanoth* of prayer. It is a further development of the emotional concept of *Kavvanoth* first put forward by the Great Maggid. In the Great Maggid's view *Kavvanoth* became a vague emotional state of the worshipper, the precise nature of which was not specified. This indeterminate flood of emotion is now forced by turns into the two main channels of traditional religious emotion, love and fear. The alternating moods of the worshipper will now be determined by the meaning of the verse uttered by him at each particular moment of the Divine service. The worshipper may no longer indulge in emotional excesses independent of the text on his lips. The emotional anarchy which had followed in Hasidism the systematic discipline of Kabbalistic *Kavvanah* is curtailed in R. Ze'ebh Wolf's method. The worshipper is once more bound to his text.

A strikingly similar method is advocated by the anonymous author of the minor tractate *Darkhey Sedeq* by a disciple of R. Elimelech of Lesajsk.<sup>44a</sup> His method makes provision for three basic religious emotions instead of two: in addition to love and fear it recognises joy (*simḥah*). In other respects it precribes the same procedure as R. Ze'ebh Wolf: the worshipper has to derive the flow of his religious moods from the changing emotional implications of his prayer text.

"All *Kavvanoth* of prayer are [designed] to serve Him with love in a verse that speaks of love and with fear in a verse that speaks of fear, and similarly with joy. Even though the whole prayer requires [the emotions of both] love and fear, only during a verse that speaks of love must there be a predominance of love over fear and joy, and so on."<sup>45</sup>

R. Meshullam Phoebus of Zbaraz occupies a special place in the school of the Great Maggid for several reasons. His outspoken stand against the early Hasidic technique of 'uplifting the strange and wayward thoughts' secures for him an important position in the history of Hasidic ideas. Although he defeated the Great Maggid on

<sup>44</sup> Or *ha-me'ir*, i: 12a.

<sup>44a</sup> Probably R. Zechariah Mendel of Jaroslaw.

<sup>45</sup> *Darkhey Sedeq*, Lemberg, 1796, p. 9a.

this issue,<sup>46</sup> he undoubtedly belongs to the school of the Great Maggid as regards the question of *Kavvanoth* of prayer.

In his most important second epistle, written in 1777,<sup>47</sup> after

<sup>46</sup> Cf. above, p. 177 and note 38.

<sup>47</sup> The date of the epistle is not mentioned in the anonymously printed *Liqqutey Yeqarim*, Lemberg, 1792, in which the epistle is incorporated (also anonymously), but the date is given in the new edition of the author's writings, including the two epistles, under the title *Yosher Dibhrey Emeth*, Munkacs, 1905, p. 10b. The editor, Samson Heller of Kolymyja, a descendant of R. Meshullam Phoebus, used a manuscript which contained the date of the first epistle: Tuesday, 19th Sivan 5537 (1777). The second epistle containing the passage on *Kavvanoth* does not bear a date but must have been written during the *yamim nora'im* (cf. ed. Munkacs p. 35a '*akshav ba-yamim ha-nora'im*') of the year 5538 (1777) since the '*aliya* of R. Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk, R. Israel of Plock, R. Abraham of Kolisk and their followers is clearly alluded to as a recent event (p. 24b): *אכל כעת כפי הנראה והנשמע מהנפיעה שנוסעי לארץ הקדושה רבים וכן שלימים וכן נגזרו ועברו והשלימים שעברו הם המפורסמים מאד בעלי רוח"ק וגדולים בתורה ובגולה ובנסתר ועמדם רבים מעניי הצאן קדשים*. The time of this '*aliya* was Adar 5537, cf. DUBNOW, *Toledoth ha-Hasiduth*, vol. I, p. 134; I. HALPERN, *Ha-'aliyoth ha-rishonoth shel ha-Hasidim*, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv, 1947, p. 20. Since from internal evidence it is clear that the second epistle was written after the first, we may safely date the second epistle in the following autumn (*Yamim Nora'im* of 5538). I should like to take this opportunity to mention that the book *Liqqutey Yeqarim* printed anonymously in 1792 must have been edited by R. Meshullam Phoebus himself, or at least with his permission. He was still alive in 1792, the year of the edition, since according to family-tradition (published in the book *Zerizutha de-Abraham* of his brother R. Abraham Noah Heller, Lemberg, 1900, p. [4] he died on Kislev 20th, 5555 (1795). He probably used the mask of anonymity for reasons of religious self-effacement. DUBNOW in his *Toledoth ha-Hasiduth*, vol. ii: p. 323, note 5, correctly suggested the name of R. Meshullam Phoebus in connection with the anonymity surrounding *Liqqutey Yeqarim*; he did so partly at the inspiration of A. WALDEN, *Shem ha-Gedolim he-Hadash*, partly on bibliographical considerations. The Munkacs edition of *Yosher Dibhrey Emeth* which could have settled the problem definitely, was unknown to Dubnow. In any event, Dubnow is too vague regarding the role he would assign to R. Meshullam; he identifies R. Meshullam as the author of the two epistles, but he mentions a "circle" in whose editorial work R. Meshullam participated, thus the anthology would be the result of collective editorship. Things become much simpler if we assume that R. Meshullam alone was the compiler and editor of the anthology (no "circle" is ever mentioned in the work), smuggling his own two epistles anonymously into the anthology which he prepared for a similarly anonymous publication. The question of editorship has far-reaching implications. If R. Meshullam Phoebus' concealed editorial function in the anthology *Liqqutey Yeqarim* can be established conclusively, as I believe to be possible on philological grounds, then the tendentious composition of the anthology becomes self-evident. The choice and arrangement of the various Hasidic texts were anything but random. We possess unexpectedly good information about the editor's religious tendencies: in his second epistle he set out the principles of a radical revision of Hasidic teaching and practice concerning the "uplifting and restoration of wayward thoughts". R. Meshullam Phoebus advocates the restriction of this paradoxical technique of early Hasidism to persons of extremely high spiritual standards only (a *proviso* which certainly did not exist in the early Hasidic formulations of the same technique); for all practical purposes this *proviso* was paramount to abandoning the admittedly not only paradoxical, but also dangerous playing with the fire of the *ma'hashabhoth zaro'oth*. If the author of the epistles and the editor of the anthology are the same, the criterion for the selection of early Hasidic texts for an anthology was obviously the same

*Continued at foot of next page*

giving some advice on *Kavvanoth* to be used in a ritual bath or during necessary ablutions, he admonishes his addressee:

"But you must learn and revise this *Kavvanah* several times with some good friend until it is fixed in your mind so that you are able to meditate with facility. This is the way with all the *Kavvanoth* which must be very firmly fixed in the mind [ready] to meditate in a moment. For our mind is limited and cannot comprise all that one must meditate upon. And the real *Kavvanah* [*'iqqar ha-kavvanah*] is cleaving [*debhequth*] to God, blessed be He. And if we meditate on the *Kavvanoth* of the Divine Names we are not able to meditate on what is really necessary [i.e. *debhequth*]. This is why the *Kavvanah* must be fixed [and ready] in a moment. The real *Kavvanah* in truth is upon God, blessed be He, who tries the reins and the heart, when

declared policy of doing away with the practice of dealing with *mahashabhoth zaroeth*. The compiler of the anthology may be expected to have selected from earlier Hasidic literature such passages only as he deemed most fitting for his clearly stated purpose. Once we suppose that R. Meshullam Phoebus himself was behind the anthology, it would not be surprising that he did not include in the anthology any of the hundreds of passages of early Hasidic literature dealing with the "uplifting and restoration of wayward thoughts", a favourite topic of early Hasidism; for he wished the whole theme to become practically obsolete. Obviously the inclusion of any such passages in this anthology would have frustrated its purpose. Moreover combined with his epistles, in which he expressly fought against the technique of restoration of *mahashabhoth zaroeth*, R. Meshullam made the entire collection of *Liqqutey Yeqarim* the vehicle of a powerful appeal in the interests of his reformed Hasidism. Far from being an innocent compiler of a non-partisan anthology chosen *sine ira*, and, as it were, at random from the body of Hasidic texts available at his time, the compiler, identified as R. Meshullam, emerges as a propagandist of his own ideas. An analysis of the material chosen for *Liqqutey Yeqarim* would show a clear policy of discrimination against those aspects of early Hasidism which indulge in the exotic meditative cult of "uplifting the *mahashabhoth zaroeth*". While our anthology carefully eliminates the dark and chthonic aspects so prevalent in the teachings of the first two Hasidic generations, it throws into calculated prominence the pure mystical side of Hasidism with its radiant serenity of plain, non-paradoxical *debhequth*. The same is true of the early tractate on contemplation, *Hanhagoth Yesharoeth* (also called *Darkhey Yesharim*), by R. Menahem Mendel of Przemyślany, one of R. Meshullam Phoebus' masters. R. Meshullam drew heavily on this tractate in compiling the anthology. The so-called *Savva'ath ha-Ribhash* also contains tendentious material. The partisanship of the latter two is more veiled, but the polemical tendency against the old views of Hasidism and propaganda for the new ones could nevertheless be shown to exist in both. Much scholarly work on Hasidism (Dubnow, Horodetzky, Ysander) is invalidated on account of taking these three books and particularly the *Savva'ah*, not for exponents of a reform of original Hasidism but for straightforward Hasidic teaching. In a short hint in my paper on the *Beginnings of Hasidism* (in Hebrew, *Sion*, vol. xvi: 1951, p. 104) I still thought that the book *Liqqutey Yeqarim* was the water-shed between old and new in Hasidism, but in view of the fact that in the short tractate *Darkhey Yesharim* the germs of the reform can be discovered, it now seems to me that rather R. Menahem Mendel of Przemyślany was the first to develop an antagonism against the technique of re-integration of the wayward thoughts into the stream of contemplation and that R. Meshullam Phoebus was thus not an innovator but merely continued his master's tradition and formulated it more explicitly. A full enquiry into the various and often contradictory techniques of dealing with *mahashabhoth zaroeth* in early Hasidism is an urgent *desideratum*.



[the worshipper] truly attaches himself to God without ulterior motives [*peniyyoth*], God forbid. Therefore one must revise many times the above mentioned *Kavvanoth* of Divine Names. And truly, the real *Kavvanah* is the breaking of the heart in humility and cleaving [*debhequth*] to God, blessed be He. There is a simile on this matter in the writings under the name of Rabbi Baer that there is a key to every lock, a key that opens it precisely, and the key is fitted [*mekhuvvan*] according to the lock. But there are thieves who open without a key, that is to say, they break the lock. Thus is this matter: to every hidden thing there is a key, which is the *Kavvanah*, fitted to it [*mekhuvveneth*, also 'to be meditated'].<sup>48</sup> The real key is like a thief who breaks everything—breaking the heart well in great humility so that the barrier above is broken . . .<sup>49</sup>

And, indeed, you know that I learned some *Kavvanoth* in childhood, but I do not meditate upon them at all, for the real *Kavvanah* is the breaking of the heart as mentioned above, with love and fear, simplicity . . . as mentioned above. And were we granted this, we could easily meditate all the *Kavvanoth* of Rabbi Isaac Luria of blessed memory; for these were indeed not intended but for men of his stature, or of a little lower standing, whose heart was already pure from all dregs . . . But we are afflicted from top to toe, and all our heads are ill and our hearts ailing. Our hearts are not purified from physical desires at all, how much less from refined desires, as we take pleasure and delight in being praised and exalted, and hate being scorned. Because of this we are far from God, blessed be He, and we are not able to meditate the high meditations. Therefore I have chosen to meditate on one *Kavvanah*: to direct the heart [*lekhavven halebh*] as much as possible to God, blessed be He, [and] to the meaning of the words [*kavannath hatebhoth vehamilloth*] (of the prayer) as far as possible. And in spite of this, if I can meditate in an instant some easy *Kavvanah*, that is to say, a Divine Name which does not give trouble and does not distract from the true *Kavvanah* as mentioned above—that is good.

But during the performance of *misvoth* such as *tephillin*, *sukkah*, *lulabh* or *shophar*, it is good to meditate on the *Kavvanoth* of Divine Names. For there there is no speech, only action. But in speech like prayer there are directives [*Kavvanoth*] to concentrate [*lekhavven*] the heart on what is being said because it is almost impossible to speak unless with great effort. And how can one proceed [*laseth*] from the literal meaning to the *Kavvanah*? Nevertheless, it is very good to learn the *Kavvanoth* of all the prayers, for by this means the soul awakens when it knows how far these things go—[namely] that [the words of the prayer] bring about a great

<sup>48</sup> The author is obviously playing on the various meanings of the verb *lekhavven*, meaning "to meditate" and, particularly in non-Kabbalistic texts, "to fit" and in *lekhavven ha-lebh* "to direct one's heart". Cf. also note 42.

<sup>49</sup> A variant on this parable has been dealt with above p. 177. The present version is reproduced in *Kether Shem Tobh*, vol. I towards the end.



achievement above, very fearful. By means of this a great stirring will come about so that we may direct our minds and harness all mouth and heart may agree [when we pray]<sup>50</sup> in love and fear. By means of this God, blessed be He, will receive our prayer and He Himself will take the necessary action. Although we do not know what we are doing, He establishes upon us the work of our hands . . .

All this I wrote for your knowledge as I heard it from the holy mouth of my teacher Menahem Mendel of Przemyślany. But let every one do as he will if he but do it for the sake of Heaven, and you yourself will choose."<sup>51</sup>

This view contains the two crucial points of the Hasidic position: (a) the abrogation of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth* on the basis of our spiritual "inability", and (b) the presentation of the fullness of the heart in *debhequth* as the real meaning of *Kavvanoth* during prayer.

In his intimate note R. Meshullam Phoebus testifies that he gave up *Kavvanoth* of prayer under the influence of R. Menahem Mendel of Przemyślany, one of his four teachers, whom he mentions frequently in his epistle. We have no direct information about R. Menahem Mendel's views on the practice of *Kavvanoth*, but it transpires from this account of the disciple that he too was opposed to *Kavvanoth* of prayer, as were most of the contemporary Hasidic teachers. R. Meshullam Phoebus' expression of his view in the above passage should not necessarily be read as an exact replica of R. Menahem Mendel's ideas. The disciple may have adapted them and infused them with certain elements of his own experience. Moreover R.

<sup>50</sup> "*pinu ve-libbenu shavim*". This idiomatic expression (*Mishnah Terumoth* 3, 8, *B. Pesahim* 63a, *B. Nazir* 2b, etc.) originally indicated sincerity of speech in a vow or consecration of a sacrificial animal with no reference to prayer. R. Meshullam, while adopting this idiom as referring to prayer, lends it a different sense. I hardly believe that he was the first to use the idiom in this sense; he probably imitates usage found in *Musar*-literature. In the present context the expression implies concentration of mind on the literal meaning of the prayer uttered by the lips, in contradistinction to the Kabbalistic practice of busying the mind with *Sephiroth* and the upper worlds while the lips pronounce the traditional text of the prayers. The insistence of R. Meshullam Phoebus on this attachment to the simple meaning of the prayer-text is apparent from another passage in the same epistle (*Yosher Dibhrey Emeth* p. 32b): "... and surely you know yourself of the holy custom of my teacher R. Menahem of Przemyślany . . . that on a holy day such as this [sc. the High Festivals] a man must surrender himself entirely to the meaning of the words and letters (*le-khavvanath ha-tebhoth ve-othiyyoth*), as is well-known and as I have written above." *Kavvanah* as the attachment to the simple meaning of the prayer in another letter by R. Meshullam (*Yosher*, p. 39a): "Concerning the thought accompanying prayer, do you not know that all unanimously say that the essence of prayer is to train oneself to pray with attention to the meaning of the words (*le-hithpallel be-kavvanath perush ha-milloth*), that is to say, that one should not think of anything except the letters of the words one utters."

<sup>51</sup> *Yosher Dibhrey Emeth*, p. 21a.

Meshullam Phoebus appears to have had too much respect for the time-hallowed Kabbalistic practice to reject it outright. He is well aware that a radical simplification of the method of prayer is essential and advocates it wholeheartedly, but at the same time he is not quite resolute on the question of total rejection of *Kavvanoth* of prayer and therefore suggests occasional recourse to them. But it is worth noting that he only mentions the comparatively "easy" *Kavvanoth* of the Divine Names in this connection and not the full apparatus of the Lurianic *Kavvanoth*.

He makes a careful distinction between the *Kavvanoth* of prayer and the *Kavvanoth* of *mišvoth*. In the epistle from which the above passage is quoted this distinction emerges naturally in the course of a description of the *Kavvanoth* to be practised during immersion in a ritual bath. He transcribed these meditations from a document deriving from the Baalshem Tobh with which R. Meshullam Phoebus finds himself in complete agreement. Indeed he expressly states in the passage under discussion that the *Kavvanoth* of the Divine Names during the performance of *mišvoth* are to be encouraged. While there is no reason to object to them where they can accompany actions without impairing their quality, this is not the case, in his opinion, with the *Kavvanoth* of prayer.

The author is faced with the following problem: The classical *Kavvanoth* of the Lurianic system, which was the only system of reference available to the Ḥasidim, had strong activist and functional implications. The *Kavvanoth* had a job to perform in the Sephirothic Universe. They were responsible for bringing about certain fruitful conjunctions between the *Sephiroth*. In principle, R. Meshullam Phoebus does not challenge this activist doctrine of *Kavvanoth*, but in practice he is not perturbed by the gap left in the machinery of the Heavenly mechanism by omitting the *Kavvanoth*. With little regret he delegates the responsibility for the smooth working of these *Sephirothic* processes to God Himself who, he is confident, will reharass the energy of sincere and devout prayer and dispense it to the *Sephiroth* in order that they may function as efficiently as under the influence of the great praying Kabbalists' *Kavvanoth*.

Though giving up the practice of *Kavvanoth* of prayer, he still has enough regard for them to encourage the study of them. The motive for this advice is that the knowledge of the high metaphysical potency of the *Kavvanoth*, to the use of which we are not qualified to attain, will at least give us the inspiration to approach sincere prayer, which

is within our reach, with the necessary enthusiasm. The infusing of the soul with fervour and the intensification of the inner qualities of prayer have now become the chief end of all religious activity. *Kavvanoth* are beneficial for the soul but no longer serve an objective purpose. This shift of interest from objective processes in the Universe to intimate psychological experience is perfectly in tune with the Ḥasidic tendency to turn the gaze inward, from the metaphysical to the psychological.

Indeed, R. Meshullam Phoebus' advice on replacing *Kavvanoth* by what he calls "directing one's mind to God" is within the orbit of the standard Ḥasidic directive. His avowed reason for this new policy is that because of our sensual desires we are unworthy to aspire to prayer with *Kavvanoth*. This is but a slightly elaborated form of the reason given by the Great Maggid. R. Phoebus maintains that the system of Lurianic *Kavvanoth* was evolved not for general use but for people of Luria's own high spiritual standing. So much for the declared motive for abandoning Lurianic *Kavvanoth*. But indirectly, from an analysis of the text in question another line of reasoning, which seems to have carried more weight with him, can be discerned. It would appear that in the author's view the chief ideal of prayer is meticulous attention to the literal meaning of the text of the prayer, so that mouth and heart are in accord. As we have seen, a worshipper concentrating on *Kavvanoth* is always in danger of letting the literal meaning of the text slip from his mind. It is for this reason, then, that R. Meshullam rejected *Kavvanoth*, and for this too that he was more lenient towards *Kavvanoth* of *mišvoth*, because *mišvoth*, unlike prayer, are actions and the practice of accompanying *Kavvanoth* would not interfere with them.

His practice in detail is the following: (a) concentrating on God as a general theme, (b) concentrating on the literal meaning of the text of the prayer and (c) an occasional short and "easy" *Kavvanah* of a Divine Name on the spur of the moment, provided it does not prevent one from following the thread of the literal meaning of the prayer. Thus the author reluctantly retains a limited application of the old *Kavvanoth* which are to be used in a haphazard way. In this way he completely reverses the character of the *Kavvanoth*, making them arbitrary, irregular and erratic. R. Meshullam Phoebus is not the most radical exponent of the new Ḥasidic attitude to the Kabbalistic method of praying with *Kavvanoth*. The hesitations and compromises apparent in his writing reflect an endeavour to bridge the gap between



the old and the new. But there can be no doubt that he belongs to the new school.

Moreover R. Meshullam's hesitancy was of historical importance. The defeat of the old method of *Kavvanoth* was final. Whether one turns to R. Elimelech of Lesajsk or to other disciples of the Great Maggid or to the Braclaw school, one finds the new approach universally prevailing.

The argument of new times found another exponent in the person of R. Kalonymus Kalman Epstein of Cracow. His testimony as to the practice of his teacher R. Elimelech of Lesajsk reads as follows:

"There are several people who pray with the Divine Names [*bekhavvanath ha-Shemoth*] but in these generations they do not need to do this. And so I have heard from my master and teacher, the holy light, Rabbi Elimelech, may his memory be for a blessing, who said that he did not pray with *Kavvanoth*. And if he prays from the prayer-book of Luria, it is only because the Divine Name is written there in a clear script [*kethibhah tammah*] and it (*sc.* the prayer-book) is big. And to understand this well [one must know that] meditation on the Divine Names depends mainly on their vocalisation. The Divine Name vocalised in one way signifies one thing and the Divine Name vocalised in another way signifies another thing. For it is well known from the holy books that the vowels are the souls of the letters, and the cantillation signs and the coronets [*taggin*] are the spirit and the *neshamah*, as it is written in the *Tiqqunim*. Consequently if a man puts together his soul, spirit and *neshamah* . . . and unifies them by uttering the letters and words of the prayer, then the Divine Name which he utters with his whole soul and spirit and *neshamah* . . . will receive vowels and cantillation signs and coronets, which point to the soul and the spirit and the *neshamah* of the letters as mentioned above. And this *Kavvanah* is superior to any *Kavvanoth*."<sup>52</sup>

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J. G. WEISS

<sup>52</sup> *Ma'or va-shemesh*, 1942, vol. II, 51a.

## Current Literature

*Australian Biblical Review*. Vol. VI, Nos. 1-4, January, 1958. (The Fellowship for Biblical Studies, University of Melbourne). ix + 199 pp. 10s.

This issue of the *Review* contains five articles of interest to students of the Hebrew Bible. Two of them are concerned with passages in *Deuteronomy*. In one of them (pp. 113-121) S. B. Gurewicz, the editor of the *Review*, brings interesting rabbinic evidence to bear upon *Deut.* xx: 1-8, where cases of exemption from military service are specified, and he points out that not in all wars were the classes of people mentioned in *Deuteronomy* exempted. In "secular" or "political" wars exemption was granted, but not in "religious" wars. In the case of the latter, women, and rabbis too, seem to have been liable to military service. After considering the difference between a "political" ("secular") war and a "religious" war, the writer goes on to discuss 1 *Macc.* iii: 57, and he argues that, while Judas Maccabaeus in his battle with Gorgias followed the deuteronomic law regarding exemption, he need not have done so, for his battle was a "religious" one.

The second article concerning *Deuteronomy* (pp. 41-46), which is listed in the contents among "Students' Papers", is a thoughtful contribution by P. E. Broughton, who draws attention to verbal parallels in *Jer.* i: 4-10 and *Deut.* xviii: 9-22, more particularly between verses 7, 9, of the Jeremian passage and verse 18 of the deuteronomic passage. Jeremiah regarded himself as fulfilling *Deut.* xviii: 15, and a number of factors indicate that he thought of Moses as his ideal. This deuteronomic passage, which Jeremiah knew, determined his outlook, for example his attitude to false prophets (cf. *Jer.* xxviii: 9 and *Deut.* xviii: 22), and his call to be a prophet to the nations can be better understood in the light of the deuteronomic passage.

"We shall never appreciate God's mercy until we have come to see what His uncompromising justice means." These are the concluding words of L. Morris in his study of the punishment of sin in the Old Testament (pp. 63-86). Starting from the fact that in the Old Testament God is uniformly regarded as not condoning sin of any kind, and as the author of punishment for sin, the writer considers his theme in a number of brief sections. He treats, for example, of divine punishment through human agents, sickness and natural phenomena, of sin as folly—it can be avoided through knowledge—of the punishment of the innocent, of the deprivation of blessings which results from sin, and of the reformatory character of punishment. A great deal of careful work has gone into this study, which is, however, somewhat surprisingly, completely devoid of documentation.

J. A. Thompson's thesis (pp. 145-168) is that Transjordan in Old Testament times was a land worthy of economic exploitation because of its agricultural and pastoral wealth, its mineral resources, and its importance for the sea and land routes to rich areas beyond its boundaries, to the Arabian peninsula and the coastal areas of Palestine and Phoenicia. The Old Testament evidence is surveyed, and archaeological discoveries are taken into account, such as the Moabite Stone, the Solomonic copper

refining works at Ezion-geber, and the tablets of the Assyrian and Babylonian kings, who sought to gain control of the trade routes through Moab, Edom and the lands to the south and even to Egypt. The writer inevitably depends to a large extent upon the work of Nelson Glueck, yet he sometimes makes interesting suggestions. An example is the suggestion that *Is.* xvi: 8-10 and *Jer.* xlviii: 32f. may refer to Moab's export trade in wine.

The Chronicler's account of the rebuilding of the second temple is, as is well known, commonly regarded as unhistorical, while greater credence is given to the contemporary evidence of Haggai and Zechariah (i-viii). F. I. Andersen considers some of the problems involved (pp. 3-35), and he concludes that there are no solid grounds for doubting the historical reliability of the account in *Ezra-Nehemiah*. He addresses himself to three main points. First, according to *Haggai* and *Zechariah*, the foundation of the temple was laid in the reign of Darius, but according to the Chronicler, in the reign of Cyrus. The writer resolves this discrepancy by supposing that the Hebrew word יסד, while it certainly implies the commencement of a building operation, can refer also to the completion of the task. *Ezra* iii: 10-13, where יסד occurs three times, shows, he thinks, that what was done immediately after the Return is not incompatible with new beginnings of other aspects of the work later on. Secondly, *Hagg.* i: 4, 9 describe the temple as חרב, whereas, according to the Chronicler, restoration work had begun some seventeen years earlier. This difficulty is met by the claim that חרב here need not mean "in ruins, desolate", but rather "deserted". And thirdly, whereas Haggai stirred up the indigenous population to build the Temple, we read in *Ezra* that the returning Jews rejected the offer of the indigenous population to help them. The writer removes this contradiction by supposing that in *Haggai* the עם הארץ are a group of people different from those in *Ezra*; in the latter they are the Samaritans. The writer's interpretation of יסד and חרב will probably not convince everyone. He has, however, written an able and well documented article, and at some points he shows himself effectively critical (see, for example, his criticism of Oosterley, p. 4, n. 2, and p. 32).

These articles bring together much useful material, and, as has been indicated, some interesting points are made. They should certainly be found helpful by those for whom the *Review* primarily caters. And it is encouraging news that they appear to be a growing number. For the editor tell us that the *Review* will in future be printed, adequate funds for the purpose having been subscribed.

Since the last issue of the *Review*, the Fellowship for Biblical Studies has suffered a grievous loss by the death of Professor M. D. Goldman, who was the prime mover in the establishment of the Fellowship, a Past President of it, and a frequent contributor to the *Review*. An appreciation of him by the editor is included in this issue.

D. WINTON THOMAS

*Studies on the Book of Genesis* by B. GEMSER, J. HOFTIJZER, A. R. HULST, T. JANSMA, N. H. RIDDERBOS, A. VAN SELMS, L. A. SNIJDERS, F. VAN TRIGT (*Oudtestamentische Studiën* XII, ed. P. A. H. DE BOER), 1958, 315 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 37.50 guilders.



This volume contains a number of important articles, the first of which (pp. 1-21) is by B. Gemser who writes on "God in Genesis". The Author stresses the noticeable difference between Genesis on the one hand and the rest of the Pentateuch on the other, with particular reference to the conception of God: in the former book we find a generally peaceful atmosphere with no polemical attitude towards other gods, whereas throughout the other Pentateuchal books the exclusiveness of YHWH is jealously guarded. The Author adopts the division into "sources" of the material, and demonstrates how this difference in atmosphere and outlook is shared by all three documents (*J*, *E* and *P*). The problem posed by the said difference links up with the general question of the historical value of the Patriarchal narratives, and it touches upon the fundamental issue of the character of the El-religion: was it, to use the phraseology of modern scholars such as Pettazoni and Widengren, a High-god religion? It appears that the Ras Shamra texts support this view, and if it is adopted, then the difference between Genesis and the other Pentateuchal books can be explained at the same time as the historical value of the narratives is maintained. On the other hand, this view would have important repercussions on the evaluation of the figure of Moses, who would then not stand out as the founder of Israelite monotheism, but rather as the one who brought about the fusion of the El-religion and the YHWH-religion.

J. Hoftijzer in "Some Remarks to the Tale of Noah's Drunkenness" (pp. 22-27), deals with the difference between the narrative in *Gen.* ix: 18ff. and the proverbs in vv. 25ff. and rejects the explanation of Holzinger, Gunkel and Skinner that a redactor, in order to harmonize an original tale about Noah and his sons Shem, Japheth and Canaan, introduced "Ham, the father of Canaan". The Author regards the arguments for this theory as unconvincing.

In an interesting essay on "*Kol Basar* in der priesterlichen Fluterzählung" (pp. 28-68) A. R. Hulst examines in some detail the question whether there is any theological difference between *Gen.* vi: 5 and vii: 4 (*J*) on the one hand, and *Gen.* vi: 12 and vi: 17 (*P*) on the other. According to *J*, YHWH saw that the wickedness of *ha-'adam* was great (vi: 5) and decided to wipe out every *yequm* (vii: 4). According to *P* the depravity of *kol basar* (vi: 12) causes the extermination of *kol basar* (vi: 17). Do *J* and *P* with their different phraseologies express the same idea, or do they in fact differ in their conceptions? Granted the correctness of the division into "sources", it might be argued that whereas *J* sees the Flood and the extermination of all living beings as the result of the wickedness of man alone, *P* regards the entire creation as guilty. The solution depends on the meaning of *kol basar* in vi: 12. The Author examines the entire material, and his conclusion is that, although the phrase may be regarded as characteristic of *P* in the Pentateuch, and is used there most frequently as referring to the entire creation, its exact implication in *Gen.* vi: 12 is rather to be decided by the general reference of the context to guilt, sin and punishment. The Author suggests that we have here a conception which was shared by the Priestly author and the canonical prophets, and whose common origin may be found in the cult.

In a long and highly specialized article, entitled "Investigations into the Early Syrian Fathers on Genesis" (pp. 69-181), T. Jansma approaches the problem of the exegesis of the Nestorian Church and its relationship to Jewish exegesis. The Author suggests that the manuscript from the Mingana Collection on which Dr. Levene based his edition of parts of an anonymous Nestorian commentary on the Pentateuch (*The Early Syrian Fathers on Genesis*, 1951) is unsatisfactory, and gives a list of the manuscripts on which a critical edition must be based. Tackling the problem of influence of Jewish upon Nestorian exegesis, Jansma first investigates the sources of the above-mentioned anonymous commentary; Jansma's conclusion is that much of the material goes back to Theodore of Mopsuestia and to Ephraem. Furthermore—and in this Jansma's approach is explicitly different from that of Dr. Levene—the influence of Jewish exegesis upon Nestorian exegesis is very uncertain, the latter being largely dependent on Greek exegesis.

As we have seen, B. Gemser, in his article, demonstrates the special character of Genesis from the religio-historical point of view. In an article entitled "The Canaanites in the Book of Genesis" (pp. 182-213) by A. van Selms, further material elucidating the same theme from the ethnological point of view is presented. The Author, whose excellent book *Marriage and Family Life in Ugaritic Literature* (1954) is well known, deals with all the relevant passages which throw light on the population of Palestine during Patriarchal times, its composite character, expansion, political organization, and its relation to Israel as reflected in the Patriarchal narratives. The present reviewer found section IV of van Selms' article particularly interesting, for here the Author deals with the friendly atmosphere which, as far as the relationship between Canaanites and Israelites is concerned, pervades the Patriarchal narratives, especially in contexts describing the various agreements into which the Patriarchs entered with the Canaanites. Generally speaking, the polemical and hostile attitude of the other books of the Pentateuch is lacking in Genesis, a feature which to the Author suggests that already in oral tradition these narratives "were characterized by a desire to maintain peaceful relations with the older inhabitants of the country". The Author touches on the religio-historical problem of the relationship between the God of Abraham and the Canaanite 'el 'elyon, who are identified by the narrator in *Gen.* xiv. The reference to this identification is *en passant*, and it is a pity that van Selms has not given us his views on its consequences. It has in fact had far-reaching consequences for the appreciation of the religion of the ("nomadic") Israelites in pre-Mosaic times; cf. especially I. Engnell, *Gamla Testamentet*, p. 125.

N. H. Ridderbos discusses (pp. 214-260) the many problems connected with the interpretation of the two first verses of the Bible. Most recently P. Humbert (in *Mowinkel Festschrift*, 1955) has argued that there is no *creatio ex nihilo* in *Gen.* i, but the Author finds after a careful examination that *Gen.* i does in fact support that "doctrine". In this remarkable article both the theologian and the philologist may find most interesting and instructive discussion of the implications of such key-words as *bara'*, *shamayim*, *tohu* and *bohu*. We can only mention briefly some of the Author's

conclusions: *bara* is not a synonym of *asah*; *tohu* is explained as "*das Leere, das Nichtige, das Ungeordnete, das Ungeformte*", and implicitly the Author rejects the suggestion by Albright that *tohu* is a *forma mixta* between *bohu* and *tehom*. But then there is still the well-known problem of the syntactical relationship between vv. 1 and 2. To Ridderbos' mind *Gen. i: 1f.* should be translated as follows: "*Zu Anfang schuf Gott den Himmel und die Erde. Und [dabei ging es wie folgt zu:] die Erde war [anfänglich] wüst und leer, etc.*". This ingenious interpretation has two theologically interesting consequences, for on the one hand God becomes the Creator from nothing, and on the other He becomes the Creator of chaos. Limitation of space prevents the reviewer from entering into further details of this brilliant and fascinating study which deals with every conceivable problem arising from the opening verses of *Gen. i*.

L. A. Snijders writes on *Gen. xv* (pp. 261-279) and propounds some theories which may perhaps not find general acceptance; thus e.g. *ben mesheq* is translated "the attacker" (from the root *shqq*); the phrase *karath berith* is taken to mean "kill a covenant", and the Author thinks that the ceremony described in vv. 7ff. vindicates this original meaning of the idiom: in the words of W. B. Kristensen, "the death of a sacrificial animal was . . . the death of the covenant, its sanctification . . . [and the covenant was in this way] transported into the world of absolute life". In connection with vv. 2ff. the Author curiously omits a reference to the Nuzu tablets whose bearing on the situation there described is generally recognized.

It appears to the present reviewer that the explanation of the covenant ceremony by J. Pedersen, in *Den Semitiske Ed*, pp. 50ff. (to which, again, the Author makes no reference) is more natural than the one mentioned above: the ceremony is rather to be seen as a sacrifice accompanying the obligation.

The English of the volume under review is sometimes rather awkward, and some readers might have liked a list of abbreviations. But this seems petty criticism: the work is a substantial contribution to the study of the Book of Genesis, worthy of the excellent traditions of Dutch Old Testament scholarship.

P. WERNBERG-MØLLER

*Documents from Old Testament Times*. Edited by D. WINTON THOMAS.

Translated with Introductions and Notes. Nelson, 1958, xxvii+302 pp. 16 plates, 18s.

Students will have good reason to be grateful to the members of the Society for Old Testament Study who have collaborated to produce this volume, and no less so to the publishers for putting it within reach of their private pockets. The book naturally invites comparison with J. B. Pritchard's sumptuous *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, an *editio minor* of which is now announced as forthcoming. Although nearly all the documents here treated are also to be found in Pritchard's much larger collection, in no case is the editor the same, and annotation is here on a more generous scale; the following items are not to be found in Pritchard (editors named in brackets): Hebrew seals and weights (D. Diringer), Hebrew coins



(J. Weingreen), the Milqart Stele (M. Black), and the Saqqarah Papyrus of Adon (W. D. McHardy), the latter two items being in Aramaic. The most obvious omissions are Hittite material and the Dead Sea Scrolls—the neglect of the latter of which the wording of the title of this collection is perhaps intended to justify. It is true that specimens of Qumranic literature are now relatively accessible to the junior student, but it is a pity that not even one of the *Thanksgiving Psalms* was squeezed in. Perhaps the editor felt that such hospitality would have opened the door to too clamorous a queue of *apocrypha* and *pseudepigrapha*. But to counterbalance these omissions we have been given 16 excellent plates, whereas Pritchard's illustrations form a separate volume.

The material is arranged in 5 sections—primarily according to script and, within the western and north-western Semitic world, by languages (i: Cuneiform; ii: Egyptian; iii: Moabite; iv: Hebrew; v: Aramaic). Readers of this *Journal* will anticipate for themselves the nature of the contents—which cover matters cosmological, mythological, historical, liturgical, literary, ethical, and epigraphical. Mention must be made of D. J. Wiseman's survey of the historical records of Assyria and Babylonia, which provides generous and almost continuous coverage of O.T. History from 853 to 539 B.C.E. Another extremely useful item among the more extensive pieces is J. M. Plumley's selections of the *Teaching of Amenemope*, which covers some 15 of the 30 chapters; most valuable, too, for their conspectus of Egyptian ideas regarding death and survival, are the treatment of the *Instruction for King Meri-ka-re* and the *Dispute over Suicide* (T. W. Thacker). Economic History receives some attention through the inclusion of the Samarian Potsherds (J. N. Schofield), seals and weights (D. Diringer), and Coins (Jewish only) (J. Weingreen).

The following points are of some interest, or invite comment. J. Kinnier Wilson, editing the *Babylonian Epic of Creation*, regards it as entirely discrete from *Genesis* (he does not mention *Is.* li: 9f., *Ps.* lxxiv: 12f.); he plays down the *Tehōm-Tiamat* equation, and insists that parallels between the Babylonian and the biblical Flood narratives must not be allowed to influence criticism of their respective cosmogonies (p. 14). Sargon's reference to frenzied attention to the water supply at Ashdod under "Yamani", the Greek, in 715 (p. 61) perhaps merits a cross-reference to Hezekiah, his contemporary. Hezekiah is credited ("undoubtedly") by N. H. Snaith (p. 209) with the Siloam tunnel, and hence its inscription, no doubt correctly; the alternative view that has sometimes connected it with Simon the Just (cf. *Ben Sira* 1:3) is passed over in silence. One wonders whether the Ugaritic plaint (*Aqhat* III, 27) that at death "glaze will be poured out on my head, even plaster on my pate" is perhaps not a figurative description of white hair, as J. Gray takes it (p. 125), but rather an anticipation of death itself (cf. II: 29-30), and alludes to some such funerary ritual as that of which the Jericho skulls are relics. It is worth observing that the words of triumph in the Stele of Merenptah (I, 40, p. 139) "Ah, how pleasant it is to sit when one is engaged in chatter" (*lit.* speak a foreign tongue, talk gibberish) (R. J. Williams), lend some point to the description of the Egyptians as 'am lo'ez in *Ps.* cxiv: 1. In dealing with the *Hymn* of Akhenaten (c. 1370



B.C.E.) the same editor stresses (p. 149) its parallels and possible connection with the earlier Egyptian *Amun Hymn*, of the period of Amenhotep II (c. 1436-11).

Dealing with the earliest Hebrew coins, J. Weingreen finds in (an assumed) Persian "permission" to subject territories to mint their own coins an expression of an enlightened imperial policy (p. 232). But moneying was, at this early stage, far more a private concern than a governmental preserve or privilege. Weingreen finds in the occurrence in *Ezra-Nehemiah* of 'adarkon, darkemon (i.e. daric) proof of a closely contemporaneous date of the text and the events that it records. Surely, however, at least the latter form (= δρρχμῶν) is an anachronistic confusion implying exactly the reverse. His discussion of the question of figures on Jewish coins might have referred to E. Bammel, *Syrian Coinage and Pilate* (JJS II, 2, 1951, p. 108f.), and H. Loewe, *Render Unto Caesar* (C. U. Press, 1940, p. 74f.). H. Rowley, presenting some of the Elephantine Papyri, discusses—and rejects—the view that the colonists did not know the deuteronomic law. An aspect of the Papyri that he might also have mentioned is the fact that they occasionally imply Jewish post-biblical institutions familiar from rabbinic literature—e.g. the "sealing up" of leaven on *Pesaḥ* (whether *s'thūmū* or *ḥ'thūmū* be read) (p. 259, l. 9), and the abstention from anointing and sexual intercourse on fast days (p. 263, l. 20) (cf. Mishnah *Yōmā*, viii: 1). It seems to the reviewer as hazardous to infer (p. 258) from the famous "Passover" rescript that the Festival was an innovation for the Elephantine Jews in 419 B.C.E. as it would have been to infer, from the sort of Army Council Instructions issued frequently during the last war in which paschal and similar facilities for Jewish troops were detailed, that Jewish observance at, say, Assouan, was something new in 1943.

Each section of this collection contains select bibliographies for its various contents, and it is to be hoped that these may be constantly reviewed as new impressions are called for, without waiting for further editions. In a few cases the book has been overtaken in the press by work deserving reference. I have noticed the following two items: on p. 45, add Mary P. Gray, *The Habirū-Hebrew Problem*, *HUCA* xxix (1958), p. 135f; p. 70, R. D. Barnett, *The Siege of Lachish*, *Israel Exploration Journal*, 8, 3, 1958. A few misprints might be rectified; on p. 86 *Yakudu* (twice), presumably for *Yahudu*: p. 243f., and Index, *Amarus*, for *Amanus* mountains. A reference to 1 *Sam.* xxiii: 7 on p. 122, note 8, if it be not a wrong reference, requires some elaboration.

RAPHAEL LOEWE

ERNST JENNI, *Die Politischen Voraussagen der Propheten*. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1956, pp. 118. sFr. 14.

The author's position is that the prophets of Israel are "advance-messengers of the divine ruler who comes to execute his judgement and to consummate salvation". The imminent "Day of YHWH" moves and drives them; they are concerned with "the eschatological future". Nobody would deny that eschatological expectation plays an important part in the

religious history of Israel, and since the prophets as we know them through the Hebrew Bible are the chief exponents of biblical religion it is obvious that prophecies concerning the end-time are prominent. But they do not exhaust the richness and variety of the prophetic function and activity. The prophets love their people as much as they are under an irresistible compulsion to obey the summons of God and to announce His will to their generation as well as to the other nations. Hence their inner conflict, torn as they are between justice and compassion.

The author restricts his detailed and valuable examination of the prophets to political and historical predictions about nations and individuals; he acknowledges only those as genuine and primary which fit the general plan of eschatological judgement and messianic hope. Every other political or historical prediction is, according to him, secondary, and owes its origin to disciples of the prophet or to editorial revision. That such prophecies exist the case of Baruch, *amanuensis* to Jeremiah, proves conclusively. But even in the case of Baruch the big question is: what represents, if not the *ipsissima verba* of the Prophet, at least his ascertainable ideas as seen against the general tenor of his prophecies, and what must undoubtedly be attributed to Baruch's reading and interpretation of his master's message? Here again Prof. Jenni seems unnecessarily to narrow his vision and to exclude from consideration prophecies which—though not predictions of the future—are historical and political utterances without any reference or relevance to eschatology. Are Amos' denunciations of the perversion of justice, of immorality and of luxurious living the less genuine because they castigate contemporary evils as contrary to the divine will, irrespective of the end-time? Again, Jeremiah's condemnation of the worship of the queen of heaven is indicative of his deep concern for his people in the *here* and *now*; together with his denunciation of social evils, it is an integral part of his prophetic function and activity, though not connected with the *eschaton*. Moreover, a critical attitude towards sacrifice as an insufficient and external form of worship as compared with clean, holy living has nothing to do with the final judgement in the mind of the prophets at that moment. They combat evil when and where they meet it because it is evil and contrary to the will and explicit command of God. Yet Prof. Jenni rightly stresses "the personal intervention of YHWH who as a free master has power over the fulfilment of His word even against that of the prophets", who are His messengers. But this only proves that by determining the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of a prediction one does not gain an infallible criterion for the primary or secondary nature of a given prophecy viewed exclusively from the aspect of eschatology. If we look at the O.T., we observe that eschatology is the natural consummation of the divine plan with Israel and mankind. There is an almost unnoticeable transition from history to meta-history. The prophets are concerned all the time with this divine plan in its entirety in history and especially with its immediate application to the contemporary situation. Only if one looks towards the N.T. and Jesus as Christ eschatology and all that it entails becomes the centre of meaning and interest and the exclusive purpose of prophetic prediction. In fact, the very use of terms like political, historical, eschatological in isolation blurs our vision

and gets the O.T. out of focus. They are all facets of one whole, the divine plan in history, to speak theologically.

This criticism of Prof. Jenni's position is not intended to detract from much that is valuable, helpful and suggestive in his detailed examination of individual political and historical predictions. The student of the O.T. will be grateful to him for his careful analysis of the so-called political predictions of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea, Amos, Haggai and Zechariah. Prof. Jenni first selects the texts for a subsequent detailed examination and excludes what is in his view is not a genuine political or historical prediction, by determining what is a primary and what a secondary prediction. The latter is usually a "prose-addition". It is, however, not always beyond reasonable doubt that such passages are actually editorial, *post factum* statements and additions. He then examines specific historical predictions which he subdivides into those concerning the fate of individuals (kings, the prophet Hananiah) and those concerning political-military events. Next he considers passages in which "political prediction is interwoven with the general eschatological consummation", especially the prophecies about Cyrus and Zerubbabel. These are classified as "actualizing exchatology". A short final chapter draws certain conclusions from the previous analysis.

In view of the restricted range and purpose which Prof. Jenni assigns to prophecy in Israel we would do well to heed Prof. Rowley's characterisation: "Most of the oracles in the prophetic books arose out of a given historical situation and were directed to a people who lived in that situation . . . the work of each prophet bears the marks of the period in which he lived". (From his contribution to *Myth, Ritual and Kingship*, ed. S. H. Hooke, Oxford, 1958, entitled: *Ritual and the Hebrew Prophets*, p. 253. See also particularly *ibid.*, pp. 258f.).

E. I. J. ROSENTHAL

R. DE VAUX, *Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testament*. I, 1958, pp. 347 (Paris, Editions du Cerf, Fr. 990).

Biblical laws and institutions have been treated by a considerable number of scholars but there exist only a few comprehensive descriptions of the social structure of ancient Israel. In this book Father De Vaux has successfully tackled this task and students of the O.T. as well as sociologists and historians will be grateful to him.

Whereas J. Pirenne in the *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Oriental* and the *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité* has arranged the institutions of the Hebrews according to periods, Father De Vaux prefers classification according to the institutions. Thus, except for its first part, the book does not describe the different stages of social development, listing all known expressions of public structure together. In view, however, of the scarcity of material and the uncertain dates of part of the biblical sources, an institutional rather than an historical order is to be preferred.

The transformation from tribe to nation is the topic of Part I. Having spoken of social organisation, the Author goes on to explain the system of blood-vengeance and other tribal ideas that persisted until much later



periods. The evolution of a national society is studied mainly from the period of the Judges onwards though conditions during the patriarchal age, as compared with those after the Exodus, are of equal interest. Thus in the chapter on demography we miss any notice of statistical data about patriarchal society which seem to be quite obvious. Abraham's military strength is estimated at 318 warriors (*Gen.* xiv: 14), corresponding to a total population of under two thousand souls. Twice we are told that an increase of people and cattle had caused secessions (*Gen.* xiii: 5, xxxvi: 6), which indicates a constancy in the size of the group.

After an interesting summary of marriage laws and the conditions of women there follows a chapter on children and education. When trying to fix a *terminus a quo* for the use of writing in Israel (p. 82), one should, again, go back to the earliest strata of the O.T. No mention is made of this art in *Genesis* (cf. iv: 21-23). We are not told of any written document during the settlement of disputes or transfers of land in *Gen.* xxi: 29, xxiii: 16, xxxi: 44. The first indication of writing is connected with the promulgation of the Law in *Ex.* xxxii: 16 and the "Writing of God" seems to the reviewer to state the origin of Hebrew script in general (cf. Mishnah, 'Abhoth V. 6). While the earliest function of writing was, therefore, the preservation of the holy Law, its gradual introduction for secular purposes is also reflected in biblical sources. In *Gen.* xxi: 29 and *Ruth* iv: 7 the term "attestation" means a formal act of consideration in the presence of witnesses; *Is.* viii: 16, however, already uses the expression in connection with writing. In between the use of documentary evidence must have become common.

The rules of inheritance are discussed in the next chapter. According to the Author (p. 89), the law protecting the rights of the first-born condemned (retrospectively) the action of Abraham and David. But there is more in this, for the law illustrates social evolution. In tribal society the right to change the rules of succession seems to be incidental to the *patria potestas* and jurisdiction over the family. When justice became more and more centralized, the father could no longer choose his heir according to his views as to the relative merits of his sons, but had to bring any grievance before the elders. Only in the royal court did the old privilege persist (cf. p. 156); similarly, the rejection of female heirs (cf. p. 157) and the succession to the previous king's harem (cf. p. 179) are also remnants of an earlier usage, preserved in the house of the king.

With regard to the position of female heirs, mention should be made of the earlier practice being preserved in the passage dealing with levirate marriage. According to *Deut.* xxv: 5, a man is considered to be without heir if he leaves no son surviving; a daughter apparently not being taken into consideration. The LXX and the rabbinical interpretation, which are based on the decision concerning the daughters of Zelophehad, include the female heir. Our passage, however, seems to be based on an earlier law. It was formulated when "brethren dwelt together", i.e. during the patriarchal stage. In the Elephantine marriage deed (ed. Cowley 15 line 20, p. 45), the daughter is a possible heir at least where no son survives, but perhaps even in the opposite case also. The childless widow, on the other



hand, seems to have enjoyed usufruct for life only and not a right of succession, as is stated on p. 91.

The third part of the book is concerned with civil institutions, under which heading such manifold topics are arranged as *Demography, Persons, State and Crown, Law and Justice, Economy* (i.e., material resources and obligations deriving therefrom), *Division of Time, Weights and Measures*. In the chapter on the royal court, "the King's Son" is shown to be an official, without any necessary relationship to his master. The use of the term as a synonym of servant may also be seen observed in 2 *Kings* xvi: 7.

In the chapter on the administration of justice the absence in Israel of an ordeal by throwing the accused into the water is explained by the lack of rivers in the country (cf. p. 243). But is there not a memory of such an earlier practice in the name of the spring of Kadesh (*Gen.* xiv: 7, *Num.* xxviii: 14, *Deut.* xxxii: 51)?

The Author rightly shows that the term *ge'ullah* has sometimes the meaning of pre-emption and not redemption, but his explanation of *Lev.* xxv: 25 on p. 255 in the former sense does not convince the reviewer. The preposition is not connected with the verbal ("vient chez lui") but with the nominal sense of *qrb*, and the same combination is used in *Lev.* xxi: 2-3 and many other passages. The *go'el* always demands something back from a foreigner, be it the blood of his clansman, his body where he has sold himself into slavery, or his real property. The original meaning is, therefore, *redemption* rather than *pre-emption*, though the latter right may have arisen quite early.

The Hebrew pledge is primarily not a security given at the contraction of the debt, as stated on p. 262, but a chattel seized in distraint. On p. 86 *Jacob* should be read instead of *Abraham*, and on p. 254 *nahalah* for *mahalah*.

The clarity of its style, the almost complete dispensation with footnotes and controversy with other scholars, and finally the valuable bibliography, will make this book a standard work in the study—always inspiring—of the Bible. We look forward to the second volume.

ZEEV W. FALK

ANDRÉ NEHER, *Moïse et la Vocation Juive* (Maitres Spirituels). Paris, Editions du Seuil, illustrated, 192 pp.

ERICH VOEGELIN, *Order and History*. Vol. I *Israel and Revelation*. Louisiana State University Press. (London: Oxford University Press), xxv + 533 pp. 60s.

A new book on Moses by André Neher, even a brief study in a popular series, is an event to be acclaimed by the Jewish reader. Professor Neher, writing with a warmth and topicality befitting his wider audience, establishes the fundamentally existential reality of the life and work of Moses as recounted in the Pentateuch. External evidence may confirm, but the truth of Scripture is, in the last analysis, felt upon the pulses especially by the Jew who lives in the Law of Moses and for whom it is "his portion and the length of his days". But such realization is not confined to Jews. There is

Christianity and there is also Socialism, and Neher reminds us that both systems take over, in different forms, the doctrine of Salvation which Moses proclaimed. And the same truths are attested negatively by such modern writers as Kafka and Bialik, whose unsatisfied yearning for "the Law" echoes the spiritual needs of modern Man.

Again, the truth of the account is evidenced by the immanent laws of History—the sufferings in Egypt are echoed and confirmed by the Jewish bondage in the Nazi era, the wanderings in the desert, by the migrations of modern Jewry, and the entry into the Promised Land, by the extraordinary and marvellous repetition of that very process in our own time. Such parallels remind us that we are engaged (the term may bear its existential weight in this context) in the same Covenant-history as our ancestors, and bring us back inevitably to the Lawgiver and the Mountain of Sinai.

The most attractive feature of the presentation is undoubtedly the series of illustrations, admirable for their selection and photogravure, which in glimpses of every-day life, and in art and archaeology, bring together the Exodus from Egypt and the sublimities and terrors of modern Jewish life. The book, written in lucid and graceful prose, is popular without any lapses into vulgarization: from it the educated French reader will gather something of the present-day significance of the *Torah*, as Word, Doctrine, and Life.

By contrast with Neher's booklet, the weighty volume by Professor Voegelin of Louisiana aspires to being a work of "summit" scholarship; it so deals with large masses of specialized material—more or less digested—as to produce a grand account of the contribution of Israel to the conception of historical order. The work is to be completed in six volumes (for vols II and III, see *JJS*, ix, 1-2, p. 105); it is no less than an analysis of the meaning of history as it was lived and understood by ancient and modern peoples, and in particular as that meaning expressed itself in potent symbols and institutions.

Dr. Voegelin speaks of the "Israelite discovery of history as a form of existence"—a discovery inaugurated by Moses; so far, Professor Neher would agree, and he would also agree with the emphasis on "the historical present of the Covenant" as the chief symbol of Israelite historiography. Other symbols which he identifies as central in all accounts of Israelite historical experience, are: *She'ol*, Canaan, and the Desert. Such symbols are for Voegelin genuine historical insights rather than properties of mythology, and yet in his treatment they often take on a shadowy, mythological character. This happens for instance when he sets the Israelites' account of their own historical existence beside the Rise and Fall of Civilizations recounted by Toynbee. There, neither the People of Israel nor their doctrine of Covenant can have much importance, and this drives Voegelin to construct a dangerous distinction between Sacred History and pragmatic history. The former will not be tied by the same rules as the latter; it is "paradigmatic—a useful word, which one welcomes; and the "criteria of truth applying to paradigmatic events in this sense cannot be the same as those applying to pragmatic events". Here one pauses and asks oneself,

are we not being asked to accept a bisected universal history of the Augustinian type with the realistic, pragmatic section governed by deterministic Toynbeian categories, and the sacred "paradigmatic" section ruled by Israelite prophetic categories? And the danger of this would seem to be that the world we know with its rise and fall of Empires, its advances and retreats, is not that region in which the human freedom and responsibility taught by Israel's prophets can in fact be exercised. This would be to kick Israelite historiography and Israelite history upstairs into the region of *metahistory*, and though Dr. Voegelin resists this implication, one feels that he has never quite escaped it. He is to this extent not existentially "committed" to the Israelite view of historical existence. In the final chapter he sees the doctrine of the chosen people replaced by that of the Chosen Man, ultimately to be exemplified in the Christian version of Salvation.

The book suffers from certain defects as a work of scholarship, partly to be excused by its scope. At the same time one must deplore the tedious and occasionally obscure style, the repetitions, the unproved assumptions (David a non-Israelite: *She'ol* = Egypt), and a too facile panoramic handling of Babylonian, Egyptian and Greek antiquities. The documentation is inadequate and most often refers us to secondary sources. One is impressed by the labour which has gone into the writing of this book, but otherwise it is not easy either to agree with it or admire it.

HAROLD FISCH

*Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East*. Presented to Professor Harold Henry Rowley by the Society for Old Testament Study in Association with the Editorial Board of *Vetus Testamentum*. Edited by M. NOTH and D. WINTON THOMAS, Leiden (Brill) xix + 301 pp. 32 Guilders.

The Society for Old Testament Study chose a fitting way of marking the sixty-fifth birthday of the *doyen* of present-day critical scholarship of the Old Testament when it presented him with this group of essays on the Wisdom Literature—an elegant publication in which there is something for all tastes, and yet a greater degree of organization and coherence than one usually finds in collections of this sort. At the same time, it is amusing and instructive to see how widely the contributors can differ within the space of this slim volume. W. F. Albright in his essay on Canaanite-Phoenician sources of Hebrew Wisdom concludes that *Proverbs* is entirely pre-exilic and has a "Solomonic nucleus". Martin Noth ("Die Bewährung von Salomos Göttlicher Weisheit") would agree. R. B. Y. Scott, on the other hand ("Solomon and the Beginning of Wisdom in Israel") holds that the Wisdom writing begins not earlier than the reign of Hezekiah, and the attribution of such work to Solomon (in 1 Kings v: 10f.) is a late Midrash. There is scarcely a single assertion of this kind which is not contradicted elsewhere in the book. Dr. Lauha ("Die Krise des Religiösen Glaubens bei Kohelet") maintains that there is no oriental influence in *Ecclesiastes*. H. L. Ginsberg, on the other hand ("The Structure and Contents of the Book of Koheleth"), claims that such influence is considerable. The term *Hokhmah* again receives two directly opposite expositions. Mowinckel, in what is perhaps the most



important essay in the collection ("*Psalms and Wisdom*"), affirms that it always has a "religious basis"; the true wisdom is "the fear of God that is the deepest motive of morality". Noth, however, declares of *Hokhmah*, *Es is die Sphäre des Menschen und nicht die Gottes*. One wonders what the ordinary Bible-reader would make of all this; would he not conclude that critical scholarship today is a kind of elaborate parlour-game in which every statement is automatically convertible into its opposite? It may be that the critic would answer that his work, like Higher Mathematics, has nothing to say to the common man, who merely seeks in Scripture the Word of God and in the writings of scholars a light whereby to read the Word more clearly and luminously. Criticism is, however, unlike Higher Mathematics in that there could be in it a region of interpretative, exegetical study, designed to reveal the harmony and architecture of the biblical books, where authorship, sources, influences, and dates, and all the other controversial issues matter little. What a pity that biblical scholars do not in this respect learn from their colleagues in the field of Modern Literature, where synthesis and analysis so often go together, both being controlled by a humble attention to the subtleties of language and imagery. Some such exegesis is attempted by Ginsberg in his essay on *Qoheleth*, but otherwise we have only, in this direction, the exegesis of individual words and *cruces*. D. Winton Thomas contributes some helpful lexicographical notes on *Proverbs*; but the most interesting contribution of this kind comes from P.A.H. de Boer ("*The Counsellor*"), who studies a group of words connected with counsel and counselling. He is led to conclude that **אב** and **אם** are used in different places (e.g. *Isaiah* ix: 5; *Genesis* xlv: 8; *Judges* v: 7; 2 *Samuel* xx: 18) as terms for counsellors, male and female, respectively. In this he is supported by the *Targumim* and the Midrash (commenting on the word **אברך** [*Genesis* xli: 43]). He finds the same usage surviving in the talmudic expression **יש אם למקרא** "there is authority for the reading". He believes that Deborah is, in almost the same sense, a "mother in Israel"—i.e. "an authoritative adviser". I. Engnell offers a number of ideas on the first chapters of *Genesis*, most of which one remembers reading in older works of the Myth-Ritual school—though his wholesale rejection of the source-criticism of these Chapters (with acknowledgements to Cassuto) has all the iconoclasm of the new Scandinavian school ("*Knowledge and Life in the Creation Story*"). His concluding quotation from W. Staerk should be meditated by everyone working in the Old Testament field:

"Les exégètes qui cherchent à expliquer les traditions bibliques ne devront pas oublier que la seule méthode vraiment féconde est celle qui consiste à interpréter les détails par l'ensemble et à considérer d'abord le sens naturel et l'essence des récits . . . Les contradictions, comme aussi les doubles traditions qui paraissaient d'abord s'exclure réciproquement, se révéleront alors plus d'une fois comme partie intégrante de l'idée totale. Et c'est ainsi que l'on échappera aux résultats décevants d'une critique qui opère toujours avec le scalpel de l'analyse et qui considère seulement les apparences extérieures et non les réalités."

HAROLD FISCH



H. VAN VLIET, *No Single Testimony*, *Studia Theologica Rheno-Traiectina*, Vol. iv. Drukkerij en Uitgevers-Maatschappij v/h Kemink & Zoon N.V., Utrecht, 1958, pp. ix+162, Fl. 15.

This "Study on the adoption of the law of *Deut.* xix: 15 par. into the New Testament", as the sub-title runs, starts with a survey of O.T. texts in the N.T. and the effect which *Deut.* xix: 15 might seem to have had on some features of N.T. literature. Naturally enough, parallels to this rule are sought in the world around the N.T., but with no result as far as the laws of Rome and post-classical Greece or the literature of Hellenistic Judaism are concerned. From these facts the conclusion is reached that the law of *Deut.* xix: 15 was restricted to Jews and met with little sympathy in more cosmopolitan quarters. The conspicuous silence of apocryphal and pseudepigraphic Palestinian literature (with the sole exception of *Susannah*) calls for interpretation, the more so since Van Vliet subscribes to the view that post-exilic Palestinian Judaism was characterized by a fairly strong rigorism. As an answer to this problem Van Vliet suggests that *Deut.* xix: 15 was not so interpreted as to exclude the single witness; it was understood to require no more than a proper accusation and good evidence (either circumstantial or by direct testimony). Hellenistic influence—especially in Sadducean circles—may have a share in the responsibility for this interpretation which—as Van Vliet rightly points out—turns out in fact to be more rigorous than the requirement of two witnesses proper, because the latter offers the defendant a better chance for acquittal. *Susannah* is interpreted by Van Vliet as reflecting the struggle between the more humane Pharisaic concept of justice and righteousness combined with lovingkindness (represented by the youth Daniel) on the one side, and Sadducean rigorism (represented by the Elders) on the other. Since the law of *Deut.* xix: 15 is part and parcel of the revealed O.T. concept of justice and righteousness, the N.T. writers with their Pharisaic background could not help introducing this principle as obligatory on gentile as well as on Jewish Christians, however strange it may have been to the former.

This is a very short summary indeed of a very careful and packed study, which will be found useful and stimulating by workers on more than one field. The literature gathered and used by the author is truly amazing (the notes cover no less than 70 pages of small type). A very detailed Table of Contents contributes to an easy perusal of the book. Although the list of *errata* is far from being exhaustive, the number of misprints is, comparatively, small.

S. LAUER

D. DIRINGER, *The Story of the Aleph Beth*. Popular Jewish Library No. 10. London, Lincolns-Prager, 1958, 195 pp., bound 7s. 6d., paper 4s. 6d.

The British Section of the World Jewish Congress is to be congratulated on the idea of making available, in its popular series, the researches of our foremost authority on the history of writing. Dr. Diringer has made a valiant attempt to present a difficult subject in a form intelligible to the layman without over-simplifying the many unsolved problems it still offers. After a short survey of the story of writing in general, he deals at some

length with the origin of the alphabet and discusses (and rejects) the theory of its invention by the ancient Israelites. He shows how all existing alphabetic writings derive from the Canaanite. A large section is devoted to the history of the Early Hebrew Script; almost all extant documents are briefly described.

Diringer convincingly argues that the E.H.S. was currently employed until the very end of the Second Commonwealth, and that its abolition was due to Pharisaic influence. The evolution of the Square Script is well described in its early stages, but a detailed account of its later phases is (p. 174) declared to be too difficult to attempt. Instead the reader is offered some details about rules for writing scrolls and books, the various systems of punctuation, the varieties of Hebrew pronunciation, the use of Hebrew letters for writing other languages, etc. This material is very briefly presented, and is somewhat marred by a curious disregard of modern linguistic concepts, such as the phoneme and its relation to orthography. The description of "modern Hebrew vocalization" is rather misleading. The discussion is made difficult to understand by the irksome "economy" of using Roman transliteration for Hebrew letters throughout. These however, are, minor flaws in an otherwise admirable work, which is made even more attractive by a generous allowance of photographic plates.

C. RABIN.

Z. BEN HAYYIM, עברית וארמית נוסח שומרון, על פי תעודות שבכתב, ועדות שבעל פה. 2 vols. Bialik Institute, in conjunction with the Academy of the Hebrew Language (Merkaz, Jerusalem). 1957.

Professor Z. Ben Hayyim is to be complimented on this important work of scholarship. These two volumes are important not only to the Samaritan specialist but to any scholar working in the field of the history of Hebrew Grammar.

We have come a long way since the Massoretic Controversy of the Christian Reformation and Post-Reformation period, when the Protestants with Buxtorf tended to regard the Tiberian vowelpoints as given with the Law at Sinai. It was the Jewish scholar Elias Levita who, in his *Massoreth ha-Massoreth*, had questioned the age of the Tiberian vocalisation and shown that it was not coeval with the Hebrew sacred text. Morinus, of the Paris Observatory, used Levita's arguments to score a point against the Protestants, and maintained that the Hebrew Bible without the vowel-points was "a nose of wax" which could be twisted at will to suit one's individual opinion and so the tradition of his Church was necessary to understand it, in his eyes, aright. Brian Walton in the London *Polyglot* (1657) complained that what should have been a purely grammatical question had been made a weapon in a theological dispute.

Until the time of Gesenius, in the first half of last century, the Massoretic Controversy rumbled on, until it was given its *quietus* by him. But the discovery of Babylonian and Palestinian supralinear vocalisation in manuscripts from the Cairo Genizah, and Petermann's pioneer work in setting down Samaritan pronunciation, demonstrated that the Tiberian vocalisation was but one tradition of Hebrew Grammar and pronunciation. But within

the *Qehillath Yisra'el* we already had had both Askenazi and Sephardi pronunciations, both being based on the one Tiberian vocalisation. The work of Paul Kahle, in his *Masoreten des Ostens* and *Masoreten des Westens* and his *Cairo Genizah*, showed the need for a historical approach to Hebrew Grammar; for until this day Tiberian vocalisation, though not coæval with any of the biblical books, is used to explain their grammar.

The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, with their peculiar orthography and distinct tradition of Hebrew, has heightened the need for a historical approach to Hebrew Grammar. Gone are the days when Cowley, in his introduction to his *Samaritan Liturgy* (1909), could dismiss Samaritan Hebrew as degenerate presumably because it is different from that of the Hebrew Bible as handed down by the Tiberian Massoretes. The Samaritan tradition of Hebrew is a living tradition, just kept alive by a small sect, but living none the less and also ancient. That there are resemblances between the Samaritan tradition of Hebrew and that of Qumran is important. Professor Ben-Hayyim's view, shared by other scholars too, is that the Samaritan tradition of Hebrew is not only old, but was once not only that of the Samaritans but of the indigenous Jewish population of Palestine as well.

The relation of the Samaritan tradition to that of the Dead Sea Scrolls on the one hand, and to that of the Tiberian Massoretes on the other, is not yet clear and must still be worked out; and Professor Ben Hayyim's work is basic material for the final solution. Professor Ben Hayyim sees the need for special study of each and every ancient and living tradition of Hebrew, and when such have been compiled the *data* will be at hand to trace the inner history of the Hebrew language. Professor Ben Hayyim has in these two volumes made available for us much of the basic Samaritan linguistic material. It is a tremendous piece of work, and though it stands by itself, it is not to be regarded as complete; a third volume will deal with pronunciation of Samaritan Hebrew and Aramaic, and a study of the phonology and morphology of both Samaritan Hebrew and Aramaic will be included. In that volume will be included a general evaluation of the Samaritan tradition or *Massorah*.

In the present two volumes we are, in the Introduction, briefly but ably introduced to the problem of the Samaritan linguistic tradition, and given an account of the basic material for the study of the Samaritan tradition of Hebrew. Very important are the brief studies of the authors of texts. After establishing his method of editing and translating the texts, Prof. Ben Hayyim devotes the major part of vol. I and II to these Samaritan texts, which range over Samaritan Grammar, Syntax, Pronunciation, and Lexicography. Hebrew Grammarians in general, and not merely Samaritan specialists, will prove to be heavily in Professor Ben Hayyim's debt for what he has here presented. There is a wealth of material here; helpful as his comments are, I think he would be the first to say that much has yet to be drawn from these grammatical and syntactical treatises which he has made available in sound texts.

Very important, too, is the native Samaritan Hebrew Arabic-Aramaic glossary which he has edited and included in the second volume. Not only



is this important in any historical study of Samaritan lexicography, but it is an important source of material for the eventual compilation of a Samaritan lexicon. At present, as every student of Samaritan knows, the lack of such is a great handicap. The *Meliš* is not more than a word-list, compiled by Samaritans for Samaritans, but it does show what they themselves thought the Hebrew and Aramaic equivalents were. It is the more important that it was compiled at a time when they still knew some Aramaic, and still read their Targum.

The work is well indexed and its value is thereby greatly enhanced.

JOHN BOWMAN

J. WEINGREEN, *A Practical Grammar for Classical Hebrew*. 2nd Edition. pp. xii + 316; Oxford University Press, 1959. 21s.

Professor Weingreen's *Grammar*, which has deservedly reached a second edition, is probably the best "practical" text-book for the study of Classical Hebrew written in the English language. One often feels when teaching Hebrew that one's method is, as has been said of the art of cooking or baking, "too subjective and intangible to be communicated". Professor Weingreen has, however, set out the principals which have guided him, in the preface to the first edition, and these must be constantly borne in mind by teachers using his *Grammar* as a text-book. While this does not mean that a teacher must slavishly follow the book, he would do well not to amplify Professor Weingreen's text without carefully attuning himself to the latter's method. For example, Professor G. R. Driver's explanation of the origin of consecutive tenses in Classical Hebrew (cf. Appendix, pp. 252-3) would not be of much use to the beginner as an integral part of section 49 treating of the *Waw* consecutive. Similarly the temptation to amplify what Professor Weingreen has to say about the *daghesh forte* (pp. 16-17) should be resisted until a much later stage. On the other hand, on a topic such as the phonetic value of ה a teacher could improve on what Professor Weingreen says (p. 3) by personal demonstration, though it is doubtful whether an adequate description of the phonetic value of ה could be given in writing, unless one describes the sound of ה as representing something like the sound one makes when breathing out on a spectacles' lens before wiping it clean.

On some points of detail one may disagree with Professor Weingreen's treatment. One wonders, for example, if a little more could not have been said about the *waw* consecutive, namely, that the verb reverts to its original tense whenever the *waw* becomes detached from the verb (e.g. after לֵא or after the introduction of a subject + *waw* conjunctive). Though the point belongs more properly to syntax, it is one which is likely to puzzle the student if concurrently with his study of grammar he also begins to read biblical texts. Again, in dealing with the *interrogative He* it would seem worth making the point that although the *He* usually attaches to the first word of the sentence, the choice of the first word depends on the gist of the question. Thus, while הוּדָה בְּבֵית דָּוִד would mean "is David in the house?", הוּדָה בְּבֵית דָּוִד would mean "is David in the



house?" The point is simple enough, and once grasped the student could easily be made to appreciate the difference between, say *המן הסלע הזה* *המים נוציא לכם* (Nu. xx: 10) and such subtle variations as *המים נוציא לכם* and *הלכם נוציא מים* (Cf. . . . *אתה הירדן* p. 221, line 2, contrast *ואתם תשבו פה* *ibid.*, line 3, in Exercise 38).

Among the omissions in Professor Weingreen's book one notes the verbs *אהב* and *אהו*. These verbs are not included among the *Pe 'Alef* verbs (p. 161) although the list of verbs (five) purports to be complete and includes the composite verbs *אבה* and *אפה*. The omitted verbs are, of course, also 'Ayin guttural verbs, but a cross-reference to the latter verbs at p. 166 would resolve the student's difficulty. One also feels that, owing to its frequency in the Bible, the *Hiph'il* of the verb *ירה* (or *ורה*) deserves mention.

All in all, the present reviewer's preferences and the Author's omissions notwithstanding, Professor Weingreen's book bids fair to becoming an indispensable text-book for the English student of Classical Hebrew. On one point, however, the reviewer feels so strongly that he is obliged to register his emphatic dissent from Professor Weingreen's view. The point in question is the *Qere* readings, explained at p. 22 as "corrections of recognized errors". The least Professor Weingreen can do in the next edition of his *Grammar* is to recognize the existence of an alternative view, namely the view that, subject to certain exceptions, the bulk of the *Qere* readings represents manuscript variations.

ARIE RUBINSTEIN

KURT SCHUBERT, *Die Gemeinde vom Toten Meer*. Munchen & Basel, Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1958, 144 pp., price DM 5.50 (linen bound DM 7.50).

This work will no doubt hold an honoured place amongst the growing number of surveys of Dead Sea Scrolls studies for the wider public. It is a model of clarity and objectivity, and concentrates upon the more serious and essential aspects of the Scrolls world, particularly on its theology and the problem of connections with early Christianity. Other aspects are only lightly touched upon, though Schubert manages to convey in brief outline all the necessary background information.

On the vexed question of dating Schubert is surprisingly brief and decisive. He states that "*inhaltliche Untersuchung*" of the texts points clearly (*ergibt*) to the time of Yannai. Of other views he only mentions the pre-Maccabaeen dating (p. 22). It is equally clear to him that the people of Qumran were Essenes, but not *the* Essenes. Essenism consisted of several divergent groups and those described by Josephus and Philo were not the group settled at Qumran (p. 42; pp. 69-72); the Teacher of Righteousness was not the founder of Essenism as such, but only of the Qumran group (p. 70). The Essenes are identical with the *ḥasidim ha-rishonim* of the Talmud, and with the New Testament group of those who waited for the Kingdom of God (p. 108). Both Essenes and Pharisees stem from the *ḥasidim* of the Maccabaeen age, except that the Qumran group accorded greater importance to the priests (p. 37). It was the Pharisees who broke

away from the Qumran group (or rather its general Essene ancestors, C.R.) in the time of John Hyrcanus, and their name *perushim* "dissidents", and the designation *bogedim* in DSH derives from this split. (p. 38). For Schubert, therefore, the Essenes (in his wider sense) are not only spiritually, but also organizationally the true successors of the religious revival of the second century B.C.E. On the other hand he dwells on the close similarity between the Rabbinic *Merkabah* and *Hekhaloth* mysticism of the first centuries *after* the fall of Jerusalem and basic concepts of Qumran theology (pp. 64-6), which is difficult to understand if the two groups had been hostile to each other for such a long time.

The influence of the Qumran sect upon Christianity was, according to Schubert, diffuse rather than direct, and extended over all its early stages, from John the Baptist (who was, however, not a Qumran sectarian), *via* Jesus himself and the Jerusalem community (Schubert surmises that the "priests" of *Acts* vi: 7 were members of the sect, p. 130) to the Johannine layer, Paul (who acquired these ideas when he became a Christian), and the *Epistle to the Hebrews*. The points of similarity touched upon in this chapter are particularly valuable for the understandings of the Scrolls.

The quotations from the Scrolls are well and conservatively translated. Individual scholars will differ from some of the renderings; I would like to draw attention to "*nichtige Heiden*" for *goye hevel* (p. 113), explained as "heathen irrelevant for the process of salvation". Quite apart from the doubtful semantic shift from *nichtig* to *nicht relevant*, it seems preferable to translate *hevel* as "idolatry", the meaning it often has in Rabbinic sources.

C. RABIN

J. VAN DER PLOEG, *Le Rouleau de la Guerre*, traduit et annoté avec une introduction (Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah), edited by J. van der Ploeg, vol. II. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1959. pp. 198. 25 guilders.

The author of this volume published in *Vetus Testamentum* (v. [1955], pp. 373-420) an annotated translation of the *War Scroll* (1QM). Since then two monographs on the same have appeared, one by Y. Yadin (1955), and one by J. Carmignac (1958), and many articles have been written dealing with specific points in that extraordinary manuscript. A revised and enlarged edition of the article mentioned above would thus appear to be justified.

The book under review consists of an introduction (pp. 1-30), bibliography (pp. 31-33), list of abbreviations (p. 34), translation (pp. 35-54), notes (pp. 55-194), and index of biblical passages (pp. 195-198). As far as his attitude to the two monographs mentioned above is concerned the author, for all his respect for Yadin's work, rejects the latter's Roman dating of 1QM, and finds himself able to accept very few only of Carmignac's suggestions. Judging the book as a whole after reading its detailed argument, these two (some would say rather negative) features stand out very clearly. On the other hand, it should also be said that the author discusses very fully and competently the many problems in 1QM, both in the introduction and in the copious notes, and his solutions must be taken into

account in future discussion. In any case, the author himself stresses the provisional character of his own work.

In the introduction the author rightly emphasises the eschatological-apocalyptic character of 1QM, and deals with such problems as the original size of the manuscript, its date and its literary character. Professor van der Ploeg reaches the conclusion, on the basis of an examination of the text at the bottom of cols. iii and v, that all the columns originally contained  $\pm 21$  lines (i.e. roughly a third of the text is missing). The question of date is treated in connection with the problem of the literary genesis of the text; the author, as already stated, rejects Yadin's arguments for a Roman dating, and points instead to the fact that the author of 1QM is inspired by the Bible; in the few cases where there may be Roman features in the descriptions of military matters, it is argued that such features may have been known to a Jewish author writing before the Roman period (i.e. before 63 B.C.) and Professor van der Ploeg is in favour of an earlier, Maccabean dating of 1QM. He suggests that, although the whole manuscript was clearly copied by one and the same scribe, it does contain traces of conflicting traditions, the most prominent of these being the idea of a victorious battle against the *Kittim* on a single day as compared with the idea of a warfare against all the peoples of the world lasting 40 years. It is argued that the former concept is characteristic of the early part of 1QM, whereas the latter (with all its military details) represents a younger tradition. It may seem that van der Ploeg, in holding this view, is to some extent—perhaps unconsciously—yielding to the force of Yadin's argument for a Roman date. The author's solution of the literary problem of 1QM is different from both that of A. Dupont-Sommer, who has suggested that the manuscript contains two—in part parallel—"rules", composed by different authors, and that of Yadin and Carmignac, according to whom the manuscript is a unity.

Some of the points made by the author in the notes (which constitute the most important part of the book) call for special comment. In the note on i: 8 it is stated that the plural form *qšwwt* is not biblical, but see *Kēthibh* in *Exod.* xxxvii: 8 and xxxix: 4, and cf. J. Carmignac in *Vetus Testamentum*, v (1955), p. 346. In the note on ii: 5 the translation of *lhdshn*, "to clear away the fat ashes" (Gaster) is rightly rejected, but reference might have been made to 1QS x: 15 (see the reviewer's *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 146, n. 46). In the note on iii: 14 it is suggested that *dgl* be taken in the meaning "group". This is undoubtedly right, but it might have been noted that Gray had already suggested a similar meaning of the word in *Num.* ii: 2 etc. (see the *International Critical Commentary*, *ad loc.*). In the note on iv: 8, in discussing the meaning of *gdl 'l*, the author correctly prefers to take *gdl* as a substantive, but it might have been noted that the word is very likely not the Massoretic *gōdhel* or *g<sup>e</sup>dhōl* (for the latter, cf. *Exod.* xv: 16), but rather, because of the defective spelling, the word *g<sup>e</sup>dhal* as we have it in the proper names Gedalyah and Gedalyahu: that *tshbht* is Aramaic might have been stated in the same note. In the note on v: 3 the possible Arabic equivalent of *b<sup>e</sup>'osrām* in Hos. x: 10 is *bi'asrihim*, not *ba'asrihim*. In the note on v: 7 the defective spelling *kydn* might have been noticed;



for it cannot be doubted that the word was pronounced *kidân* rather than *kidôn*, analogously with other words in which, in the Qumran dialect, the original *-ân* ending appears to have been preserved (cf. the reviewer's remarks in *Journal of Semitic Studies*, iii (1958), p. 247f., n. 4, where further literature is cited). In the note on v: 11 *bkwr* is taken as a superlative ("choice quality"), the author referring for this meaning to *Job* xviii: 13 and *Isa.* xiv: 30. It is to be noted, however, that *bkwr* in both biblical passages mentioned is followed by a qualification, and it may well be doubted whether the word, when used absolutely, can have superlative force; the meaning "in the crucible" is therefore to be preferred in 1QM v: 11. It seems to the reviewer that the author here makes a mistake which in some ways is parallel to the one W. H. Brownlee made in reading *wrbw* in 1QS x: 19 and translating *wrbw* by "riches" (see the reviewer's *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 147, n. 60). The meaning "choice quality" of *bkwr* when used without qualification is as unacceptable as the supposed meaning "riches" of *wrbw* used by itself. In the note on v: 12 the pronunciation of *yshr* is given as *yôsher*, but this is undoubtedly incorrect in view both of the defective spelling and of the occurrence of *yashar* as a substantive in *Ps.* cxi: 8. In the same note it is argued that the word *spwt* may be connected with *saf* "basin", "bowl", in post-biblical Hebrew used in the meaning "cavity"; the author, on the basis of this, suggests that *spwt* in 1QM v: 12 means "grooves". This is very unlikely, because the post-biblical usage of the word as meaning "cavity" is obviously derived from the literal meaning "bowl" and so suggests a bowl-shaped depression or cavity rather than a straight groove (see e.g. the quotation in Levy's *Wörterbuch*, iii, p. 562). In the note on vi: 2 reference is made to Arabic *zarqatun* as meaning "*coup de lance*"; after some research the reviewer found the reference (which should have been given by the author): Dozy's *Supplément*, i, p. 587. Incidentally, in Lane's *Lexicon*, part iii, p. 1227, the word *zarrâqatun* is recorded which may be more relevant still. In the note on vi: 3 the author gives the meaning "lightning" of the Syriac equivalent of Hebrew *ziq* which the reviewer found to be in accordance with Gesenius-Buhl's *Handwörterbuch*, 17th ed., p. 197, but in disagreement with Payne Smith's *Dictionary*, p. 115, where the meaning is given as "shooting star"; in the same note the author's speculations on the form *shlhwbt* are unconvincing. Surely the difference from classical Hebrew is bound up with the fluctuation of *lhb*, *lwhb*, and *lhw* in the Qumran writings, and it is difficult to maintain the priority of *shlhwbt* to *shlhbt* of the Massoretic Text. In the note on vi: 5f. it might have been noted that the original text *mkt 'wyb* is dependent on *Jer.* xxx: 14. In the note on vi: 12 the obviously intended pun of *wrky* and *w'rwky* might have been pointed out. The two expressions *wrky ph* and *w'rwky rwk* are probably synonymous and might be rendered by "calm and patient" or some such phrase, rather than "*de tendre bouche, ayant l'haleine longue*", as the author suggests. In the note on vii: 7 the preposition *k* is given the meaning "*environ*", but can we assume such a lax reference to the well known sabbatical rule here? It would perhaps be better to translate: "at a distance of (2000 cubits)", see Gesenius-Buhl's *Handwörterbuch*, 17th ed., p. 329, for biblical passages in which this

meaning of *k* appears to apply. In the note on vii: 10 the active participles *lwbshym* and *hwgrym* might have been noted, because they appear to be used here in a way different from biblical usage. In the note on vii: 16 a reference to *Lev.* xiv: 12 (where *ha-Kebhes hā-'ehadh* clearly means "one of the [two] lambs") would have been better than a reference to *Gen.* xlii: 27. In the note on viii: 6 it could have been pointed out that the *Niph'al* of *psht* is not found in biblical Hebrew, the *Qal* being used in the meaning which the author (although interpreting its implication wrongly) ascribes to the verb here. In the note on viii: 11 Yadin's equation of *yhyshw* with *yhshw* is, in the reviewer's opinion, wrongly rejected; the closely similar parallel passages quoted suggest this, and it may be that the form *yhyshw* should be derived from *hshh*, in analogy with the Samaritan impf. forms *yhyshw* (from *hsh*) and *tkyrw* (from *krh*) (cf. the reviewer's note in *Vetus Testamentum*, viii (1958), pp. 305ff.). In the note on viii: 13, in advocating the adverbial usage of *'hr* the author should not have referred to *Lev.* xiv: 36 and 2 *Chron.* xxxii: 9, because in both these passages the word is used prepositionally; a reference to e.g. *Gen.* xviii: 5 would have been more to the point. In the note on viii: 15 *hṭl* is correctly explained as absolute infinitive *Hiph'il* used as a substantive; the reviewer notes that there are a couple of nouns of this type in the Great Isaiah Scroll (see G. R. Driver, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S. ii (1951), p. 23). In the note on xiv: 2 it might have been indicated that *rhš* in Hebrew is not used of the washing of clothes, etc., and that therefore Dupont-Sommer's interpretation of the passage is wrong.

The book is beautifully produced, but there are a number of misprints. In transcribing Hebrew words the author does not distinguish carefully between *samekh*, *šin*, and *šadhe*, and on p. 15 two different signs are employed in transcribing *'aleph*. On p. 3 reference is made to an article by L. Rost on IQM which is erroneously omitted from the bibliography. On p. 98 a volume by R. de Vaux is said to have been published in 1958, but on p. 111 in 1957. On p. 130 two identical references are given to two different articles in *Vetus Testamentum*. The abbreviation "Discoveries I" of Barthélemy's and Milik's volume, announced on p. 34, is not used consistently; the volume concerned is referred to in several ways, e.g. on p. 139, l. 18 as IQ [34<sub>2</sub>]; it will not readily occur to every reader that this reference is to Barthélemy's and Milik's publication, pl. xxxi, fragm. 34, l. 2. On p. 155 (cf. also p. 162) reference is presumably made to Vermès' book on the Scrolls, apparently mentioned somewhere previously; the inclusion of this work (with indication of the edition used) in the bibliography would have been a help.

P. WERNBERG-MØLLER

CECIL ROTH, *The Historical Background of the Dead Sea Scrolls*. Basil Blackwell, 1958, Oxford. pp. viii+87. 10s. 6d.

Dr. Roth's explanation *in extenso* of his reading of the Qumran riddle has been awaited with eagerness, and its appearance in English is to be welcomed; owing to technical delays, the book has been overtaken in the press by its own Hebrew translation (Massadah, Tel Aviv), but the author

has exploited the delay to incorporate a few extra points. Roth starts from the premise that the Zealot element in the Jewish Revolt of 66 C.E. will have had, like most other revolutionary factions, its own ideology and its own politico-ecclesiastical programme—hitherto obscured by the determination of Josephus, their implacable opponent, that their case should not be presented. Finding that the “philosophy” of the Dead Sea Sect reflects precisely such an outlook as seems in character with the recorded activities of the Zealots, he proceeds to dovetail Josephus into the Qumran material, claiming that incidents and personalities mentioned by the historian can be recognised clearly enough in the Scrolls. The members of the Sect were consequently (one wing of the) Zealots: and Qumran, with Machaerus and other neighbouring places, constituted a kind of Zealot “republic” with Masadah as the capital on which the Qumran community ultimately closed. After the final *débâcle* surviving Zealots elsewhere were gradually absorbed by “normative” pharisaic Judaism, but not before some of them had escaped from Palestine and sown the seeds of the rebellion in Egypt, Cyrene, etc. in 114–5—that is, after an eschatologically significant interval of 40 (41) years from the fall of Masadah and the death of Eleazar ben Jair.

The case is argued with Dr. Roth's accustomed cogency; but he is at pains to stress the tentative nature of his reconstruction—which, incidentally, enables him to fit the Damascus document (or at least its earliest version) into a plausible context by assigning it to the years between the defeat of Eleazar's grandfather, Judah b. Hezekiah, at Sepphoris and his escape thence (4 B.C.E.), and his reappearance in Judaea (4–6 C.E.) It must be borne in mind that Zealot theory had already been put forward in a germinal form independently by H.E. Del Medico and by J. Klausner, but the credit for seeing its wider implications and for working them out remains Roth's. Since the present reviewer admits to now finding it the most satisfying explanation of the evidence so far propounded, after prolonged hesitations when he heard it first publicised, it may be appropriate to examine the cardinal points upon which the theory turns and to assess the arguments that can be raised against them.

The essential document (of those so far available) is the *Habakkuk Pesher*, in which the Wicked Priest is said, at the least, to have had murderous designs on the Teacher of Righteousness, while the House of Absalom is there declared to have failed to support the Teacher against the Man of Lies. Roth's identifications for these characters are, as the Wicked Priest, Eleazar ben Hananiah, Captain of the Temple: the Teacher of Righteousness he holds to have been a title held probably successively by different Zealot leaders of the family of Hezekiah, the revolutionary executed by Herod in 46 B.C.E., and in particular by his grandson Menahem ben Judah and the latter's kinsman and successor Eleazar ben Jair. The “House” of Absalom means the followers of Absalom, the supporter of Menahem who was killed with him in the Temple in September 66. The Man of Lies is (tentatively only) equated with Simon bar Gioras, but the theory is not affected if he is left as a cypher pending further discoveries. Ignoring him, let us consider possible objections to the other characters. Eleazar is stated by Josephus to have led the attack against Menahem in



which the latter was killed; this identification is therefore sound enough, assuming that in the crucial passage (? + the mutilated reference in the *Pesher* to *Ps.* xxxvii) by the "Teacher of Righteousness" Menahem is intended. Roth would argue that even if the title refers not to Menahem but to his successor Eleazar ben Jair, who escaped, the situation is not affected, inasmuch as the intentions of Eleazar ben Hananiah = the Wicked Priest will have been no less hostile towards him; the contention is certainly strained, but it is sustainable. There is some inconclusive evidence that the Teacher of Righteousness was a priest himself; if he indeed was, then it is no objection to his identification with Menahem that Josephus does not call Menahem one, seeing that there are established instances of his omitting the title—including an oblique reference to himself. As Roth indicates, the *dénouement* of Menahem's last appearance in the Temple gains in point if he was in fact a priest and was attempting by a *coup* to usurp the High Priesthood.

With regard to the House of Absalom, objections are not so easily disposed of. Insubstantial, however, is the objection that he alone is mentioned under his own name: the occurrence of *Miṣrayim* in *Daniel* xi: 8 might have been cited as a parallel. Roth, moreover, is on firm enough ground in asserting that the castigation of the House of Absalom for their neutrality at the time of the Teacher of Righteousness' sufferings presupposes their potential assistance, so that "they" are not to be looked for among the opponents of Menahem and his Zealot following (= Teacher of Righteousness and Qumran Sect) as hitherto known. But Josephus implies that Absalom was in fact killed on the same occasion (? protracted by tortures) as Menahem himself (*War*, II, xvii: 9), and it is very difficult to follow Roth in assuming that his death may have occurred at any stage of the disorders, from the initial *mêlée* in the Temple onwards. Nor has Josephus any suggestion that Absalom had an independent following. Dr. Roth has to postulate one, and to assume its dissidence, in order to explain the "House" of Absalom, and would justify his postulate on very tenuous lexical grounds. Absalom, unlike Menahem's subordinate officers (τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνας) is called "the most notorious instrument of his tyrannical régime" (ἐπισημότατον τῆς τυραννίδος ὑπηρέτην). ὑπηρέτης means, in a military context, a staff officer, and Absalom is therefore clearly represented as Menahem's adjutant (in the field, and in the sphere of military government); the use of Thucydides—the model vocabulary, for Josephus' translator—and ὑπηρέτης in the Papyri would bear this out (F. Preisigke, *Fächwörter* (1915), p. 175).

In spite, therefore, of the rarity of the name Absalom in the sources, this superficially attractive identification proves to be the least reliable; but the plausibility of the equations Teacher=Menahem and Wicked Priest=Eleazar, Captain of the Temple, is not much affected by its omission. But Dr. Roth is surely going too far when he writes (p. 18) that to presume the simultaneous existence at Qumran and Masadah of two different groups each severally venerating a sophist-teacher (he substantiates, more or less satisfactorily, his assertion of such "veneration" at Masadah) with an

"associate" named Menahem is to presume "a coincidence so preposterously extended and duplicated [as to be] out of the question". But perspective is not lost sight of; the Author stresses (p. viii) the relative unimportance of the proposed prosopographical identifications as against the identity of the newly discovered documents with the politico-religious literature and programme of the Zealots. If, however, the identification with Menahem has to be abandoned, would we still be justified in recognising here the manifesto of the Zealots rather than that of any other of the messianic or "irredentist" movements of the foregoing century? To be sure, the Zealot party far surpassed them all in prolonged existence and in significance; and Dr. Roth's claim must, therefore, on the whole be conceded, that between the limits assigned by internal evidence of the documents and by their archaeological context, viz. between 65 B.C.E. and 70 + C.E., the main Qumran documents fit most convincingly into the years 66-73, and that consequently the persecuting rôle of a priest towards the Sect's leader identifies his followers as Zealots.

Yet in two matters affecting the Zealots Josephus and the Scrolls are reciprocally at variance, and each point is too substantial to be brushed aside by Dr. Roth's plea (p. 76) that Josephus, writing in any case of his diametrical opponents for an audience uninterested in internal Jewish squabbles, was not concerned to elaborate the Zealot picture. It may be allowed that the Zealots would probably not have divulged their esoteric affairs to one of Josephus' standpoint; but the party had been in existence long enough, and enjoyed sufficient prominence and sympathy, for the main points in its programme and concept of Judaism to have been common knowledge. It may also be taken for granted, with Dr. Roth, that the final speeches of Eleazar at Masadah as reported by Josephus, if fictitious (as they surely are), will at least have had to be composed in character. Now the second of these speeches (*War*, VII, viii: 7) expatiates at length on the immortality of the soul in terms far more positive than anything yet known from Qumran, where the allusions to such a doctrine detected by some (and, equally, denied by others) in the *Thanksgiving Psalms* are quite equivocal. In view of the nature of the Qumran documents now in our hands, this objection cannot be regarded as an *argumentum ex silentio*. Secondly, Roth seems clearly right in stressing the point first made by Sh. Talmon that the Qumran Sect had as perhaps their most essential objective the implementation of a reformed, or different calendar—that of the *Book of Jubilees*. The Calendar and its proper operation was so seriously regarded in early rabbinic times that it seems scarcely likely that Josephus, concerned as he was to denigrate the whole Zealot point of view, would have refrained from castigating the socially disruptive implications of their proposed calendar reforms, if in fact the Zealots did make an uncompromising issue of them.

A few points of detail may be noted. It hardly seems necessary to suppose (p. 78) that the Qumran texts of *Numbers* xxiv: 24 read something like כְּתִים וְאַשּׁוּר יִעֲנֶנּוּ עֲבָר; *Ps.* lxxxiii: 9 will account for the rôle assigned to 'Ashshur. The antiphon "*Blessed be the Name of His glorious Kingdom for ever and ever*", it is stated (p. 62 n.), "may be termed the Zealot creed".

Elbogen (*Jüdische Gottesdienst*<sup>2</sup>, p. 495) regards it as perhaps the oldest response in the Liturgy, which contains other fragments embedded in itself that would qualify much more suitably as Zealot rallying-cries. The end of Additional Note F goes too far, in the absence of any *Pesher* fragments to 'Ophel in Micah iv: 8. On p. 58 (note) *moveable* is presumably a slip for *immoveable*. In spite of Dr. Roth's endeavour not to take his own tentative reconstructions for granted, the question is occasionally begged, e.g. p. 25: "We are driven to the conclusion that the reoccupants [of Qumran] were Judah the Galilaean and his followers, whose lives were organised in a semi-monastic fashion, as we can see from the Scrolls". The atmosphere in Masadah "may have been akin to that of a revivalist camp" (p. 16) but I can see nothing in Josephus to suggest that it was; and until Roth's thesis is proved, it must be clear that the atmosphere of Qumran and the *War Scroll* may at the most be postulated for Masadah: it may not be predicated of it.

This book has, independently of its thesis, the very real merit of investigating anew the Zealot side of the great rebellion against Rome, and Dr. Roth's conclusions regarding this may largely stand if his thesis is rejected. In particular, by drawing attention to the apparent survival of folk memories of Menahem in messianic contexts, and to a most significant remark of R. Joshua b. Hananiah (p. 69 n.), he makes plausible the suggestion that many surviving Zealots did, ultimately, come to terms with the pharisaic party within Jewry.

RAPHAEL LOEWE

*Leo Baeck Institute of Jews from Germany. Year Book II (1957). The Legacy of German Jewry.* Edited by ROBERT WELTSCH. East & West Library, London, pp. xxvii+356. 7 Illustrations. 27s. 6d.

The second volume of the Leo Baeck Institute Year Book is different in plan from the first, but no less important. The editor, Robert Weltsch, need not have apologised for not having been able to adhere to the original plan that each volume should concentrate on one specific subject. The volume contains three main sections of contributions and one of documents. The first section is dedicated to the memory of the late Leo Baeck. It is a tribute to a great Jewish leader in more than one sense of the word: his personality comes to life and justice is done to his teachings.

The next two sections are devoted to two main themes: the organisation of Jewish life in pre-Nazi Germany and the inter-relation of German and Jewish thought. A few of the articles only are scholarly papers in the sense of being expositions fully documented and annotated. Most of them form rather an introduction to the problems with which they respectively deal. As such, they are welcome contributions to the understanding of the problems concerned. As these articles have been written by people themselves possessed of first-hand experience of the subject, they have an advantage over the more scholarly works which, we must hope, will be forthcoming in the future from historians whose interest in the subject will be purely academic.



It is impossible in a review to do justice to, or comment on, all individual contributions. A novel aspect is presented in the article by H. G. Reissner about the role of Eduard Gans in German and Jewish history. Fresh, too, is George L. Mosse's analysis of the anti-semitism of Felix Dahn and Gustav Freytag. Readers who are interested in the development of psycho-analysis and its creator will find most stimulating Ernst Simon's article about Sigmund Freud as a Jew. It reveals many hidden traits of Freud's personality attributable only to his having been a Jew. A weakness of the article, however, is the vagueness of its definition of what is to be regarded as Jewish. Another interesting article is the study by David Baumgardt on Lazarus and Steinthal. These two scholars played an important part in German-Jewish public life and took their place in German academic activities in the second half of the nineteenth century. Steinthal has been almost forgotten and Lazarus, whose "Ethics of Judaism" is well known, had his scholarly reputation impaired by the devastating criticism of Hermann Cohen. It is a good thing to find the balance in some measure restored.

Jewish historical studies, when limited to one country only, are sometimes unnaturally narrowed down. For instance, the reader who is interested in studies in Jewish liturgy in modern times would naturally like to find the subject treated comprehensively. To limit it to the contributions to this branch of scholarship made by German Jewish scholars—as E. D. Goldschmidt was apparently compelled to do because of the scope of the year book—makes the treatment one-sided. He had to omit the share of Rappoport and Luzzatto. On the other hand, Walter Schwab's article on the relationships between German and Anglo-Jewish communities is in fact more concerned with England and should have been correspondingly entitled.

Although the Year Book's sphere is German Jewish history, it might have been more liberal in accepting other worthwhile contributions, even if they were only distantly connected with the question of German Jewry.

JACOB KATZ

N. N. GLATZER, *Leopold and Adelheid Zunz: an Account in Letters 1815-1885*. Publication of the Leo Baeck Institute. London, (East and West Library), 1958. xxvi+427 pp. 35s.

The volume offers the correspondence of the Ehrenberg family with Zunz. The main contributions come from Samuel Meyer E. (1773-1853) and from his son Philipp E. (1811-1882). Both men were headmasters at the Samson Free School in Wolfenbüttel, where Zunz obtained his first education at the beginning of the century. Adelheid Zunz and Julie Fischel, Philipp's wife, are also well represented; and a group of letters from and to I. M. Jost, the historian, are of some importance. The source of this (mostly unprinted) material is the Franz Rosenzweig Archive, now in Boston. The letters were originally collected by the Ehrenberg family. A part of the letters, written by Zunz himself, had been removed from the remainder in preparation of an edition before 1920. They were deposited in the Zunz Archive in Berlin and have not yet been recovered, but Prof.

Glatzer was able to print parts of these letters either from copies, which have survived, or from publications by Geiger and Elbogen. But there is no annotation indicating the exact source from which these Zunz letters are taken. The reader consequently never knows whether a gap in any given letter (and they frequently break off at an interesting passage) originates from the copy or the quotation on which the editor had to rely, or in his own decision (mentioned in the preface) to omit minor parts of the text as irrelevant. All the letters are given in German, while the explanatory material, including headings of pages and chapters, are given in English. The introduction gives a sketch of Zunz' life and writings with references to the most striking passages from his letters. At the end of the volume the reader finds notes to all letters; these translate the frequent Hebrew phrases in the letters, and identify persons and events which are mentioned. There is also a survey of dates relevant to Zunz' career and writings, a list of letters written and of addresses and an index, mainly of persons. The volume is illustrated by 4 portraits and 4 facsimiles. In many cases the occasion and topic of lost Zunz letters might have been found out from cross-references in existing ones; such reconstruction would be relevant to the history of the relations between the two families, and this would have to play an important part in any attempt to write a comprehensive biography of Zunz, which is still a *desideratum*. Prof. Glatzer rightly summarises Zunz' position as the founder of the "Science of Judaism", so translating the original "*Wissenschaft des Judentums*" in a way which has now become usual, but is nonetheless misleading. The German term in no way implies any connection with natural science (as, for instance "social science" properly does; it was coined after the pattern of "*Altertumswissenschaft*", the study of classical antiquity, as practised by F. A. Wolf and A. Boeckh, Zunz' masters at Berlin University. The basic idea—that of combining a critical survey of all the available material from the past with the establishment of permanent values for the present—comes from this same direction. No modern English translation can reproduce the full meaning which the word *Wissenschaft* has in the idealistic atmosphere of 1800, but translations like "Jewish Studies" or "Jewish Learning" do at least avoid suggesting wrong associations.

The published correspondence does not yield a great deal of information about Zunz' position in the intellectual history of his time. We find no penetrating discussions of the relevance of a research project to the philosophical, religious or political problems of those days, such as abound in the correspondence of German scholars of his rank during the period. *Obiter dicta* of the early period, in which rabbinism is rejected, or strong expressions of disapproval of representatives of the reform movement, which are frequent in the middle period, are formulated by Zunz almost without explanation and context; and from these fragments it is quite impossible to reconstruct the development of the man. Prof. Glatzer remarks that "he was by no means a great writer of letters" and emphasises that his wife had "a freer and more natural attitude to West-European culture". This comment is convincing, and probably contains the reason why the editor has restricted his annotations to the letters severely to

factual matters of names and events. But the character of Zunz' intellectual personality and work remains enigmatic, while his stubborn honesty, which contributed so much to his difficulties to establish himself in life, is copiously documented.

For the historian, the most important result of the new source material in this volume seems to be this: that in Germany the process of adaptation to life in the modern world started slowly and painfully when seen at close quarters by contemporaries, and gathered momentum in the middle of the century. When the elder Ehrenberg, himself a pioneer with many characteristics of this type, handed on his headmastership to his son in 1843, he explained that Philipp would now find everything ready made for him, with a board of governors composed of men trained in academic studies. Contrasting experiences during the earlier decades are very fully illustrated. The young men, who built their future on studies in the faculty of arts, were in an almost desperate situation; the government excluded them from public service, so long as they were of the Jewish faith, and the men who exercised effective control in the Jewish communities, by virtue of their financial position, had no understanding of or sympathy for their outlook. The great majority in the middle and smaller communities still seemed far away from any intellectual or moral contact with their environment. This aspect can easily be overlooked when the great achievements of the emancipation period are studied. We can best appreciate the intention of Prof. Glatzer's publication, when we compare it with the great document of Jewish revival at the end of the period, the letters of M. S. Ehrenberg's grandson Franz Rosenzweig. We know from him that he had always been conscious of the fact that his great-grandfather was the link between himself and the Ehrenbergs (*Briefe*, p. 217), two of whom he accepted as sincere speakers for the Christian faith in the great dialogue which runs through his student days. At the same time the survival of Adam Rosenzweig, a fine letter by whom is printed in the new volume, and of Julie Ehrenberg, gave him the feeling of direct contact with the Jewish legacy of his ancestry, symbolised by the position of Zunz in the family circle.

HANS LIEBESCHÜTZ

*Essays in American Jewish History*. Publications of the American Jewish Archives, No. IV. Cincinnati, 1958. 534 pp.

This volume, "to commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the American Jewish Archives under the direction of Jacob Rader Marcus", contains twenty-one items, the last being a bibliography of the latter's works. In such a "patchwork" collection one must expect to find a variety of subjects and a variation of quality. It is for instance doubtful whether some 15 pages taken up by Joseph E. Rosenbloom's "Some Conclusions About Rebecca Gratz" need be devoted to restating what is already largely known about the lady (including the doubt as to her identification as the original of Sir Walter Scott's Rebecca, the Jewish heroine of his "Ivanhoe"), for the sole purpose of placing on record the author's judgment that although she "stands out as a figure of some importance among American Jewish women . . . Rebecca Gratz was not a great woman".



In a survey of the Yiddish material in the "Henry Joseph Collection of the Gratz Family Papers", M. Arthur Oles draws attention to two notes in the English language written in Hebrew characters by one Aaron Levy, and to the phonetics of 18th-century American Yiddish indicated therein. Among other interesting items is a postscript to a business letter by a Meyer Josephson of Reading (Pennsylvania) in August 1762, in which the writer asks Michael Gratz to order kosher cheese for him from London.

Guido Kisch, in "The Founders of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* and America" states that Zacharias Frankel "is the only one among the early representatives of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* who gave any thought to American Jewish history", citing Frankel's series of articles "*Zur Geschichte der Juden Amerikas*", in *MJGW* XII (1863).

Whether most of the books listed, and with full bibliographical description, in "Some Unrecorded American Judaica Printed Before 1851" (article by Edwin Wolf 2nd) are worth the 57 pages of excellent print expended on them, is a moot point.

Among the most thoughtful of the essays is Selma Stern-Taeubler's "The Motivation of German Jewish Emigration to America in the Post-Mendelssohnian Era". Sociology is represented in the volume, among other items, by an essay on "The Function of Genealogy in American Jewish History" in which Malcolm H. Stern supplies in tabulated form information on "The Assimilation of the Sephardim in North America", and "Converts to Judaism through Marriage Before 1840". "The Decisive Pattern in American Jewish History", claimed by Ellis Rivkin, does not for long remain different from the European pattern from which it differed at first.

Samuel Sandmel brings to contemporary notice Isaac Mayer Wise's *Jesus Himself* (which appeared in Wise's own weekly, "The Israelite", in 10 Chapters from June 1869 to April 1870—with an (unfulfilled) promise "To be continued".) The essayist feels justified in doing so despite recognising the considerable weaknesses of Wise's work. He also expresses surprise that neither the Swedish scholar Gösta Lindeskog, author of *Die Jesusfrage im Neuzeitlichen Judentum*, nor the French priest Joseph Bonsirven in *Les Juifs et Jésus* pay any attention to the views of I. M. Wise (although he does mention Stephen S. Wise in connection with the latter's pulpit-review of Joseph Klausner's famous book). The essayist could have added that the same is true of W. D. Davies in his *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (S.P.C.K., London, 1948). But then the latter also studiously omitted, at any rate in that book, reference to Gerald Friedlander's "Jewish Sources of the Sermon on the Mount".

The reviewer feels that the extracts published in the volume (by Moshe Davis) of Cyrus Adler's personal letters to his wife, written by him during the latter's stay in Paris in 1919 as a representative of the American Jewish Committee at the Peace Conference, will prove interesting and useful to historians and others in more than one way. Somehow these letter-extracts recalled to the reviewer the impression made upon him when he read, at the time of its appearance, another piece of Cyrus Adler's writing, viz. his

memorandum to the Wailing Wall Commission—learned, skilful and human withal.

Matityahu Tsevat goes into considerable detail in his "Retrospective View of Isaac Leiser's Biblical Work". Jacob Kabakoff has assiduously collected scattered material on "The Role of Wolf Schur as Hebraist and Zionist". The experience of the latter was paralleled by that of many devotees of Hebrew elsewhere; so it is not to be wondered at that frustration embittered a contemporary of Schur in England to the point of perpetrating on the name America—having in mind American Jewry's poverty, in those days, in Hebraic culture—the Aramaic pun '*Ammā Reqā*'. This volume should provide evidence of the extent to which American Jewry has redeemed itself from this *soubriquet*.

J. ISRAELSTAM

HANS-JOACHIM KRAUS, *Klagelieder*. Biblischer Kommentar, Altes Testament XX, Neukirchen, 1956. 88 pp., price DM 7.

This commentary on *Threni* follows the pattern of the well-known series in which it appears. The philological and textual notes on each chapter are followed by a more detailed discussion of its date, *Sitz im Leben*, etc., apart from the general introduction. Kraus considers all five chapters to have been composed shortly after 587 B.C.E. by circles close to the destroyed Temple, for the purpose of the ritual commemoration of the destruction—for which the book is still employed. He quotes a remarkable parallel, the plaint for the destroyed sanctuary of Ur, to show the existence of a genre "*Klage um das zerstörte Heiligtum*".

C. RABIN

*An Introduction to Jewish Law*. Edited by PETER ELMAN. Popular Jewish Library. Lincoln's-Prager (for the World Jewish Congress, British Section), London, 1958, pp. 104. 4s. 6d.

This outline of the subject reproduces a series of talks given to Jewish study groups at the Universities. The Editor is fully aware of its limitations, of which he warns the reader; but he might have directed them, as the next stage, to one of the fuller alternatives listed in his short select bibliography, or better still to M. Mielziner's most useful *Introduction to the Talmud*, which is not. After a 3-chapter summary of the sources of Jewish Law, several major topics (Marriage and Divorce; Property; Tort; Contract; Inheritance) are described by a team of contributors and finally Jewish court procedure is explained. Some chapters are less well documented than others; and there is a regrettable lack of care in the transliteration of the Hebrew and Aramaic terms, which are liable enough to perplex the elementary student, even if accurately rendered. The isolation of purely legal concepts from moral ones—all the more necessary in an interpretation, because of the blurred distinction between them in the subject matter of *Halakhah*—has not always been achieved (e.g. I. Jakobovits on Marriage and Divorce). A major *lacuna* is any consideration of pentateuchal law *per se*; and a frank discussion of the possible relationship of its various parts to each other and to extra-biblical legal material from the Semitic

world would have helped the student to see Jewish Law as an historical *continuum*. Other *desiderata* are some indication of contemporary Jewish legal development in Israel and the tracing of a single easy legal point, in outline and in translated form, through the various codes and the major commentaries and *responsa* dealing with it.

RAPHAEL LOEWE

JAKOB JOCZ, *A Theology of Election: Israel and the Church*, with a Preface by the Bishop of Bradford, London, S.P.C.K., 1958, pp. vi + 227, 25s.

Varying an old proverb, one might justly say that "one man's theology is another man's nonsense". Dr. Jocz, who describes himself as a Hebrew Christian, makes the same point when he admits that Jews and Christians have always been talking at cross purposes. Perhaps he has omitted to add that there are no indications that this state of affairs would ever change, and there is little doubt that his remarkably honest and searching study continues that tradition. Apparently it is not yet sufficiently realized that the confrontation by "the Synagogue" is an inescapable and immanent Christian problem, whereas the confrontation by the Church may or may not happen to be a human, philosophical, religious or historical problem to the Jew, but is certainly not immanent in his Judaism. Whatever a Christian has to say on the subject is therefore pure Christian theology; and so also, of course, is the *theologoumenon* that the person of Christ is the supreme challenge to "the Synagogue". As theology all this is, of course, perfectly legitimate and Dr. Jocz's book is a balanced and at times refreshingly sound contribution to one of the most hackneyed and tortuous subjects in Christian writing. Perhaps more account should have been taken of G. Schrenk's careful exegetical studies denying any special position to the Jewish people in the economy of *Heilsgeschichte post Christum natum*. Clearly indebted to Karl Barth for some of his basic positions (particularly in his interpretation of the continued witness of the Jewish people), the Author is acutely aware of the salutary challenge which the Jewish "no" (analysed, by the way, in a remarkable book by the Dutch pastor F. Kuiper, *Israel and the Goyim*, Amsterdam, 1949) presents to the Church. On the other hand the presentation of Jewish realities and problems, though well-informed and generally correct, is too theological to be meaningful to a non-Christian. A good example is the somewhat mysterious entity called "the Synagogue"—indispensable as a counterpart to the Church—which it may be doubted whether any Jew would ever recognize; it certainly has nothing to do with the *keneseth Yisra'el* of midrashic and later literature. One suspects that often it is merely a hypostasis of *post Christum natum* "Judaism", and more particularly the orthodox version of it stemming from Maimonides. Thus many of the author's statements (e.g. about the "distinct form of monotheism", p. 59; the character of redemption and salvation, p. 76 etc.) are understandable on the assumption only that e.g. *Kabbalah*, Hasidism and many other spiritual currents in Judaism form no part of the tradition of "the Synagogue". Some readers will be surprised to learn that "Pantheism is never far removed from Judaism" (p. 155). To say that the Synagogue would not be itself with Jesus Christ seems, to the



historian, to mean as much and as little as the statement that the Synagogue would not be itself with Muhammad.

The author bravely tries to read some positive theological meaning into post-Christian Jewish history, but curiously fails to mention the establishment of the state of Israel. Whether its theological significance is affirmed or repudiated, the fact itself would certainly seem to call for some comment, particularly as it concerns the phenomenon "Israel" which is supposed to be above all "historical" (the Author quotes Tillich and others to that effect). The assumption that Judaism is necessarily and above all concerned with "salvation" (p. 186) may perhaps be capable of proof, but it is certainly a *petitio principii*.

Dr. Jocz's book contains many striking and sound observations, but its main importance is as a document of 20th-century theology trying to take "Israel" (in its double sense) seriously. The fact that it is written by a "Hebrew Christian" gives it a special interest both from the theological and from the psychological point of view, for the author's contention that the "Hebrew Christian" presents a "challenge" is clearly meant to imply that he also claims the right to be considered as a Jew, though not of "the Synagogue". Though hardly contributing anything to the Christian-Jewish dialogue (probably an impossible undertaking, anyhow), Dr. Jocz's work should, in its own way, prove a salutary "challenge" to Jewish theologians, mainly by the stress it lays on election as the central category in the dialectic of history—but election interpreted as so exemplarily human and universal a movement of the divine towards man, that the traditional Jewish formulations of this *theologoumenon* appear to be wanting, in their national and all but biological or tribal exclusiveness.

Z. W.

DAVID BAKAN, *Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition*. Princeton, N.J., van Nostrand, 1958, pp. xix + 326, \$5.50.

The writing of thrillers, existentialist novels and humorous short stories has by now come to be recognized as a legitimate pastime for dons. Reading *Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition* one gains the impression that Mr. Bakan, Associate Professor of Psychology in the University of Missouri, is the most recent recruit to the company of academic humorists, making his *début* with a clever and sustained parody of the type of pseudo-psychological and pseudo-historical pseudo-scholarship that occasionally gets into print nowadays. The author develops his mock-argument in seven stages. (1) Freud's background was eastern European Jewry; (2) eastern Jewry was known for "mystical tradition" (meaning, of course, Hasidism); (3) mystical tradition conceals revolutionary, antinomian and all sorts of surprising iconoclastic features; (4) Prof. Leo Strauss has written a (highly debatable) book in which he discusses the literary tradition of writers dissimulating their thoughts in their writings; (5) consequently, any kind of esoteric "dissimulated" thought can be attributed to any writer, particularly when he can be suspected of being in contact with the mystical tradition; (6) Prof. G. Scholem once put forward

the interesting hypothesis that the Sabbatian *débâcle* provided the social *humus* for enlightenment and emancipation: Jewish circles that had lost their old faith and their roots in the old ghetto would be the first to be ready to welcome the new age; (7) This can be re-phrased to the effect that the esoteric mystical tradition of eastern Jewry (Sabbatianism, Frankism, etc.) has profound inner affinities with rationalism, liberalism and the like. Therefore—*presto*—Freud's psychoanalysis, with all its apparent destructiveness of traditional religion and values, is really an expression of Freud's conditioning by, and participation in, the Jewish mystical tradition. *Q.E.D.*

With at times really amusing gusto the author feigns complete unawareness of the glaringly obvious flaws in the argument, and actually succeeds in deftly evading the few points that seem to cry out for serious treatment. *E.g.*, Freud's thorough Jewishness has never been properly appraised. The subject certainly needs a better understanding of both the *ponderabilia* and *imponderabilia* of his Jewish character and background than Ernest Jones could bring to his biography. A serious study would have to make a detailed enquiry into the exact nature of Freud's Jewish childhood knowledge, and the kind of family background (whether hasidic or not, etc.) that conditioned his image of Jewishness and his later Jewish identification. That in some of its highest (*viz.* lowest) reaches mysticism can confront orthodox religion with the biggest surprises is, of course, a commonplace. To go on from there and to suggest that mystical tradition = the kind of mentality which enabled Freud to develop psychoanalysis, is one of the necessary *non sequiturs* without which no mock-argument would be possible. Scholem's hypothesis on the relation of Sabbatianism and *haskalah* may or may not be true, and leaves ample scope for argument among historians and sociologists. What Scholem of course never said was that Sabbatianism and mystical tradition were the same, nor did he ever suggest that there was an *intrinsic* relation between mystical heresy and modern trends of enlightenment.

Occasionally the author touches on really important issues, but in keeping with the mock-scientific character of his book he refuses to follow up his cues. Thus, it might be extremely worth while to take up certain points where Jones's biography leaves off and to analyse more thoroughly, and in strictly psychoanalytic terms, the meaning of Freud's theories on religion, Moses, Monotheism etc. in the context of his own personality development. But these and other points Prof. Bakan has possibly reserved for serious treatment in another book. Altogether the present reviewer has two complaints only to make. (1) A joke, to be really good, should not be too long: 326 pages seem to be slightly excessive for the purpose; (2) The publisher's blurb carries the joke too far and is almost misleading by seemingly suggesting that the book intends to be a serious contribution to scholarship. There is, moreover, an error in the statement on the dustcover which says that "written in a clear and direct style [the book is] *understandable* to those who have studied neither psychoanalysis nor Jewish history". For the italicized word we should, of course, read "acceptable only".

Z. W.

J. HEMPEL, *Glaube, Mythos und Geschichte im Alten Testament* (Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. 65), Berlin, Töpelmann, 1954, pp. 62.

Myth—its relation to history and its nature as a symbolic expression of some kind of truth, as well as problems of mythology and de-mythologizing—have been very much to the fore in the last decades, and have been but slightly ousted from the public interest in more recent years by the providential discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Prof. Hempel's clear and concise discussion of the O.T. aspect of the subject takes up the familiar distinction of *Historisierung des Mythos* und *Mythisierung der Geschichte*. The author (who, incidentally, also draws on the Dead Sea Scrolls) distinguishes between cosmogonic myths which usually also have some eschatological reference, myths of revelation or "theophany", and soteriological myths, and shows how motifs deriving from each have been de-mythologized in the O.T. (e.g. *Is.* xiv; *Ez.* xxviii: 11f.; Daniel in the lions' den; Joseph and Potiphar's wife; the Scroll of Esther etc.) Some readers will hold different views on certain details or biblical passages, but the general approach will be familiar from the writings of Prof. U. Cassuto. These, however, are not once quoted or even referred to, probably because official biblical scholarship still assumes that no account needs to be taken of work published in Hebrew. The author rightly stresses that the "historical" dimension of O.T. religion implied a criticism and elimination of myth, but that the mythological element is none the less still strongly alive in the most central part of biblical faith, even if it is a transformed and, as it were, de-mythologized myth.

Z. W.

ROBERT GRAVES and JOSHUA PODRO, *Jesus in Rome*, London, Cassell, 1957, pp. 89. 8s. 6d.

The erudite authors of *The Nazarene Gospel Restored* have added the present slim volume, modestly subtitled "A Historical Conjecture", as a kind of dessert for the benefit of those who have banqueted on their *magnum opus*. It is an old and trite observation that amazing erudition and clever handling of sources can go together with utter wrongheadedness; so here we go. Jesus survived the crucifixion (severe coma, wrongly diagnosed as death), and after lying for some time warmly wrapped up in the shroud provided by Joseph of Arimathea, revived. When the soldiers rolled back the stone at night in order to steal the spikenard ointment with which the shroud was smeared (and "which was worth several years' army pay and could easily be sold in the brothels of Caesarea") they found Jesus alive and let him go. He then appeared to his astonished disciples; but believing that God had rejected his sacrifice, sentenced himself to Cain's punishment: wandering on the face of the earth. At first he probably betook himself to Parthia and to Rome (here Suetonius with his well-known *Chrestus*-passage comes in handy); at any rate Paul saw him on the road to Damascus some eleven years later. What ultimately became of Jesus the authors, with a commendable reserve that comes as something of a shock after their previous manifestations of uninhibited imagination, leave an open



question—though they do not fail to adduce certain Moslem and pre-Moslem accounts of Jesus' appearance in India about C.E. 50.

The reviewer confesses that he finds it easier to believe in a good and sound out-and-out "myth" than in this kind of fanciful "history". For the sake of those who think differently, he concludes the above short synopsis of this amusing little book with the encouraging exhortation **על רגל אחת ואידך פירושא הוא, זיל קרי**.

Z. W.

A. I. POLACK and W. W. SIMPSON, *Jesus in the Background of History*. London, Cohen and West, 1957, pp. 160. 16s.

Mr. A. I. Polack and the Rev. W. W. Simpson, who have long been associated in their work on the Council of Christians and Jews, have decided to publish this joint effort whose purpose it is to assess "the permanent significance of Jesus' life and teaching apart from Christological claims". By virtue of this last qualification the book, or so it would seem, must lose all significance for a genuine Christian. What remains is another popular account of the fact that Jesus was a Jew and greatly indebted to his Jewish background. Possibly this truism still needs pointing out to some Christian circles, just as one still occasionally hears that some Christians believe the commandment to "Love thy neighbour as thyself" to be written in the N.T. and not in *Leviticus*. Apart from this possibly useful educational aspect, the main interest of the book seems to lie in the sample evidence it presents of how far a broad-minded, mid-twentieth century Jew is prepared to go in appreciating Jesus, how far he is willing to meet his Christian brother in venerating this (for the latter) supremely important figure, and at what point his Jewish loyalty makes him stop. These points are set out very clearly, since the text of the book was drafted by the Jewish partner, corrected by Mr. Simpson where necessary and, where no agreement was possible, supplemented by the latter with foot-notes stating the nature of the divergence of opinion. Whilst one appreciates its documentary value, the exposition of the "Background of History" given in the book calls for little comment. Views will always differ both on the exact interpretation of the "historical Jesus", and on the nature and significance of his impact on subsequent history; changes in these views make fascinating study for the history of ideas and for sociology. It is a pity that no statistical evidence is as yet available to show whether Mr. Polack's view is in any way representative, and if so of what group.

Z. W.



# INSTITUTE OF JEWISH STUDIES

ACADEMIC YEAR, 1958-59

The following Papers were read at the weekly Research Seminars:

Professor C. RABIN: The Character of Biblical Hebrew.

S. LOWY, M.A.: The Extent of Jewish Polygamy in Talmudic Times.

J. G. WEISS, M.A.: R. Menahem Mendel of Przemyślany on the Contemplative Life.

D. PATTERSON, M.A.: Religious Attitudes as reflected in the Novels of the Haskalah.

A. RUBINSTEIN, LL.M.: Observations on the Masoretic Category "*Sebirin*".

RABBI S. WOOLF: The Interdependence of *Ṣaddiq* and *Rasha'* in early Ḥasidic Literature.

S. LOWY, M.A.: Abraham Abulafia's Influence on Joseph Gikatila.

Dr. O. LEHMANN: From the Unknown Jewish Treasures of France.

Rev. J. ISRAELSTAM, B.A.: Conversations between Rabbis and Romans in the first two centuries C.E.

Dr. H. LIEBESCHÜTZ: The Crusading Movement and the Crisis of Medieval Jewish History in the West.

J. G. WEISS, M.A.: The Ḥasidic Concept of Study.

Dr. S. M. STERN: A Theory about the Origin of the Mishnaic Language.

Dr. J. BOWMAN: Samaritan Pilgrimage Rites.

RABBI Dr. L. JACOBS: Further Evidence of Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud.

Dr. E. I. J. ROSENTHAL: Anti-Christian Polemics in the Medieval Bible Commentaries.

A. RUBINSTEIN, LL.M.: Studies in the Masorah.

S. LOWY, M.A.: A Halakhic Problem reflecting the Relationship between Mishnah, Tosefta and the Talmudim.

Dr. S. STEIN: R. Meir ben Simeon of Narbonne and his *Milḥemeth Miṣwah*

A. RUBINSTEIN, LL.M.: The Leningrad Bible of 1008 C.E.

Dr. P. WERNBERG-MØLLER: Literary Aspects and Problems in the Thanksgiving Hymns from Qumran.

S. LOWY, M.A.: The Difference in the Social Conditions in Palestine and Babylonia as reflected in the Talmudim.

Dr. A. ALTMANN, M.A.: Ibn Bajja and Maimonides.

J. G. WEISS, M.A.: Some Sources of the *Sefer Yeṣirah*.



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## TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW

Contributors are requested to adhere to the following conventions:

(a) In articles on history, literature, etc., use only the vowel signs *a*, *e* (for *Šere*, *Segol*, and *Shewa*), *i*, *o*, *u*, without diacritic marks. Do not distinguish with *d* and *g* between *dagesh* and *rafe*, write *b* and *v*, *k* and *kh*, *p* and *f*, *t* and *th*. Indicate *dagesh forte* by doubling. Express final ך by *h*. Special letters: ך' (where pronounced), ן *w*, ן *z*, ן *h*, ן *t*, ן *š*, ן *s*, ן *q*, ן *sh*, ן *s*(=ׁ).

Names, etc. for which there is an established English spelling, should, of course, be written as usual, e.g. *Jacob*, *Jerusalem*, *Kabbala*.

(b) In philological articles only, where an exact transliteration is required, use the following system:

Vowels: *ā*, *ē*, *ā* (*Segol-yod*), *ī*, *ō*, *ū*; *a*, *α*, *i*, *o* (*Qamaṣ qatan*), *u*;

*a*, *α*, *o*, *e* (*Shewa*).

Consonants with *Rafe*: *b*, *g*, *d*, *k*, *p*, *t*.

Special letters (other than for system [a]): ן *š*, ן *s*.

If desired, write ן (*Alef*) initial and final.

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Please follow the system of the Royal Asiatic Society, but without underlining the digraphs *th*, *kh*, *dh*, *sh*.

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